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Abstract 
This project demonstrates how Historians of Psychology can contribute to the future of 
Psychology from within the Department of Psychology (rather than from departments of 
History, the History and Philosophy of Science, or Science and Technology Studies). To 
do this, I focus on the claim that Jean Piaget’s last works constitute a “new theory,” while 
also showing how this labelling was appropriate. This is discussed briefly in the 
introduction. The first chapter is also quite simple: it follows the turn toward “locality,” 
and uses autobiography to show why a psychologist might want to pursue advanced 
training in history. This approach is then reflected in the second chapter, where Piaget’s 
autobiography is used to situate what followed in his own studies. The third chapter 
reflects this at an again-higher level, comparing an American history of Piaget’s 
biography with a Genevan history (but augmented with new archival research). In 
addition to revealing new details about his life, this also highlights a difference in 
historiographical sensibilities at work in shaping the discipline. The fourth chapter then 
shows that this generalizes. It reviews the most famous case of an instance where a series 
of texts were “indigenized” during their importation into American Psychology (viz. 
Titchener’s importation of Wundt). To confirm that the same thing occurred with Piaget, 
I introduce a new technique inspired by the Digital Humanities. In short: I show in 
quantitative terms acceptable to Psychologists what Historians would be more inclined 
accept from a study of primary sources. Two examples of this more-traditional kind of 
history are then presented. In chapter five, I consider a change in Piaget’s appeals to a 
formalism associated with Kurt Gödel. In chapter six, I look at how this change informed 
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Piaget’s return to biology (and his subsequent updating of the Baldwin Effect). And the 
conclusion re-examines the original claim in light of everything else discussed. The 
ultimate result, though, is not only a new way to consider Piaget’s standard theory of 
stages. I also present a new way to understand his broader view of the development of 
knowledge. This also in turn informs a new way of doing history, presented in the 
Appendix. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Piaget’s new theory, and how to find it 
 
  “PIAGET’S NEW THEORY” IS fascinating (see esp. Beilin, 1992b). The label itself is 
certainly a part of its draw. It is suggestive of future possibilities; of advances on ideas 
regarding child development that had their greatest societal impact in the West during the 
widespread and dramatic education reforms that followed Sputnik (Bliss, 1995; Herman 
& Ripple, 2002; Hsueh, 2005; F. B. Murray, 1992; see also Marchand, 2012; Stendler, 
1965). But it’s also exciting because the works behind that label remain largely unknown 
to English audiences: there is indeed something there to be discovered, if only one could 
understand the texts (see esp. Smith, 2009a). 
That the appellation exists at all is actually kind of wonderful. It suggests that 
those who can read the French originals might be able to build directly on the legacy of 
one of the Twentieth Century’s most prominent theorists. This would then have 
implications for all of the areas that Piaget influenced at the height of his popularity in the 
1960s and ‘70s: education and developmental psychology, of course, but also philosophy 
and psychiatry too (see Almy, 1979; Beilin, 1992a; J. S. Hall, 2000; Lovell & Shayer, 
1978; F. B. Murray, 1979; Voyat, 1977). 
Still, that the New Theory continues to be “new” nearly forty years after the 
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author’s death, in 1980, has always struck me as peculiar. There seems to be something 
implied about contemporary Psychology by the fact of its constituent works’ 
unremarked-upon existence. And maybe also something about Psychology’s relationship 
to both its own history and History as a discipline. So that’s what this dissertation is 
about: Psychology’s connection to its past, but using Piaget as a source of concrete 
examples and evidence. Its contribution is therefore also to those two areas: how we “do 
History,” in Psychology, and how contemporary psychologists might understand Piaget 
better as an historical subject.  
In Chapter I, though, I do little more than introduce myself, the project, and how I 
got here. In short, it’s autobiography: motivation. But it’s also a necessary disclosure of 
potential conflicts of interest, and—perhaps surprisingly—it’s methodologically 
important. This is because “localities” are becoming increasingly significant to historians 
of science (see Chambers & Gillespie, 2000; Shapin, 1988-2007/2010). And, indeed, that 
interest is beginning to influence the history of psychology as well (e.g., Carson, 2007, 
2014; Green, in prep; Teo, 2013b). Thus, it plays a role here too: everything is situated, 
including the narrating historian (i.e., me).  
In Chapter II, I therefore introduce Piaget by referring in part to his 
autobiography. But the narrative there is presented with the recognition that the subject is 
already a very well-known person: much of what is discussed amounts to little more than 
a review of others’ scholarship, reflected through the prism of Piaget’s own self-
presentation in material that he wrote himself. I push on this a little bit, of course, but not 
hard. 
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This is intended to be a gentle start. It’s in Chapter III where I actually start to 
“do” History in a more serious way: I refer to more complex primary and archival 
sources, fill in some gaps in an existing published peer-reviewed study, and then compare 
that study to another that’s not accessible in English. Note, though: this comparison 
wasn’t done because my doctoral program has a language requirement. It doesn’t. 
Instead, I did it to set up what follows. In short: I tried, in a general way, to make a 
specific problem clear—why it could be that there’s a New Theory—so that we could 
begin to think about that problem in more general terms.  
The problem, briefly put, is this: our perspective is skewed by how we are situated 
in our own context. The view of contemporary psychologists is therefore not just 
incomplete, but bent in a particular direction. Indeed, following the turn to focus on 
“localities,” this can be put in slightly different terms: the meanings of foreign texts are 
reshaped to fit local interests (cf. Callon, 1986). In other words, texts are “indigenized” as 
they are moved (see Danziger, 2006; Pickren, 2009b). And the result is that the “foreign” 
remainder is omitted, dismissed, glossed over, mangled, or neglected. 
Chapter IV shows using some simple quantitative tools that this occurred during 
the importation of Piaget’s ideas into American Psychology. But first it reviews how such 
an argument could be accepted by contemporary Historians of Psychology. This is 
necessary because, in the History of Psychology, quantitative argumentation is itself 
often considered to be a “foreign” approach. (Historians don’t infer; they demonstrate, 
usually by citing original primary source texts.) 
Accepting this, the quantitative demonstration is used simply as a formalism 
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illustrating a more general argument. The actual structure of that argument is provided by 
a history: I review the process whereby early Historians of Psychology realized that a 
similar claim could be made regarding the importation of Wilhelm Wundt’s writings 
during what is now considered to be the generally-accepted birth of Modern Psychology 
as a discipline.  
The importation of Wundt’s work into American Psychology is a special case, 
with real rhetorical value, because the histories delving into it originate in the 
professionalization of the History of Psychology itself. Indeed, what I will call the 
“Wundt Argument”—that changes occurred in what Wundt meant, as his work and 
influence were carried by Titchener from Leipzig to Cornell (and from there to the rest of 
the United States)—is foundational in a way that will be hard to dismiss as “foreign.” 
This is very useful in setting up what follows after: the formalism then helps simply to 
show that the Argument itself can be generalized, and it is therefore presented in the 
simplest possible terms.  
The structure of this generalization is important. Otherwise, the rhetorical move 
might seem like a sort of sleight of hand. So I want to be clear from the outset.  
After laying out the Wundt Argument, I refer to a quantitative analysis by one of 
the early professional Historians of Psychology. This showed that certain of Wundt’s 
works were overlooked during the importation of his works at the founding of Modern 
Psychology. (As he put it, “the Völkerpsychologie fared poorly” [Brožek, 1980, p. 106].) 
Following this, I then show how newer methods can demonstrate the same thing—in 
more detail—of Piaget’s works. Piaget thereby provides a second instance of the 
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“indigenization process” that occurred with Wundt’s works. And this suggests a more 
fundamental process, underlying both importations, which I will call the “Indigenization 
Argument.” 
Briefly put: when meanings move between localities, changes are both inevitable 
and demonstrable. Wundt was changed, and so was Piaget. They were “Americanized” 
(see e.g., Rowland, 1968; cf. Rieber, 1980b, pp. 147-149). That then affords a second—
very different—instance of really “doing” a history of Piaget. Indeed, it shows explicitly 
why there is a New Theory. 
Let’s put this in the simplest possible terms: there is a “new theory” because there 
is a “standard theory” (see e.g., Beilin, 1989b, pp. 95-101; 1992a, pp. 192, 197-198, 202; 
1992b, p. 10). In other words, there is something that is generally understood of Piaget. 
This even has sufficient technical vocabulary attached to it—“accommodation,” 
“assimilation,” “conservation,” “constructivism,” “equilibration,” “stages,” etc.—that 
specialist dictionaries were produced by insiders to help readers parse those meanings 
(see e.g., Battro, 1966/1973; Legendre-Bergeron, 1980; also Montangero & Maurice-
Naville, 1994/1997). But changes in these technical definitions have remained largely 
unexamined; readers simply assume they understand, because the later meanings overlap 
with others already known from earlier works. 
In short, the “standard theory” is represented by the “Piaget” referred-to in 
textbooks. This is also the “Piaget” to whom Vidal (1994) referred in choosing to entitle 
his early biography Piaget before Piaget. To wit: there was a man (in Vidal’s case, a boy) 
before there was a legend. And yet it is this legend upon whom even the highest-quality 
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secondary sources and collections typically focus: “the famous developmental 
psychologist” (e.g., M. Chapman, 1988a; Gruber & Vonèche, 1977/1993). As a result, 
divergences from this known character—including even those that the man himself later 
undertook as “one of the chief ‘revisionists of Piaget’” (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 703n)—
appear “new” to those who can’t see them as having arisen from within their own local 
context. 
This contrast is wonderfully revealing, especially in terms of how it helps us to 
look at the later works that we don’t presently understand. But, from all of this, we also 
derive an explicit contribution by History to Psychology: as with Wundt, the “Piaget” we 
see is not the Piaget who was. There’s a lot more to know. 
The resulting efforts are not “postmodern,” however, as some commentators have 
suggested dismissively (e.g., Kose & Fireman, 2000). Such approaches simply reflect 
different aspects of what it means to do History as a specialist of the history of 
psychology: the proper application of the right tools and methods, in engaging with 
primary sources, to see what cannot be seen from the present vantage. 
Following the articulation of this contribution, and History’s role in making it, the 
goal in the last chapters is then to begin to deliver on the implied promissory note. Thus, 
Chapters V and VI chase specific opportunities afforded collectively by Chapters II, III, 
& IV. The intent, though, is not to present the New Theory itself. This has already been 
ably done, and the results have remained invisible (e.g., Beilin, 1992b; Davidson, 1988; 
also Acredolo, 1997; Bickhard, 1997). Thus, instead, my intent here is simply to make 
those “foreign invisibilities” easier to see (cf. Burman, Guida, & Nicolas, 2015).  
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After this, the Conclusion wraps everything up. But it does so with a twist: it 
engages critically with the means by which the New Theory was originally identified, by 
tracing the original sources that influenced the secondary literature that applied the “new” 
label. As a result, it seems to question what could be perceived as the foundation of this 
very project. Yet it ends by returning to where we begin in what follows in Chapter I: 
how it is that History has a contribution to make to Psychology, and the importance of 
localities in understanding meaning. The Appendix then, in turn, shows how the resulting 
approach could also make a contribution to History itself: I return to Piaget as a 
biographical subject, and use the dissertation’s larger epistemological contribution—the 
identification of levels in Piaget’s later works, replacing the stages of his earlier works—
to propose a new kind of history. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
Locating the study 
 
A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION IS finished three times: once when the proposal is 
approved and the candidate can see the eventual manuscript in their mind’s eye, a second 
time when the relevant conference papers have all been presented and the candidate’s 
colleagues can see the eventual manuscript in their minds’ eye, and finally when the 
candidate abandons the envisioned manuscript and hands in something simpler. This final 
step seems crucial. It is not a defeat, though; it is a milestone. Understanding the 
difference is the last lesson every doctoral candidate must learn: the dissertation is not the 
book. 
I wish I had figured this out sooner. But the speed of my progress through York’s 
doctoral program in Psychology is certainly not because no one told me. (The same 
words were spoken while I was finishing up my MA in Interdisciplinary Studies: “Save it 
for the book!”) Their meaning must simply have passed me by. And that, in fact, is partly 
what this dissertation is about: the difference between words and meanings—texts and 
contexts—but with specific reference to how Jean Piaget (1896-1980) has been 
understood as belonging to the history and future of psychology. 
Of course, I have benefitted tremendously from what I have heard of what I was 
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told. This project would not have been possible without the advice, guidance, and support 
of a huge number of people. (Many of them are named in the Acknowledgments.) At the 
same time, however, the project itself is also the culmination of a much longer personal 
journey that can be traced especially to three influential moments during my 
undergraduate training in psychological science at the University of Toronto (Hon.B.Sc 
2004).  
These three moments set up the story that follows by answering a simple 
question: “How did I get to the History of Psychology?” This then seems like a useful 
place to start, here, because my goal is ultimately to show how others with a similar 
background—those interested in scientific psychology, including even those whose 
interests incorporate the brain1—can, should, and will want to undertake a similar 
journey. It also reflects an important aspect of my larger argument: just as Histories must 
be put in context, so too must be the Historians who present them. 
To achieve this goal for the project as a whole, this chapter moves through three 
partially-overlapping institutional localities: the undergraduate program in Psychology at 
the University of Toronto (1999-2003),2 the master’s program in Interdisciplinary Studies 
                                                 
1 The neuroscientific version of the argument that follows is developed in (Burman, 2012b; 2014.) 
2 I actually started in Commerce and Finance (B.Com), but that didn’t last. Because I was also 
working in the tech industry at the time, I was curious to know why dot-com businesses with no revenue 
were worth so much. (Recall that, at that time, even small companies with no prospect of profitability could 
be worth billions on paper.) But the professors in the area dismissed my questions as meaningless: “Those 
investors are irrational, and thus irrelevant—a fool and his money are soon parted.”  
I didn’t find this answer very satisfying. And since that was my life, the question didn’t seem 
meaningless. So I asked them who studied those kinds of questions. The inevitable answer: “I don’t know; 
maybe psychologists?” That’s when I decided to pick up psychology as a minor, although I ultimately left 
finance entirely.  
The only professor from that time who had any continuing influence on me was Dr. Andrey 
Feuerverger. His first-year Statistics of Stock Markets seminar was a revelation: using the big UNIX cluster 
to model trading strategies against historical data, and then defending the outcomes as non-random, was a 
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at York University (2005-2008),3 and the doctoral program in the History and Theory of 
Psychology also at York University (2007-2014).4 They provide the context to make 
sense of my current position, which—to my surprise and delight—now finds me working 
at the Piaget Archives in the University of Geneva, Switzerland (2014-present).5 More 
importantly, though, they also lay out the process of my discovery of the value of History 
for Psychology. 
Of course, it goes without saying that Geneva is the ideal location from which to 
continue my research. (This is where his papers are!) But I will not talk here in detail 
about the Piaget Archives, or what I have found there. That’s for the future. My goal here 
is to consider the past, so we can see the future more clearly. Indeed, this is what I 
consider to be the primary role served by History in Psychology (which is distinct from a 
History of Psychology that exists outside of the Department of Psychology).6 Everything 
                                                 
fantastic introduction both to computer-assisted quantitative reasoning and the deeper philosophical 
requirements of hypothesis-testing. I hope one day to return to that original interest, but armed with new 
tools. (My first original research project was on exactly this topic, developing an argument—in response to 
his prompting over several years of mentorship—that we ought to model the market as if its participants 
could be located along a boundedly-random continuum of irrationality: “The development of the self as an 
economic actor” [unpublished].)  
3 The foundation for my graduate work was also strengthened immeasurably by my time as an 
associate producer at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (2004-2006). And it was necessary to stay, 
after I was accepted into the graduate program at York, because I received no funding in the first year of 
my MA. But because this was an experience unlikely to be shared by other developing psychologists, it 
distracts from the story that I wish to tell. It therefore won’t be discussed further.  
4 I withdrew in 2014, in good standing, to complete my dissertation without the burden of tuition 
fees. 
5 This move was first supported by the Swiss Embassy through the ThinkSwiss Research 
Scholarship. The Fondation Jean Piaget then provided a supplementary bursary, to help defray the cost of 
living in Geneva. My research is presently supported by a grant from the Fonds National Suisse, subside n° 
100011-146145. 
6 This split also seems to parallel the divide in History between internalism and externalism. 
Typically, externalist histories look outward to put things in the context of their social, political, and 
cultural times. Internalist histories, then, do the reverse: they typically focus on the subject matter to the 
exclusion of context. This, then, is a challenge for historians of psychology because psychologists—quite 
reasonably, it seems to me—would prefer that “their historians” speak about “their subject.” And the 
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here reflects that interest, and therefore only select aspects of my research output from 
recent years will be discussed.  
Articles intended as contributions to a History of Psychology that could exist 
outside of the Department of Psychology have been published elsewhere (e.g., Burman, 
2012b, 2012d, 2014). So have pieces intended to establish my credibility in the broader 
fields to which I would like to contribute as a Professor of Psychology (e.g., Burman, 
Guida, et al., 2015; Burman, Green, & Shanker, 2015; Green, Feinerer, & Burman, 2013, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b; Matthews, Burman, & Murtha, 2014; Nicolas, Andrieu, Croizet, 
Sanitioso, & Burman, 2013). Yet these all relate to this project only indirectly, so their 
results will not be examined here in detail. 
What this project is, ultimately, is a history of Piaget. But it is a particular kind of 
history. It is not about the man (biography), nor is it really about his ideas (intellectual 
history). It is also not about the social, political, or cultural contexts in which the man 
lived or his ideas were conceived (externalist history). Rather, I am interested in how we 
have understood Piaget. This departs from the disciplinary norm, but it does so in ways 
that I intend to be both useful and revealing. 
Such an approach could be structured as a “public understanding of science” (e.g., 
Grant, 1998; Rutherford, 2009). Yet again, though, I take a different path; one closer to 
“knowledge translation” (see Kitto, Sargeant, Reeves, & Silver, 2012). But it is also not 
an examination of translation in a strict linguistic sense (e.g., Jurczak, 1997; Smith, 1981, 
                                                 
present fashion among historians is for the reverse. There are many ways to address this conflict. The 
approach taken here is one of them. Others are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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2009a). My interest is not in errors, but in differences. The project is therefore about us, 
in a sense, and—especially—our relation to older scientific ideas that may still have 
important continuing implications for new research, practice, and policy (cf. Carson, 
2007, 2014). 
In pursuing difference, my discussions will typically adopt two perspectives: what 
we know (as well as how and why), and what we can’t clearly see (as well as how we see 
and why). These two perspectives are then brought together here through a larger 
consideration of what it is that Historians of Psychology are doing in Psychology. In 
other words: the project is an examination of the doing of the History of Psychology, for 
Psychology, but using histories of Piaget to make the surrounding discussions more 
concrete.  
It has been a long journey. Learning the history of psychology takes time, because 
there is a lot of material to cover. But learning the History of Psychology7 is more 
complex still, because—in addition to the content—it has its own additional disciplinary 
norms and values. Surprisingly, however, this place where I now find myself is very 
similar to where I first started: I have found to my delight that history can be as rigorous 
as the best of scientific psychology. It’s just different. As a result, it seems clear that there 
are real contributions to knowledge to be made by History to Psychology. We need only 
to see them. 
                                                 
7 This capitalization—“history of psychology” and “History of Psychology”—is intentional. The 
intent is to follow Graham Richards’ (2002) distinction between little-p psychology and big-P Psychology: 
the subject (content) and the discipline (form). 
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1. Historical developmental psychology 
So, then: how did I get to History? It started in an unusual place: in my 
introductory course to Developmental Psychology at the University of Toronto, in the 
Winter semester of 2002. The professor suggested as one of our essay options that we 
compare and contrast a contemporary study with an historical one.8  
This is not, strictly speaking, History. In most cases, the results will be influenced 
too much by the contemporary view (“presentism”). So let’s instead be clear about the 
impact that this had: had it not been for the resulting experience, I would likely never 
have sought out any higher-level historical courses. Also, I did not choose immediately to 
write about Piaget. (This is not a love story.) 
Piaget’s name was no more meaningful to me then than any of the other names 
mentioned in Marty Wall’s big Intro course at Convocation Hall. His was just one among 
many, and I wasn’t so clear about those either. (When I first chose the major, I remember 
vividly that an upperclassman teased me when I mispronounced Rorschach as sounding 
more like “Dvorak,” whose name is known either as a classical composer or the inventor 
of a high-performance computer keyboard, according to the audience.) Piaget’s name was 
also associated with some spooky language that seemed not to make sense in light of 
anything else I had learned to that point (e.g., assimilation, accommodation, etc.). Thus, 
instead, for no reason in particular that I recall—except perhaps because I wanted to 
                                                 
8 This puts it at the middle of my third year of undergraduate studies, not long after I had decided 
to leave Finance for Psychology. My justification for the change was that, if I was going to understand the 
crash of the dot-com stock market bubble (in which I had participated and about which I felt quite 
strongly), then I would need to understand something about human behavior and decision-making. This 
was reinforced later that year by the awarding of a Nobel Prize in Economics to Daniel Kahneman, a 
former UBC psychologist who had moved to Princeton in the mid-1980s.  
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begin at the beginning, and had read about him in Richard Dawkins’ and Daniel 
Dennett’s popular writings about evolution—I chose to focus on Charles Darwin’s (1877) 
biography of his infant son, William Erasmus Darwin (1839-1914), as mediated through 
his notebooks of observations and several intervening decades.  
Given what I knew then about the elder Darwin (viz. that he had “discovered” 
evolution), it was surprising to me that he had written something that was both 
psychological and developmental. William (“Doddy”) was also conceived at around the 
same time as his father’s ideas about Natural Selection, and so the son seemed to me to 
be the lesser of the two contributions. Still, though, Charles was both a famous naturalist 
and a new father. His observations of his son’s development would therefore be 
interesting regardless of the issue’s ultimate historical importance.9 And it would meet 
the requirements of the paper. Thus, it was decided: Darwin. 
The library’s then-new website showed that the university owned only one copy 
of the biography. This was held in the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, which is 
located at the base of the neck of the famously turkey-shaped Robarts Library. So that’s 
where I went.10  
After the porter relieved me of my knapsack, a librarian sat me down in the 
reading room. It was dimly lit, with booked-lined walls that reached far overhead; more a 
                                                 
9 I became more positive about children once my nephew was born. 
10 Of course, I now know that this is an article and not—as the library website still says today—a 
book. I also now know that the piece had been reprinted several times (e.g., Darwin, 1877/1971, 
1877/2010). At that time, however, I knew nothing. More important, however, is that the larger lesson also 
didn’t come from the words themselves; rather, it came from the interactions inspired by the material object 
that provided form to the content. Put differently: the more important meaning, for me, was not found in the 
text. It arose from the context.  
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cavern—or a small cathedral, for the worship of knowledge—than my mental image of a 
library. (There were no flickering fluorescents overhead, nor any chewing gum long ago 
ground black underfoot.) The books themselves were unexpected too: ancient tomes of 
various sizes, some of which were so large that they needed to sit flat on special 
oversized shelves the size of dinner tables. Then the librarian brought me the biography, 
although I should probably say, “The Darwin.”  
I expected a photocopy, not an historical artifact. I wasn’t there to “do History.” I 
was just there to pick up an old pre-scientific document so I could critique it; to tear it up 
(figuratively). I’m certain that I even asked her to make me a copy, rather than risking 
damage from my handling the original.  
“No,” she said, to her credit. “You have to do this properly.” 
The pages were almost too delicate to touch: they were brittle to the point of 
being crispy. They were also translucent in places, presumably where others had touched 
them with oily fingers. But I was committed to leaving The Darwin in as good shape as I 
had received it. So, as the librarian watched from a nearby alcove, I decided that I should 
use a piece of acid-free paper—if such a thing existed—to turn each page as gently as 
possible without leaving a mark.  
When I asked at the desk, she had some prepared for me. It seems to me now that 
she had probably been waiting with it, ready to swoop in if required, but wanted first to 
see what I would do before intervening. I returned to my carrel with the papers; a pilgrim 
with a passport. 
While I sat there, in my first encounter with History (and wondering what to do 
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next), I noticed a distinctive smell. It was quite pleasant, and tasted in the air almost like 
vanilla. This was completely unlike the off-putting chemical smell of the glue in the new 
journals made available for review in Robarts’ and Gerstein’s Current Periodicals rooms. 
Electronic journals had also been introduced, of course, but the coverage was spotty and 
the websites poorly-constructed. As a result, it often seemed simpler in those early days 
to go browse in person. Besides, nobody had wifi yet, and very few of the university’s 
rooms had Ethernet sockets to plug-into. I also usually didn’t know what I was looking-
for, so thumbing through the volumes was often the way to go: scholarship by accidental 
discovery. But not with The Darwin. 
When I finally figured out how to turn the pages without bending or even 
touching them, and started reading, I was surprised by what was written. Darwin’s report 
wasn’t at all like the other texts that I had read for that class, or any other. But there were 
similarities.  
He engaged with an earlier published study. He spoke of behaviors that he had 
observed at different ages. And he concluded from his observations that the earliest of 
these behaviors must have been the result of inherited reflexes. He was also very careful 
in attributing to his son the adult labels for emotions and cognitions, when it was not at 
all clear that those were what his son was experiencing.  
This was not a foreign thing, as I expected from the way in which I had come by 
it. It just seemed overly informal. It was a baby-biography, rather than a scientific study 
of child development. But it also seemed more cautious, in some respects, than many 
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more-modern texts that I had read.11 For this reason, and also because it was not possible 
to dismiss Darwin as “ignorant” for failing to follow contemporary practices (Dawkins 
and Dennett had presented him as biology’s Greatest Genius), I was forced to consider a 
different perspective: according to whose standards should this text be judged?  
This was almost certainly not what my professor intended. And, in fact, I do not 
remember what I wrote in my essay. (Nor do I remember the grade it received.)12 These 
don’t matter, though, for I had been gifted a much more important lesson: a practical 
introduction to historical investigation, guided by a trusting and forgiving librarian and 
inspired by a proper scientist of developmental psychology. I was thus launched, but not 
in the usual way. 
History was not for me a way to escape scientific psychology. History was rather 
a means of engaging with the discipline’s lost and forgotten territories; a way to look for 
treasures that might have been overlooked by the discipline’s map-makers (see e.g., 
Keegan & Gruber, 1985; Lorch & Hellal, 2010). History was a way forward, even as it 
looked back. 
2. Seeking the meaning of ‘meaning’ 
 The second influential moment came the following year, in the Winter of 2003, in 
                                                 
11 I later learned the name for failing to heed this caution, but it’s worth saying it directly now: 
Darwin was careful not to commit what William James (1890/1981) soon afterward called “the 
psychologist’s fallacy” (i.e., the replacement of a subject’s reported experiences with one’s own). Note, 
though, this could easily be equated with a general version of historians’ admonition against “presentism” 
(i.e., the replacement of an historical context with a contemporary one). Because this is then shared by both 
disciplines, it seems uncontroversial to suggest that the lesson is therefore important. Regrettably, however, 
it is also one that many psychologists—including even developmental psychologists—now seem to miss: 
children are not adults in miniature. 
12 My transcript shows a B for the course, which is pretty good. But it’s not awe-inspiring. 
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a graduate seminar that a favorite professor—Jordan Peterson—invited me to audit. He 
called it, simply, “Maps of meaning” (following the title of his then-recently published 
book [Peterson, 1999]).  
The topic was systems of organized belief in human thinking, from a partly 
neuroscientific perspective, but examined anthropologically through myth and world 
literature. It was also without most of the infrastructure usually carried over into such 
discussions from the philosophy of science. But we did read Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1993) 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. And Kuhn had written about how he had struggled to 
understand Aristotle. That caught my attention: this guy had had a similar experience as 
mine, a year before, when I had been trying to understand Darwin! 
Kuhn’s reasoning was straightforward: this ancient philosopher, Aristotle—who 
had been so influential that he was referred-to for centuries as, simply, “The Philosopher” 
(Ackrill, 1981)—had been wrong about so much that modern physics had shown to be 
the case. But it was not possible to dismiss him as ignorant, because his stature was 
greater even than Darwin’s. Aristotle’s wrong-ideas were therefore things to take 
seriously; the ignorance was ours (of his reasoning), not his (of scientific discoveries 
made long after his death).13 
Kuhn decided that he needed to figure out how and why what Aristotle had said 
made sense at the time as a thing to think; how Aristotle’s knowledge claims were 
justified, given what was believed at the time. And this basic insight seemed more 
                                                 
13 I learned later that holding historical people to present-day standards combines two 
historiographical sins: “presentism” and “anachronism.” But I didn’t know that at the time. And no one told 
me. So it was an important (personal) rediscovery. 
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important, to me, than the specific details of his resulting theory regarding the 
organizational role played by “paradigms” in the advancement of science and their 
“revolutionary” replacement after the accumulation of “anomalies.” Indeed, Kuhn’s 
organization-of-perception story could be interpreted in many different ways (e.g., Fuller, 
2000). And that, I think, was ultimately my professor’s point in sharing the material: 
Kuhn’s writings are useful, to psychologists, as things-to-think-with (see e.g., Peterson & 
Djikic, 2003; Peterson & Flanders, 2002; also Peterson, 2013).  
In retrospect, this also applies to the course itself: it is not its content that now 
seems to have been most important to my formation. Rather, it was the course itself that 
was valuable; a sustained interaction, but exemplified by a single moment. 
I remember specifically that, at one point, my professor stopped mid-sentence 
during an extemporaneous lecture. He interrupted himself to say that Kuhn’s paradigms-
and-revolutions were inspired in part by Piaget’s studies of the stages in children’s 
cognitive development. This, then, was an opportunity: one could make a better thing-to-
think-with if the underlying influence could be clarified. But there was a problem, and a 
reason why no one had done the work. 
“It’s too bad,” he said, “that no one here speaks French and could explain to us 
what else Piaget said that could still be useful.”  
He then remembered the idle banter from one of our lab’s breakfast meetings 
(which were also a real highlight of my undergraduate experience). He turned to me, with 
an expectant look. 
“You speak French, don’t you?” 
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That then became my mission: to find, understand, and explain the seemingly 
impossible connection between Piaget’s view of children and Kuhn’s view of science. 
But my focus at the time was primarily on Kuhn, rather than on Piaget. Kuhn was the one 
who had influenced my professor’s perspective, and thus had also shaped the experiments 
that we were doing in his lab. And Kuhn was the one who had had a similar experience to 
mine at the Fisher Library. In addition, I found his attitude—the serious treatment of 
things that don’t make sense—very appealing. It was therefore Kuhn who guided my 
work. 
I followed our course-readings from Structure with my own study of The 
Essential Tension (Kuhn, 1977) and the then-still-new The Road Since Structure (edited 
by Conant & Haugeland, 2000). I also chased an unpublished book hinted-at in 
interviews and other essays, which Kuhn had tentatively titled The Plurality of Worlds: 
An Evolutionary Theory of Scientific Discovery. Failing to get a copy (it had been 
removed from the archive that held it), I then also read quite a lot more at the intersection 
between evolutionary biology and developmental psychology, since both Kuhn and 
Piaget had seemed to me to lean in those directions.  
These readings led to my first scholarly publication: a book review, arranged by 
my professor, in which I appealed to those same biological ideas in order to simplify a 
new advance in psychological theory which suggested that perception and cognition 
ought to be conceived as being more deeply situated in acting, feeling bodies: 
“enactivism” (Burman, 2006). But, again, I learned more than content as a result of the 
effort. 
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The commitment required of writing for publication surprised me. Even a finished 
course paper is little more than a draft of what an editor will accept for peer review. And 
I had no idea that there could be more than one round of review. Or that this further 
scrutiny, after a revision, could still produce a rejection letter.  
This has now happened to me a handful of times, of course, and I consider 
“responding to rejection” to be an important part of the work of this avocation. Indeed, 
the material that appears here as Chapter V was reviewed, revised, resubmitted, re-
reviewed, and then rejected by six different journals before being accepted for 
publication in the seventh. 
For the book review, though, all of this editorial heavy-lifting was done internally. 
And the experience prepared me for what would come later: my professor made it clear 
that a first piece is only a “first” piece if it is followed by a second, and a third. A fourth 
is then reflective of a pattern—hinting at the possibility of a proper program of 
research—and, in any case, after doing all of that the writing itself is no longer so 
daunting. He said much the same thing about drafts too: a “shitty first draft” is just a 
place to start, after which everything is made easier. (He was referring, I think, to Lamott, 
1994.)  
Still, it took me a long time to figure out what my shitty first draft was supposed 
to be about. After reading all of the Kuhn that I could find, I turned to Piaget. 
Unfortunately, though, he had written a lot more—in French—by at least an order of 
magnitude. (His collaborators pushed the number of potentially relevant primary sources 
above two orders of magnitude beyond Kuhn’s own daunting output, most of which I still 
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haven’t finished reading.) Worse, so much of it also seemed unrelated to my interests. 
The secondary sources didn’t help much either, because what my professor wanted me to 
do hadn’t been done. There were only hints of something unseen, not the clear roadmap 
that students come to expect from textbooks. 
I just couldn’t find a way forward, aside from more reading. It was a grind, with 
no real end in sight. But then things were helped along immensely by the publication of 
an article to which I could respond directly. The sub-title makes its relevance obvious: 
“Piaget vs. Kuhn on scientific progress” (Tsou, 2006). In short: I got lucky. 
This article took my seemingly-infinite problem and reduced it to a handful of 
specific individual points—on fewer than two-dozen pages—that I could engage one-by-
one. I was then also able to reorganize my readings, and focus on what had been missed 
in this new piece that struck me as most important.  
This gave me an easy shitty first draft. And that became my second scholarly 
publication (Burman, 2007b). As I worked on it, though, the larger project itself also 
began to change: questions regarding “maps of meaning” and “architectures of belief” 
became questions regarding how educational systems had used Piagetian ideas to 
encourage children to hold justified beliefs (Burman, 2008a). And then this new question 
was formalized and generalized, but using Kuhnian terminology, so that the underlying 
issues could be engaged more rigorously: how might a fractured epistemic landscape of 
partially-conflicting beliefs be encouraged to unify? (Burman, 2009a; following 
discussions with a senior doctoral student in the York HT doctoral program [Goertzen, 
2007; 2008]).  
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In other words, I had undertaken a philosophical project using historical sources 
having special relevance to psychology and education. Yet, aside from my exploration at 
the Fisher Library, this was at first totally uninformed by any proper or sustained training 
in historical method. And that was a gap that needed to be addressed: reading a lot and 
speaking French are both necessary to develop a deeper understanding of Piaget, but 
neither is sufficient.  
There was also a further problem: I had hated my first properly “historical” 
course, and it nearly ruined me for History forever after. I was saved only by my early 
inoculating experience with Darwin, as reinforced afterward by Kuhn. I therefore clung 
to Kuhn as someone who seemed to know what History was good for. Of course, this 
then itself became something of a frustration to my doctoral advisor, when we met later, 
because my lasting apparent-allegiance reflected a psychologically-orthodox—but not an 
especially historicist or contextual—reading of Kuhn’s works (see e.g., Green, 2004b; 
also Green, 2015b, pp. 2-3).14 But this can now be put in terms that are consistent with 
the larger argument of this dissertation: I had not yet learned how to use historical 
sources to leave my present-context. I was still deeply situated in the background 
provided by my experience and training, and was struggling to find ways of seeing 
beyond it. 
                                                 
14 A further observation regarding the importance of locality and personal interaction: the author to 
whom Green responded, Erin Driver-Linn, had previously studied under Jordan Peterson—the very same 
favourite professor who had inspired my own project. He had moved from Harvard, where she had had him 
as an advisor in 1995, to U of T in 1999. Thus, his sphere of influence moved with him. And, indeed, so did 
that of my first mentor in history; I met him at U of T soon afterward, and then we moved north to York. It 
is there that I then met Green, and wooed him—“vigorously,” he says—to serve as my doctoral advisor. I 
also met Fancher, recently retired from the York doctoral program, who had written the dozen-pages about 
Piaget that helped me to see my project in the first place. 
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3. Finding history 
 I took my first course on the history of psychology at the same time as my 
introduction to Developmental Psychology: in the Winter of 2002. But the course was 
nothing like my encounter at the Fisher Library. In retrospect, though, it provided an 
excellent example of what not to do when teaching the course: the “history of 
psychology” is not identical with the doing of “History of Psychology” (see Note 7). 
In his lectures, the professor—a scientist who shall remain nameless—presented 
reviews of infamous mistakes by famous dead people who were all ignorant in different 
ridiculous ways. This comedy of errors was then reflected on the tests, for which we were 
required only to memorize a seemingly unending series of names, ideas, and dates. The 
tests themselves then consisted of drawing lines between the trivia across different lists 
presented in columns. This seemed to me like it would have been very unpleasant to 
grade, since there was no meaning to engage-with, but I’m pretty sure that I once saw a 
TA with a stack of acetate sheets: if the lines on those maps overlapped with what had 
been written on the page, then the “history” represented was deemed “correct” by 
geometric comparison.  
It was, in short, a nightmare. I doubt I did very well, and am disinclined to check. 
That said, however, the course wasn’t a complete waste of time: I was exposed to 
several interesting historical writings, including by some proper Historians of 
Psychology. Among them was a deeper and more rigorous discussion of Piaget than what 
had been presented in my other textbooks (Fancher, 1996, pp. 425-436). And this was 
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eventually quite helpful. But, again, it was not sufficient.15 Much more important was 
what happened after I completed the requirements for my degree: an opportunity to 
participate in another graduate course, but in History. That was utterly transformative. 
 The University of Toronto has a fantastic post-graduate system for recent 
academically-inclined alumni who have not yet been accepted to graduate school. New 
degree-recipients can register for a year of additional courses as a non-degree “special 
student” without needing to have all of the required prerequisites, so long as the professor 
gives permission. This meant that, with my degree in hand, I could fill-in some of the 
larger gaps in my education without first having to decide on a specific trajectory. (I still 
thought at the time that, because of my work experience, I might do an MBA and maybe 
become some sort of investment banker [see Note 2].)  
The opportunity couldn’t be passed-up. So I took a neuroscience “wet lab,” held 
in adjoining autopsy rooms at the U of T Medical School. My goal there was to 
understand better what it was that we were talking about when we attributed 
“architectures of belief” to the brain. And this quickly disabused me of the notion that 
brains are like machines in any way except metaphorically. (I had some experience 
repairing and upgrading desktop computers, and this course helped me to realize—in a 
very hands-on way—that there is nothing in a human brain that is remotely like the 
                                                 
15 Returning to those dozen pages later—and rereading my own marginalia (including the 
comment, “This is crap!” [on p. 435])—led me to reconsider Piaget, and my project, from a slightly 
different perspective: both Kuhn and Piaget were interested in the development of justified knowledge-
claims, as well as how these knowledge-claims develop and evolve, but they used different methods in 
undertaking their enquiries. Piaget’s investigations into how children’s thinking changes could therefore be 
understood as seeking similar insights as Kuhn’s historical examinations of how science changes. And that, 
in fact, was exactly the subject of one of Piaget’s later books: Psychogenesis and the history of science 
(Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989). 
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insides of a computer: anatomical areas blur together, things aren’t always in the right 
place and can sometimes even be missing, and the convenient color-coding of machines 
and textbooks is of course completely absent in the wetware.)16 Indeed, from that point 
on, I wondered if an “organismic” approach to studying humans might be more 
promising than a “mechanistic” one: this was clearly a metaphor, and adopting an 
alternative perspective might be more productive. Of course, it’s also possible that I was 
pushed in that direction by my increasingly-deep readings of Piaget in French. (Note that 
Piaget's organicism is not typically reflected in the English translations [see esp. Jurczak, 
1997]). 
To pursue that nascent thought, I also took a course in biological anthropology. 
This highlighted the similarities and differences between humans and the other great 
apes, but without any of the potentially problematic meta-theoretical baggage of a course 
in evolutionary psychology (which U of T did not offer at the time). And I approached a 
very senior visiting professor—a former Canada Research Chair from another school, 
filling in for a sick friend—about participating in his upcoming graduate seminar in the 
History of Biology. After a lengthy phone call, in which I explained my concerns about 
the dubious value of memorizing names and ideas and dates (while also describing my 
own independent studies of Kuhn and Piaget), he gave me his blessing. Jan Sapp thus 
became my first proper mentor in History.  
Jan treats the History of Biology as an interdisciplinary endeavor (requiring 
                                                 
16 I later took advantage of this background to present my own version of Kuhn’s paradigms, 
thereby linking his writings with the “new neurohistory” and parallel developments in “neurophilosophy” 
(Burman, 2012b, 2014).  
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mastery of both History and Biology), and so was happy to help me to use his course to 
organize and contextualize a study of Piaget’s biology (see e.g., Messerly, 1996; 2009; 
also Ottavi, 2001/2009). He also supported my use of French primary and secondary 
sources, because he speaks the language fluently and had even done his doctorate under 
Canguilhem’s former student, Camille Limoges, at the Université de Montréal. More 
important, however, is that Jan doesn’t care a whit about trivia.  
But that’s not what was most important. There’s a crucial further detail. 
Because Jan was just visiting, he didn’t know the campus. He therefore needed 
someone to help him after class to find his car in the dark, a task often made more 
difficult by the inevitable snow. But because it never took me long to figure out where he 
had parked from his description of the nearby buildings (I had lived on campus for two 
years), the walk then meant that I could get extra lessons for as long as our after-class 
conversations interested him. 
 These lessons ranged widely. And I took every advantage. What sources he 
mentioned, I’d grab from the library on my way home and read right away. Then I would 
be prepared, in the following week’s lesson, to pick up where we left off. Our class—
properly, a seminar—was run in a similar way.  
Jan enforced few rules, and he guided the flow of the discussion to where it 
seemed to want to go. But one rule was sacrosanct: “Do the fucking work!” (I can quote 
this verbatim, because it is underlined several times in my notebook from the time.)  
What Jan meant by this was both specific and clear: read the texts, pay attention 
to those instances where something seems strange, and then try to figure out what that bit 
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means. In other words, he wanted us to try to understand the assigned readings both for 
what they said and for the reasons why they said them. (He said that he had no patience 
for the philosophers’ habit of making things up, just to see if the results were interesting.) 
In short, his course was exactly what I had been looking-for.  
Unlike many seminars at that level, where the pattern of reading is a book or more 
a week (often examined only superficially and with the help of published reviews), Jan’s 
approach was to have us read only a few chapters at a time. But he himself knew these 
chapters intimately, because they were from a book that he had only just published (Sapp, 
2003). And he wanted us to read them very deeply. He also routinely pushed us to pursue 
the ideas he described by turning to the primary sources that he had cited. He even 
assigned the facsimile first edition of Darwin’s (1859/1964) Origin of Species for that 
specific purpose.  
So our readings became explorations. Everyone brought a different interpretation 
of the difficult bits of the assigned material, supported by different supplementary 
(primary) texts, and we debated the issues arising.  
History was alive in that seminar. It was a riot! 
The best part was that Jan got the occasional date wrong. These lapses were a 
delight to discover—and especially to catch in the moment—because he would grump 
about the error theatrically before laughing, scratching his head or waving his glasses, 
and then redirecting us to a more important question: Ah, but why does it matter that this 
was published on that date and not another? (In retrospect, I’m fairly certain that he 
sometimes gave the wrong dates on purpose as a kind of test; to see if we were working, 
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because remembering dates always seemed to be easier when they meant something.) 
 More than being serious fun, however, History is—for Jan—a way of doing 
science. His histories explain and situate and contextualize, but they also advance the 
fields that he examines and discusses and interrogates. They are relevant. And they are 
exciting: not just a protection against the doom of repetition, but also a way to see the 
possible paths that science might take in the future (see e.g., Sapp, 2005, 2007). 
This, as it turns out, is not how everyone does history. But it’s how I first learned 
it, and how I apprenticed as an Historian when I followed Jan back to York University. 
He then supervised my master’s degree in Interdisciplinary Studies, with Fred Weizmann 
(an historian of psychology) and Matthew Clark (a translator of Ancient Greek, although 
not of Aristotle). I was then able to continue my explorations, and worked hard to fill in 
the gaps in my understanding. It was wonderful. 
After completing the graduate program (MA 2009), I returned full-time to 
psychology equipped with some new and unexpected skills. But I also chose specifically 
not to return to U of T to continue my former professor’s project. I was no longer focused 
on augmenting his observations regarding Kuhn’s relevance for psychological theory. 
This, though, was for good reason: the theoretical project he had set had become for me 
historical. And York is—objectively17—the best place in the world to be if what you’re 
interested in is the History of Psychology.  
                                                 
17 According to the APA’s PsycNET interface to the PsycINFO database, which reports the 
affiliations of authors whose works are indexed by the service, “York U” was the #1 institution publishing 
journal articles tagged with either the “History of Psychology” index term or the “2140 History & Systems” 
subject classification code in both 2013 and 2014. The same is true for psychology’s “grey literature” 
database, which includes newsletters, magazines, and conference talks: PsycEXTRA shows that YorkU 
was the #1 institution producing “History of Psychology” in 2009, 2010, and 2012. 
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4. Why “constructive” history? 
This, so far, is not a history in the way that would be recognizable to someone 
who had taken my first course at U of T on the history of psychology. It is certainly not 
the history of a Great Man, nor so far of even mediocre ideas. (By the start of my MA, I 
don’t think that I had really had a properly “academic” idea worth mentioning.) But 
there’s a good reason for doing it this way, especially as part of the introduction to a 
dissertation such as this: it is clear to me that the ideas that I chose to pursue in my 
doctorate were made possible by my earlier interactions, which in turn were made 
possible by the institutional contexts in which those interactions took place (cf. Shapin, 
1988-2007/2010).  
In other words: it seems to me that the ideas that resulted from these efforts can be 
understood only by their being properly situated. (Indeed, as a writer of my own history, 
this feels correct: in preparing these words, I have gained a great deal of perspective 
about why I did what I did, and the resulting insights then helped me to explain those 
ideas more clearly.) Yet it also follows that this should generalize: an approach to 
explaining the genesis of normal ideas, developed by a normal person, ought to be 
equally applicable—following the principle of symmetry (see Bloor, 1976/1991, 2014)—
even to Great Ideas developed by Great Men (cf. Latour & Woolgar, 1979).18 
Thus, briefly put: had it not been for these early interactions, the resulting text 
would have come together in a very different way. It would also likely have had a very 
                                                 
18 It’s worth mentioning here that “Great Man histories” are no longer acceptable as History. This 
is yet another challenge to be navigated by Historians who seek to serve Psychology. The need for 
“relevance” has been recognized, however, and ways forward are starting to be charted (see esp. Ball, 
2012). 
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different character.  
There is nothing “innate” about the ways or directions in which my thinking has 
developed. Indeed, this is a big part of the reason why I have called the conclusion to this 
journey a “constructive” history: people, and the ways in which their interactions are 
organized, matter in ways that extend beyond the restricted sense that Kuhn discussed 
(which doesn’t apply cleanly to psychology anyway [see Greenwood, 1999; also Gholson 
& Barker, 1985]). But the label itself will also seem to some to be a peculiar choice, so I 
will explain it.  
My first reason for the title is to reflect what I learned from Jan: if you are a 
master of History, and also of the Science about whose scientists you are writing, then 
you benefit from a perspective that is not accessible to either position alone. This also 
highlights patterns and differences and gaps and opportunities that would otherwise be 
invisible.19 As a result, the writing produced can be framed in such a way as to be 
meaningful to both audiences—historical and contemporary, Historian and Scientist—
even as the work itself is thoroughly embedded in and informed by a rigorous and 
historiographically-correct study of sources from the past.  
Put another way: “constructive history” is History in service of science, but not 
beholden to Science. It follows its own rules for its own reasons. This then helps readers 
to construct new understandings, both of the past and of their position relative to it. And 
                                                 
19 This approach is properly due to Gaston Bachelard, who is connected to Jan through 
Canguilhem (his academic grand-father). The similarity to Kuhn then comes through Bachelard’s influence 
on Alexandre Koyré (whom Kuhn cited). But the resulting approach isn’t correctly called “Kuhnian.” It 
reflects a much older tradition, which also influenced the epistemes of Foucault (who himself also studied 
under Canguilhem).  
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that is helpful in inspiring new perceptions that can lead to new investigations.  
The second reason for the title is to pay homage to Michael Chapman (1947-
1991), who followed a similar approach in his Constructive Evolution: Origins and 
Development of Piaget’s Thought (M. Chapman, 1988a). Indeed, his history was intended 
explicitly to advance science. But he was not an Historian: he never published an original 
historical study in a professional History journal.20 He also doesn’t fit perfectly into my 
people-and-places rhetorical structure, because he died too early to influence me 
personally.  
Chapman’s influence on me instead came through his book: an object of his 
creation that I encountered in his stead. (Rather than influencing me directly as an “actor” 
who—like Jan—could have corrected my misunderstandings, I experienced his influence 
via an “actant” that required my interpretation [see Latour, 1996, pp. 2, 7-8, 15-16; also 
Burman & Nicolas, revised & resubmitted, p. 12; cf. Burman, 2012d]). But he did study 
briefly at York. And it was at York where he discovered Piaget, through the influence of 
one of Piaget’s former students: Juan Pascual-Leone. (I have also myself had the pleasure 
of receiving his corrections over many years.)21 Chapman then decamped for the US for 
                                                 
20 The core journals in the History of Psychology are History of Psychology, The Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences, and History of the Human Sciences. Historians of science also typically 
publish their best work in Isis, so works about psychological topics of exceptional historical quality are 
sometimes found there. My own core work has so far been limited to HoP (7) and JHBS (2). That said, 
however, I have also published in theory journals (e.g., New Ideas in Psychology and Theory & 
Psychology) and developmental journals (e.g., Child Development and Intelligence). This is good news, 
given our goal: historians aren’t limited to publishing in History journals. 
21 Pascual-Leone left Geneva in the early-1960s, and so—because my focus has been primarily on 
the later works of Piaget—his interests and mine run parallel to each other. I have benefitted from his 
insights, of course, but I do not follow the neo-Piagetian school that he inaugurated with his own student 
recruited up from U of T: Robbie Case (1945-2000). And, in fact, I first met Juan at the defence of one of 
Jordan Peterson’s doctoral students. On the committee was also Phil Zelazo, who later became president of 
33 
 
his doctorate and subsequent postdoctoral studies, and later took up a position as a proper 
developmental scientist at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, in Berlin, 
where he completed his book.22  
This book was one of several secondary sources that I read after completing the 
requirements for my undergraduate degree. In fact, it is one of only two books about 
Piaget on my reading list from that time that I now remember well. This is perhaps 
because Chapman’s book has been especially influential in shaping my thinking, while 
also serving as something that I could respond to. (The other is an edited collection of 
primary source texts, which is so useful that I keep marked-up copies of it in both Canada 
and Switzerland [Gruber & Vonèche, 1977/1993].) 
Why was he so important? Chapman (1988a) was one of a small number of North 
American outsiders to be led to a study of this history by a sense that we had not 
understood something of value in our original importations; that there is an “unknown 
Piaget” (p. 2).23 And although his work was informed by Piaget’s self-presentations in his 
own autobiographies—which I later came to understand is not strictly-speaking correct as 
an historiographical practice (for reasons discussed by Vonèche, 2001; cf. Burman, 
Guida, et al., 2015)—its publication was an important move in the direction of 
                                                 
the Jean Piaget Society and an important mentor to me in thinking about how American Psychology 
functions as a discipline. 
22 Biographical details are from Chandler and Carpendale’s (1992) thoughtful obituary, published 
in Human Development. I have had the good fortune to spend some time with Chapman’s former 
colleagues from the University of British Columbia, especially Michael Chandler, and as a result have 
come to a much better appreciation of depth of the personal and disciplinary loss of his early death. It is an 
honour to follow in his footsteps. 
23 This was then the title I chose of the first symposium that I organized as a graduate student, for 
a meeting of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology held in 2007 at York’s Keele campus. 
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articulating and then addressing the gaps in our understanding.  
Much that was written afterward has benefitted enormously from Chapman’s 
efforts. It is also worth noting, however, that Chapman was himself responding to John 
Flavell’s (1963) massively influential outsider-history: The Developmental Psychology of 
Jean Piaget. And it’s this book that provides the implicit background for virtually every 
English-language examination of Piaget written in the last half-century. 
Flavell’s book is today held primarily responsible for what has variously been 
called the “resurgence,” “revival,” and “rediscovery” of Piaget by American audiences 
(Müller, Burman, & Hutchinson, 2013, p. 52). But as Piaget himself noted in the 
foreword: 
It seems clear that Professor Flavell is more interested in the experiments than in 
the theory, which sometimes gives me the impression—perhaps not of having 
been misunderstood, but, if you will—of having been understood on certain issues 
more from without than from within. (Piaget, 1963, p. viii) 
In other words, Piaget noted a difference introduced between the interpretation and the 
source. This kind of observation is exactly the sort of signpost I now look for. And, 
indeed, it afforded Chapman’s approach too: “to understand Piaget from within” (p. 1; 
his emphasis).  
Chapman sought to do something more than review the parts of Piaget’s project 
that seemed relevant to his audience of contemporary developmental scientists. He 
instead sought to do with Piaget what Kuhn had done with Aristotle, and which I had 
tried fumblingly to do with Darwin’s baby-biography (and then later also with the 
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relationship between Kuhn and Piaget [in Burman, 2007b]). 
To take on this daunting task, Chapman used Piaget’s autobiographies to organize 
his narrative as an external reconstruction of the internal monologue represented by 
Piaget’s hundreds of publications and collaborations (see the bibliography published by 
the Fondation Archives Jean Piaget, 1989). That then provided an entirely new and 
different view of his subject. It was not a story shaped by how Piaget’s ideas had been 
received, as Flavell’s was; Chapman showed instead that Piaget’s thinking had 
developed, and how.  
Chapman showed that Piaget had constructed his theory a piece at a time, through 
collaborations and wide-ranging interdisciplinary explorations. This included stops and 
starts; even false-starts. In other words, Chapman’s book showed change. And it showed 
growth. By successfully taking on Flavell (who had at the time just recently received the 
Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from the American Psychological 
Association), Chapman also showed that Histories can change too.  
 That is then a further reason for my choice of title: “constructive” implies changes 
in the Historical record in a way that’s quite different from the negative connotations 
associated with “revisionist” history (cf. Kose & Fireman, 2000). And because Chapman 
used the term to describe Piaget’s theory, its repetition here reflects an important aspect 
of what I will be discussing. But it also works as a description of Chapman’s own 
approach to the doing of a history about something not well-understood: such a history 
reflects what came before, but from the “inside,” and so it necessarily reveals areas not 
previously considered relevant. 
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The final reason for the choice of title is to reflect the influence of the Dean of 
contemporary History of Psychology: Kurt Danziger, who was one of the founding 
members of my doctoral program and about whom more will be said in the chapters that 
follow. It suffices simply to say, here, that the title reflects his own in Constructing the 
Subject (Danziger, 1990). And although Chapman couldn’t have cited this book, since his 
own preceded it, their goals were similar: among other things, Danziger wrote about “the 
unknown Wundt” (see also Danziger, 1980/2001).  
The cause of our not-knowing about important aspects of the founder of our 
discipline, explained Danziger, was the way in which Wundt was imported into American 
Psychology; that the understanding of Wundt was “constructed” as a result of social 
interactions and differences in context. I will make the same argument about Piaget, but 
in a way that I intend will generalize to all similar such importations (Chapter IV). Thus, 
here, Wundt and Piaget serve as examples of something more fundamental: the process 
whereby understandings are constructed, which is also what interested Piaget (discussed 
esp. in Chapter V & VI). This in turn also marks out the fundamental role for Historians 
as knowledge producers: to provide access to the contexts in which “the unknown” 
aspects of known-interest can become meaningful in new ways (see Appendix A). 
In short: my work here emulates and builds upon those whose own efforts and 
interests inspired me. That said, however, it has been such a long time since I read all of 
them that their inspiration may now be more notional than direct. Still, I am delighted to 
recognize their influence. To the extent that readers see them reflected here, I also hope 
that my own efforts withstand the comparison. But any errors are of course my own.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
Jean Piaget 
 
WHO WAS JEAN PIAGET? The simple answer is that he was a twentieth-century 
French-speaking Swiss professor (1896-1980) whose writings, collaborations, and 
students influenced a great deal of contemporary thinking about how children develop—
especially regarding their “cognitive development” (see e.g., Beilin, 1992a; Beins, 2012; 
Martí & Rodríguez, 2012; Morra, Gobbo, Marini, & Sheese, 2008). Indeed, Piaget has 
been accepted for decades as one of the very most influential contributors to psychology 
(e.g., Diener, Oishi, & Park, 2014; Haggbloom et al., 2002; Heyduk & Fenigstein, 1984; 
Korn, Davis, & Davis, 1991; Myers, 1970; Perlman, 1980). Moreover, this influence has 
been so great that his name, as well as the eponym “Piagetian,” have become virtually 
synonymous with the study of “developmental stages.”24 Delve deeper than this, 
however, and things start to get complicated (e.g., Beilin, 1992b; Kitchener, 1986; 
Lourenço, 2016; Smith, 1993; Tryphon & Vonèche, 2001).  
It turns out we have misunderstood a great many things about Piaget and his 
research program (see esp. Lourenço & Machado, 1996; also Jurczak, 1997; Smith, 1981, 
2009a). We have also been blind to a great many things (Bickhard, 1997; Bond & 
                                                 
24 This is discussed in innumerable works. However, it is most explicit in (Piaget, 1962b, 1971c). 
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Tryphon, 2007; Gallagher & Reid, 1981; Vuyk, 1981). But for those seeking to 
contribute to the areas that Piaget influenced, these continuing errors and invisibilities are 
actually where the best opportunities are to be found. The challenge, then, is to figure out 
how to see them. That, in a nutshell, is the task for this dissertation (for the New Theory). 
In this chapter, however, my purpose is simply to introduce Piaget. I begin by 
adding some depth to what everyone already knows of his origin story. Then I delve 
deeper to examine certain aspects of his early work that he later noted were crucial in 
setting up the work that was popularized as “stage theory” (esp. by Flavell, 1963; Hunt, 
1961; see Müller et al., 2013). And then I discuss how all of this makes sense, 
theoretically, in order to provide a solid foundation upon which to build.  
In the next chapter, I continue to build this biographical foundation by examining 
how Piaget’s earliest contributions were understood at the time. But I do this a little 
differently: by looking at how Piaget’s works were received by both Americans and the 
Swiss, and then comparing and contrasting those perceptions, we are able to highlight 
some similarities and differences in perception. Then, in Chapter IV, I extend this 
discussion of difference-through-comparison and provide a new method of identifying 
new opportunities for Historical work.  
My intent for the new method is to provide a tool that it will generalize beyond 
Piaget to highlight similar opportunities of other influential authors of roughly equivalent 
stature. (All that is required by my new method is for a substantial number of an author’s 
texts to have been translated, so differences between the portfolios can be identified.) 
This then allows for the simpler identification of what has been missed. But we must 
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begin at the beginning. That is where the first misunderstandings appear, and these then 
cause a series of blindnesses that block our access to the opportunities that await us. 
1. Piaget, Psychologist? 
The greatest misunderstanding, reflected in most texts, is that Piaget was “a 
psychologist” (e.g., Rotman, 1977). The hard truth, however, is that he never received a 
degree in the subject. In fact, psychology was covered only briefly in his high school 
curriculum, as part of the philosophy course taught by Arnold Reymond in 1913-1914 
(Schaller-Jeanneret, 1996/2008, pp. 43, 45).25  
Indeed, Piaget barely received a formal university education at all: he took only 
five semesters of courses at the University of Neuchâtel between the end of high school 
and the awarding of his doctorate in 1918 (Schaer, 1996/2008, p. 52). Thus, what he said 
in the concluding lines of one of his later autobiographies—“I will die without real 
diplomas” (Piaget, 1950-1976/1976, p. 43; trans by M. Chapman, 1988a, p. 264)—is 
therefore literally true, and not just the false modesty of an eminence.  
That said, however, Piaget did indeed begin his career credentialed with a 
doctorate. This was in Natural History (Schaer, 1996/2008). And it was earned primarily 
as a result of his publications, which were in turn derived from nearly a decade of 
increasingly-meticulous fieldwork collecting and cataloguing snails in the Swiss Alps.26 
Yet his view of species got him into trouble with his professional community, because he 
                                                 
25 The syllabus indicates the following was covered that year: “Psychology, facts of 
consciousness. Psychological analysis of judgement [sic]. The emotions. The will. Reflections” (Schaller-
Jeanneret, 1996/2008, p. 43). For more detail on Reymond, see Ducret (1984, pp. 361-378). 
26 I initially thought that he might have been eating them (escargots), and thus his catalogues of 
where to find the different species could have been considered a form of animal husbandry. But the 
collections found in the desk drawers in his home office were mostly all too small for eating. 
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had come down on the wrong side of the Mendelian uprising that eventually resulted in 
the “modern synthesis” of evolutionary biology (Ducret, 1984, pp. 67-207; Vidal, 1994; 
see also Sapp, 1990; 2003, pp. 117-129, 143-156). As a result, he was effectively ejected 
from the field: Piaget became “notorious… as a bad systematist” (Vonèche, 2003, p. 5). 
Intending to change his path, in 1919, Piaget submitted a proposal for a second—
more traditional—PhD in philosophy. This was to be with Reymond (Vidal, 1994, p. 
219). And his goal, reflected in the title of his proposed dissertation, was to apply the 
biological methods from his earlier work to the analysis of human values (Liengme 
Bessire & Béguelin, 1996/2008, p. 66). But he never completed the project (Piaget, 
1965/1971, p. 10). Instead, he continued his pattern of thinking-by-publishing. His turn to 
psychology-proper then came via a public search for methods that would be compatible 
with his biological approach, and an avalanche of reported results. 
2. Piaget’s turn to psychology 
After receiving his doctorate in 1918, Piaget undertook what we would today call 
a postdoctoral fellowship in Zurich. There, he met the leaders of the dissident Swiss 
school of psychoanalysis (including Carl Jung and Oskar Pfister), as well as Eugen 
Bleuler. And from them he learned clinical interviewing. But he soon became “restless” 
(as he put it in an autobiography published thirty years later), and so abandoned the post 
after little more than a semester (Piaget, 1952a, p. 244). He then undertook a second 
postdoc in Paris, where he first began working with children at Alfred Binet’s former 
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laboratory-school at Grange-aux-Belles in Paris (P. Harris, 1997; Vidal, 1997b).27 He 
held this post until his return to Switzerland in 1921. 
Piaget’s job at the Binet Lab was to standardize British intelligence tests for use 
with French populations. This took advantage of the advanced statistical training from his 
background in Natural History (Vonèche, 2003, p. 6). But boredom, curiosity, and a lack 
of direct supervision led him to apply his new clinical skills (set out in Piaget, 1920a, 
1920b). And this pushed his work in an unexpected direction.  
As is well-known to all those who have read a textbook description of Piaget’s 
origin story, his interest was not at all in the content or organization of the intelligence 
tests themselves (as perhaps it should have been). Instead, he was interested in whatever-
it-is that produces the results that are then measurable by intelligence tests. This he later 
explained, with the benefit of thirty-years’ hindsight: 
I engaged my subjects in conversations patterned after psychiatric questioning, 
with the aim of discovering something about the reasoning process underlying 
their right, but especially their wrong answers. I noticed with amazement that the 
simplest reasoning task… presented for normal children up to the age of eleven or 
twelve difficulties unsuspected by the adult. (Piaget, 1952a, p. 244) 
In other words, he found that children’s reasoning is fundamentally different from adults’ 
reasoning. Or, put another way, some of what adults consider obvious is literally 
unthinkable earlier on. This at-the-time-unexpected finding then became the focus of his 
                                                 
27 One sometimes reads that Piaget “studied with” or “worked with” Binet. This is an error: 
although Piaget was indeed hired to do work with intelligence tests at Grange-aux-Belles, they never 
actually met. Binet died in 1911, when Piaget was 15 (Wertheimer & Maserow, 1980). See Piaget (1975) 
for his reflections on Binet’s contributions (also Nicolas et al., 2013). 
42 
 
research.  
Piaget thus began cataloguing the difficulties that normal children have with 
different kinds of questions, as well as the patterns in their speech as they talked about 
them. Yet note the similarity to his earlier studies in Natural History, when he spent his 
time cataloguing alpine snails: what do you find when you look?  
In other words: despite the use of the psychological subjects, this was still a 
biological project.28 We can make this clearer—and highlight the foreignness of it—by 
posing a purposefully distant-sounding version of his hypothesis: Do different children, 
at different ages, respond as if they belong to different “species”? (Or, following 
Haeckel and consistent with Hall: Does development from child to adult recapitulate the 
evolution of the human species from ape to man?)29  
This early approach—which we might call “transitional,” because Piaget did 
indeed eventually get to psychology-proper (Vidal, 1997b; see also Appendix A)—is 
something that I have begun reconstructing using the collection of snail shells at the 
Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto (Burman, 2010). But to discuss that work in detail 
here would pull us badly off track, given our goals, so we will leave it aside for now and 
return to it in a future article. 
Suffice it to say that Piaget appealed to a combination of methods drawn from 
natural history and psychoanalytic interviewing (or, as he put it, “psychiatric” 
                                                 
28 Mitchell Ash (2003) notes that, following Ribot, the early French view of psychology was that it 
was properly an outgrowth of biology—rather than of philosophy (p. 254). Given this, Piaget’s proposed 
application of biological methods makes more sense as “psychology” in the way that we mean it. To see 
that difference as a similarity, we need only translate through the different national contexts. 
29 This characterization, it seems to me, is accurate only for Piaget’s earliest work (see also 
Vonèche, 2003, pp. 4-5). For more on Haeckel and Hall, see Green (2015a).  
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interviewing) as a result of his suspicion that the found-difference between adult- and 
child-reasoning might generalize; that groups of children answer certain kinds of 
questions in quite dramatically different ways that would nonetheless be formalizable in 
Natural Historical terms. His attempts to demonstrate with rigor that this was the case, 
perhaps to avoid a repeat of his ejection from his first discipline,30 then afforded the 
myriad experiments that collectively constitute the empirical evidence for his “standard” 
stage theory of development: that the “sensorimotor” reasoning of infancy gives way to 
the “preoperational” reasoning of early childhood, followed by the “concrete operational” 
reasoning of late childhood and the “formal operational” reasoning of adolescence.31 But 
it’s the larger program that he continued to develop, especially after he returned to his 
earlier interests when it was shown in the early 1960s that he hadn’t been entirely wrong 
about speciation in the mid- to late-1910s (discussed in Chapter VI).32 
Thus, Piaget’s project was not initially a psychological project in the way that we 
mean the term. And it did not end up as a psychological project (see Appendix A). We 
simply call him a psychologist because he created several methods now used by 
psychologists, and eventually ascended to a Chair in Psychology (see e.g., Papert, 1999; 
                                                 
30 I was once told by a former student of Piaget’s that his prolificacy was the result of religious 
inspiration; that he felt “called” to do this work, but also that he was unable to talk about this calling out of 
a fear that the admission would lead to his work’s dismissal. Although I have no additional evidence for 
this, it does seem to merit some further examination. Perhaps there will be some mention of the family’s 
religiosity in his wife’s papers, now held at the Piaget Archives in Geneva but still unprocessed. 
31 That this got attached to the narrow age-ranges associated with North American school grades is 
almost certainly a result of reading the translations of Piaget’s works through the influence of Lewis 
Terman and his attaching “mental age” to the results of intelligence tests (see P. D. Chapman, 1988b). This 
is sufficiently important to merit its own discussion, however, and so will be examined in a future work (as 
a sequel to Nicolas et al., 2013). 
32 As it turns out, too, “the species problem” is not so clear-cut as is implied by most discussions 
of this aspect of Piaget’s program. Richards (2010) reports that more than twenty competing species 
concepts are used in grouping individuals as belonging to a meaningfully-identifiable collection. 
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Vonèche & Vidal, 1985; Voyat, 1977; also Chapter 3). Given the extent of his impact on 
the discipline, this appellation is perhaps also obligatory as an honorific (cf. 
"Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards," 1970). But recognizing this alone is not 
sufficient to produce a depth of understanding that could make new opportunities 
accessible. Indeed, it is quite possible that there is nothing more of value to be found in 
Piaget’s explicit discussions of child psychology (but see Ratcliff & Burman, 2015; 
Conclusion). Those looking for inspiration, and new opportunities, therefore need to 
delve deeper. (Or, if you prefer: because the low-hanging fruit have all been plucked, we 
need new tools to help us reach higher [cf. Blumenthal, 1998, pp. 78-80].) 
3. Delving deeper (to reach higher) 
The preceding lines add depth to the usual textbook-presentation of Piaget’s 
origin-story.33 We see the influence of his background in biology (Ducret, 1984; Vidal, 
1994, 1996/2008; also Messerly, 1996; 2009). And we see the origins of his methods 
(Bond & Tryphon, 2009; also Duveen, 2000; Mayer, 2005; Opper, 1977). In a sense, 
however, it was his earlier influences that were more important in laying the foundations 
for the later work that we understand least-well.  
For example, he felt—in retrospect—that an early realization that content follows 
form was especially crucial to setting up his project: that the former is structured by the 
                                                 
33 Of course, his origin-story is actually more complex still: Piaget was, simultaneously with his 
work at the Binet Lab, attending lectures by Pierre Janet at the Collège de France (Amann-Gainotti, 1992; 
Amann-Gainotti & Ducret, 2002). In these, Janet argued for a “genetic” (developmental) approach to 
psychopathology. And he presented a kind of stage model of the decline into mental illness, which Piaget 
then reversed and combined with Baldwin’s related ideas regarding “genesis” to inform a stage model of 
development. But because neither Baldwin nor Janet left any archives, these waters have become muddy 
with time. For this reason, they will not be discussed here; attempts to clarify the direction of their mutual 
influences are underway elsewhere (Burman & Nicolas, revised & resubmitted).  
45 
 
latter, and also that questions regarding the justification for particular decisions could be 
used to provide evidence of that structuring. This is the thread that I will follow here.34 
The relevant lines from his first autobiography are typically edited for length, and 
presented only partially (if mentioned at all), but they are so important for all that follows 
that I will repeat them here fully. As he recalled, thinking back to his early course in 
philosophy that was to set his path away from biology: 
A lesson by A. Reymond on realism and nominalism within the problem area of 
“universals” (with some reference to the role of concepts in present-day science) 
gave me a sudden insight. I had thought deeply on the problem of “species” in 
zoology and had adopted an entirely nominalistic point of view in this respect. 
The “species” has no reality in itself and is distinguished from the simple 
“varieties” merely by a greater stability. But this theoretical view, inspired by 
Lamarckism, bothered me somewhat in my empirical work (viz., classification of 
mollusks). The dispute of Durkheim and Tarde on [sic] reality or non-reality of 
society as an organized whole plunged me into a similar state of uncertainty 
without making me see, at first, its pertinence to the problem of the species. Aside 
from this the general problem of realism and of nominalism provided me with an 
overall view: I suddenly understood that at all levels (viz., that of the living cell, 
organism, species, society, etc., but also with reference to states of conscience, to 
                                                 
34 Granted, this is not an especially historicist manoeuver: we are explicitly following his then-
presentist observation—from his autobiography of thirty years later—in order to focus our investigation on 
a particular aspect of Piaget’s project that seems both poorly-understood and potentially useful. However, 
adopting this strategy allows us to skip over material that is not relevant to the project at hand. The 
resulting history is therefore partial. But that’s okay, as we discuss below. 
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concepts, to logical principles, etc.) one finds the same problem of relationship 
between the parts and the whole; hence I was convinced that I had found the 
solution. There at last was the close union that I had dreamed of between biology 
and philosophy, there was an access to an epistemology which to me then seemed 
really scientific! (Piaget, 1952a, pp. 241-242)35 
The importance of this realization, as Piaget reflected back on his own journey to that 
point nearly four decades later, was that many of the various concerns that troubled 
him—as a youth whose outlook was influenced jointly and severally by Protestantism, 
Bergsonism, and the horrors of WWI—could be rationalized simply by relating parts to 
wholes. (Swiss Calvinists are a kind of Protestants, which are a kind of Christian, whose 
beliefs are in turn compatible with Bergsonian immanence, and yet these are then in 
conflict with the fact of War which itself seems to be compatible with biology [e.g., 
Piaget, 1916; 1918/1993].) Indeed, from this perspective, even the obviously separate 
domains of biology and knowledge could be understood as being different parts of the 
same whole (and they are in turn also wholes with their own parts). In a sense, too, both 
could also be considered alive; they are changing, on their own and in response to outside 
forces. The question was, How? (Bergson’s élan vitale was continuous, while what Piaget 
saw was—at the time when they discussed it—discontinuous [Piaget, 1965/1971, p. 
101n3].) 
                                                 
35 Unfortunately, Piaget’s original writings on nominalism have been lost (Vidal, 1994, p. 86). 
While there is the possibility that they could be found among the materials recently donated to the Piaget 
Archives, the practicalities of funding such endeavors have meant that the focus is on processing materials 
from after WWII (Ratcliff & Burman, under review). For now, we are therefore limited to what he recalls 
in his later autobiography. This can of course be supplemented by other related early writings (e.g., Vidal, 
1992). But the ideal is always to examine the original primary source documents. 
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Piaget’s goal, following his Paris postdoc, thus became to examine how the 
different forms of human thinking develop, and therefore also how different contents 
(including the conflicting values of his proposed PhD in philosophy) could be justifiably 
held. As he explained: 
At last I had found my field of research. First of all it became clear to me that the 
theory of the relations between the whole and the part can be studied 
experimentally through analysis of the psychological processes underlying logical 
operations. This marked the end of my “theoretical” period and the start of an 
inductive and experimental era in the psychological domain which I always had 
wanted to enter, but for which until then I had not found the suitable problems. 
(Piaget, 1952a, p. 245; referring especially to Piaget, 1918) 
As we would now describe it, in slightly different terms, Piaget’s “suitable problem” was 
that form can be best inferred from studying the necessary; conclusions following from 
the process of a child’s reasoning that, as a result of their formal properties, could not be 
any other way (see Smith, 1993, 1997, 2009b).36  
He then continued his reminiscence, connecting together all of his early interests 
in a way that goes beyond strict formalism: 
Finally my aim of discovering a sort of embryology of intelligence fit in with my 
biological training; from the start of my theoretical thinking I was certain that the 
problem of the relation between the organism and environment extended also into 
                                                 
36 At the unveiling of a bust dedicated to Reymond at the University of Lausanne, in 1944, Piaget 
is reported to have said: “My own research on the genesis of logic in the child has been inspired to a large 
extent by his teaching, the genetic study prolonging the historical study itself” (qtd. in Schaller-Jeanneret, 
1996/2008, pp. 47, 50n44). 
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the realm of knowledge, appearing here as the problem of the relation between the 
acting or thinking subject and the objects of his experience. Now I had the chance 
of studying this problem in terms of psychogenetic development. (Piaget, 1952a, 
p. 245) 
This problem was examined objectively through a series of empirical studies, with Piaget 
continuing his research upon his return to Switzerland in 1921 at the Rousseau Institute’s 
Maison des Petits in Geneva (see Chapter III). 
Piaget had thought this project would take only five years (Piaget, 1952a, p. 255; 
also Piaget in Tanner & Inhelder, 1956-1960/1971, p. 32). Yet the result, thirty years 
later, was the emergence of a larger research program that he called “genetic 
epistemology” (see esp. Piaget, 1950; see also Appendix A). He then pursued this 
program, and continued to revise it, until his death (see also Piaget, 1968/1970, 1977b, 
1980c). 
Conveniently, for those seeking opportunities, this program has been very poorly 
understood. The greatest interpretive mistake—by far—was that it related somehow to 
the role of genes in knowledge, and thus that Piaget was a “neo-maturationist” (noted by 
Piaget in Evans, 1973, p. 39; Piaget, 1982a, p. xiii; also by Cellérier in J.-C. Bringuier, 
1977/1980, p. 81; Voyat, 1977, p. 343). Of course, we now know—from his view of 
speciation, but especially because of his ejection from Natural History for being an anti-
Mendelian—that such an interpretation could not possibly be correct. But the confusion 
over terms might indeed be understood as reflecting a change in the meaning of genetic, 
between English and French, which in this case refers to “genesis” rather than “genes” 
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(Piaget in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 40). Piaget’s program was therefore, properly, 
an application of biological and psychological methods for philosophical ends: he asked, 
broadly, How can knowledge be understood to grow, develop, and evolve in whole and in 
part? (see esp. Piaget, 1967/1971; Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989).  
4. An introduction to genetic epistemology 
For Piaget, each newborn enters the world without knowledge: their minds have a 
basic form (afforded by e.g., inherited instincts), but no content. Reflexes and random 
movements then allow them to engage with their environments. And this is key: it is from 
these interactions that knowledge is constructed. 
This point must be emphasized before we continue. Knowledge, for Piaget, is not 
a “copy” of the world. Indeed, explaining the genesis of new knowledge—how it is that a 
child comes to know something about anything, and then extends this in unexpected 
ways—was the primary goal of his research program. As he explained later: 
The problem we must solve, in order to explain cognitive development, is that of 
invention and not of mere copying. And neither stimulus-response generalization 
nor the introduction of transformational responses can explain novelty or 
invention. By contrast, the concepts of assimilation and accommodation and of 
operational structures (which are created, not merely discovered, as a result of the 
subject’s activities), are oriented toward this inventive construction which 
characterizes all living thought. (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 714) 
The infant’s earliest explorations are thus carried out—unknowingly, naively, and 
without conscious intent—using the tools of assimilation alone: a structural body 
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integrated with a functional sensory apparatus, which can bring things and experiences 
“in.”37 But, crucially, these explorations are undertaken in the real world, and without any 
of the operational “wholes” that emerge later. Thus, even the “a priori” categories of 
experience need to be reinvented (Burman, 2011; citing Piaget, 1925). 
That said, however, Piaget’s infant is more disorganized than empty. Smell, touch, 
vision, and proprioception all exist, but they act separately in different unintegrated 
domains. Structures and functions are therefore all “sensory” and “motor.” None are 
“abstract.” Indeed, this means that none are yet mental in the way we conceive of this as 
adults (although there is indeed “something it is like to be” because these structures and 
functions come with basic reflexive qualia included, which themselves then develop into 
the more complex kinds of affectivity [see Piaget, 1962a; Piaget, 1954/1981; also Gouin-
Décarie, 1962/1965; 1978]).38 
Still, in healthy children, structural-functions (sensori-motor apparatus) work 
fairly consistently. The mechanical action of the hand becomes more precise, with 
practice, but it does not change in kind. The same can be said for smell. And vision. Yet 
                                                 
37 The simplest definition that Piaget provides for assimilation is by way of analogy to eating: 
“Assimilation is chiefly a biological concept. By digesting food, the organism assimilates the environment; 
this means that the environment is subordinated to the internal structure and not the reverse…. A rabbit that 
eats a cabbage doesn’t become a cabbage; it’s the cabbage that becomes rabbit—that’s assimilation. It’s the 
same thing at the psychological level. Whatever the stimulus is, it is integrated with internal structures” (in 
J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 42). Of course, it goes without saying that the biology of eating is inherited. 
38 My response to the philosophical Knowledge Argument is therefore that “the redness of red” is 
a consequence of—jointly—the inherited sensory apparatus of the perceiver and their developmental 
trajectory to the point of their perception (in response to Jackson, 1982; see also Ludlow, Nagasawa, & 
Stoljar, 2004). The novelty of “redness” upon first seeing “red” then is not a function of knowledge, but of 
the abstractions constructed from that knowledge. These abstractions are then what give “redness” its 
meaning. My paper presenting this response remains unsatisfactory to me, however, and so it has never 
been submitted for review. Still, I have indeed tried coming at it in a different way (see esp. Burman, 
2014). I hope to have opportunity to develop this thinking further in the future. 
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it is their use in the resulting explorations that enable the infant to abstract “objects” from 
the environment in a systematic way: this sensation in domain-x (touch) and that 
sensation in domain-y (smell) co-occur regularly with that other sensation in domain-z 
(vision). These co-occurrences can then be tested gropingly—which is to say, 
unintentionally—through circular repetition, such that they ultimately become expected 
(Burman, 2008a). 
This expectation is the result of something new that the infant does not discover in 
the world. It is instead the result of the invention of a new kind of action: an “empirical 
abstraction” (see Moessinger & Poulin-Dubois, 1981). This is the construction of a new 
internal structure—a new supervening whole—that unifies aspects of disparate 
experiential domains into a functional mental unit. New experiences can then be 
“assimilated” to that structure, rather than to reflexes. And what an object “means,” 
forever afterward, is a function of an interaction between the object itself and the 
subject’s ways of structuring the results of its past explorations.39  
Briefly put: the infant’s world is one of “sensations,” rather than “objects.” This is 
then where we begin to encounter the most difficult aspects of Piaget’s vocabulary.  
Structures are wholes, ex hypothesi, and so each is “equilibrated.” When new 
parts are discovered that must necessarily belong to a given whole, however, the relevant 
                                                 
39 This was taken up in detail in the unpublished causality project (c1964-c1968) that I recently 
discovered at the Piaget Archives in Geneva. A conference talk about the project, and the discovery, has 
been presented in English (Burman & Ratcliff, 2015). And a chapter reporting on how the materials were 
found has been prepared in French (Ratcliff & Burman, under review). But the discovery is too recent for 
us to have done any more than this. Of course an English paper is being discussed, yet—because this will 
probably need to include translations, and thus it will be the first “new Piaget” to appear in over a quarter-
century—the process of preparing that material is complicated by the need to secure rights, etc. An attempt 
at a new formalization was presented in (Piaget & Garcia, 1987/1991). 
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structures are “disequilibrated” and then “accommodated” to capture these parts and 
integrate them. The structures therefore change in response to found-exceptions. The 
results of this, however, are not themselves “real” (cf. J. Richards & Von Glasersfeld, 
1980). They are internal reconstructions of external phenomena; a kind of name by which 
the real can be referred-to, having both formal properties and affective elements. 
There are lots of small restructurings throughout childhood: any time an outcome 
doesn’t match expectations, and this results in a change, we call this “learning” (see esp. 
Gallagher & Reid, 1981). But “development” is usually described more broadly as being 
characterized by a small number of important large-scale changes. And although Piaget 
talks specifically and at length about how small changes become large changes (in 
exactly the way you would expect from a biologist concerned with species), it is the 
large-scale that has drawn the most attention. This is then how his “stages” came to be 
understood (even though he talks in detail about sub-stages). 
The first major structural re-equilibration, from what Piaget called the 
“sensorimotor” stage to the “pre-operational” stage, shifts the infant’s entire world from 
being one of “sensations” to being one of “objects.” (Recall, however, that objects are 
abstracted from sensations: they are “real,” but not in the same way meant by 
philosophers who bang on tables.) This process of augmenting-equilibration then 
continues, building up from that new “objective” foundation. 
The young child interacts with the “objects” found in their world (and can thus 
begin to perceive “illusory objects”). Yet note that their existence is still attached to her 
sensation of them. Adults interpret this as “egocentrism” (see Kesselring & Müller, 
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2011). But that is a misnomer resulting from Piaget’s early experience with 
psychoanalysis. And he later apologized for the way in which that term misled early 
commentators (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956, p. 220). 
The point was not that young children are more selfish than adults, but rather that 
they live in a different kind of world that they construct (see esp. Piaget, 1926/1929). 
Objects are not simply identical with sensations; they are constituted by them. The 
sensations are what things are. With experience, however, children begin to abstract 
different ways of interacting with these things. And the objects themselves then become 
more real than the sensations that report their existence, at the “concrete operational” 
stage, because they are discovered to follow higher-order laws (e.g., conservation of 
mass, of volume, of number, etc.). Note, also, that social interactions follow the same 
pattern (Piaget, 1932/1932). 
Ultimately, the rigidity of this lawfulness is escaped: abstractions come to be 
made of abstractions, such that the “objects of thought” themselves become imaginary 
and arbitrary. This is the “formal operational” stage typical of early adolescence (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1955/1958). But even reflections on imaginary objects are grounded in the 
original empirical abstractions that started it all (see esp. Piaget, 1975/1985, 1977/2001). 
Systematically-organized, and mechanically- or mentally- (which is to say 
“operationally-”) manipulated, but still a reflection of the real (see also Piaget & Garcia, 
1987/1991; Piaget, Henriques, & Ascher, 1990/1992).40 
                                                 
40 This distinguishes Piagetian constructivism from Social construction. In short: for Piaget, 
structures are not arbitrary. They are “necessary” (see esp. Smith, 1993, 1997). In a future project, I would 
like to examine whether and how his concept of “pseudo-necessity” applies to cases of social construction: 
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5. Reaching higher 
The move from the development of children’s reasoning to the evolution of 
scientific reasoning follows the same structural pattern. Both begin from nothing, and 
thus everything we understand today was produced by this process of augmenting-
equilibration (viz. from sensations to objects to ideas). But this is easier to explain by 
reference to mathematics. And Piaget had a favorite anecdote, in this connection, about a 
friend who also happened to be a mathematician: 
When he was four or five years old—I don’t know exactly how old, but a small 
child—he was seated on the ground in his garden and he was counting pebbles. 
Now to count these pebbles he put them in a row and he counted them one, two, 
three, up to ten. Then he finished counting them and started to count them in the 
other direction. He began by the end and once again he found ten. He found this 
marvelous that there were ten in one direction and then in the other direction. So 
he put them in a circle and counted them that way and found then once again. 
Then he counted them in the other direction and found ten once more. So he put 
them in some other arrangement and kept counting them and kept finding ten. 
There was the discovery that he made. (Piaget, 1964, pp. 179-180) 
The friend’s childhood discovery, in short, was number: “He had discovered that the sum 
ten is independent of the order of counting” (Piaget, 1972, p. 6). 
Number supervenes on a countable set in the same way that the abstraction of a 
                                                 
it still feels necessary, in the same way that apparently-justified beliefs feel obvious, but it is not so 
formally (see esp. Piaget, 1977/1986, 1981/1987, 1983/1987). 
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whole supervenes on a grouping of parts. It is both discovered in nature, and constructed 
of nature: it is what we might call a “justified collection,” in the same way that a species 
is a defensible grouping of non-identical individuals (never mind their genes).  
Number, in other words, requires an action not already present in the countable 
set: naming. From this first naming, new actions are then made possible—but by 
reference to that operational name, rather than to the underlying action of counting (or the 
phenomenal qualities of the things being counted). These names can then become 
coordinated by laws, such that the names themselves become only placeholders. Thus: 
the operation 1 + 1 is “two,” necessarily, because the rule of addition refers to the 
bringing together of countable sets describable using those numbers such that the 
resulting set has the combined number of countable objects. But, crucially, no counting is 
required by the use of the operation; the rule coordinating the names replaces the action. 
Or, rather, the action is subsumed in the rule applied. 
From this perspective, number is both real and imaginary. And the rules for 
manipulating numbers are also both real and imaginary. Yet they are imaginary in the 
constrained way of logical necessity. Indeed, Piaget (1941/1952) found that number and 
logic develop together (see also Smith, 1999).  
Science is similar, but the fact of the existence of scientific knowledge in history 
also played a role in Piaget’s argumentation. To wit: it is simply the case that adults 
living together socially know something rather than nothing, and that this knowing has 
both a history and an impact. (Note that this impact of scientific knowledge was 
manifested most obviously in Piaget’s own development by the widespread 
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commercialization of electric light during his youth and early adulthood.)41  
This core part of his research program was articulated in his inaugural lecture as a 
new professor at the University of Neuchâtel in 1925. There, he took on Kant: “epistemic 
categories are necessary,” he argued, “but not innate” (my paraphrase [Burman, 2011]). 
As he put it: 
For Kant, space—nay, Euclidean space (the only kind known in his time)—was 
an a priori form of sensibility; that is to say, Euclidean space was a form (forme) 
which imposes itself on the mind and which is imposed by the mind on the world. 
But the evolution of geometry in the nineteenth century showed that Euclidean 
space was simply one of many possible forms of space. Euclidean space therefore 
lost the character of necessity given to it by Kant. The problem is therefore 
extremely complex: to identify what in the notion of space comes from the 
activity of the mind, and what is derived from external experience. (my trans of 
Piaget, 1925, pp. 195-196)  
In other words, the fact of historical change—and, in this case, the discovery that there 
are more species of “space” than assumed by Kant—showed that the way that we had 
conceived of this previously-fundamental aspect of human perception (for Kant, a 
necessary and a priori category that makes all other knowledge possible) was incomplete. 
Instead, our conception of “space” is part of a larger changeable group that we can name 
and then refer-to at the level of the whole. 
                                                 
41 Note that GE, which was founded as General Electric in 1892, was “born” just four years before 
Piaget. The tungsten filament used in modern bulbs was invented in 1904: when Piaget was eight. 
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Piaget continued: “What we have said of space could be said of all the Kantian a 
priori” (my trans of Piaget, 1925, p. 196). This then provided the basis for a whole series 
of experiments: if our scientific understanding of space can evolve and change, then the 
understanding of “space” also cannot be innate in children. This was ultimately shown in 
The child's conception of space (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956). And, indeed, Piaget 
eventually showed the same thing of the other Kantian concepts as well: time, causality, 
etc.—through more than thirty books, spanning a half-century of continuous publication 
(1927-1987, incl. posthumous works). 
Note, however, that Euclid was not replaced in this sequence. Piaget is therefore 
not talking about “progress” through falsification: 
Euclidean geometry did not become even slightly “false” when non-Euclidean 
geometries were discovered; it was simply integrated into a larger structure as a 
particular case. The error [Kant’s] lay in believing that it was general; it became a 
particular case—a particular case among other structures—and there wasn’t a 
shadow of regression. Nor of abandonment. Not a single one of Euclid’s theorems 
was abandoned. (Piaget in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 48) 
In short: changes in the scientific understanding of space meant that Euclid’s view was 
recognized as a necessary part of a larger whole. Children develop in much the same 
way, but starting from much more primitive foundations: “Any adult you choose, whether 
cave man or Aristotle, began as a child and for the rest of his life used the instruments he 
created in his earliest years” (Piaget in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 92). 
 From this perspective, Piaget’s research program is both less complicated and 
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more complex than Psychologists now think. It is about how we come to know: how 
“novelties” emerge, when they are not already “in” the system. And this is both a 
developmental and an historical problem. His use of poorly-understood terms—and his 
own accepted mistakes, such as with the use of the term egocentrism—then reflects his 
own inheritance and his locality. In other words: his works use the concepts that he had 
access to, and he changed them as he gained access to newer concepts.  
“Schema,” for example, is a Kantian inheritance: how (developing) categories are 
applied to reality. But the process by which categories develop also reflects Piaget’s 
thinking about species: equilibrated wholes with interchangeable parts (see Chapter V). 
The categories themselves then serve as the means by which the world is sampled 
(through assimilation). And the extent to which the results are unexpected results in 
structural change (accommodation).42 Development therefore consists in coming to 
approximate the demands of reality, given the inheritance of systems adapted for a 
different time and place. 
For Piaget, in short, development is an extension of evolution. And behavior is its 
engine. (This was the original title of Piaget, 1976; translated as Piaget, 1976/1979.) Still, 
the development of children does not recapitulate the evolution of the human species. The 
trajectories are simply parallel paths, and—because both are alive—they each always 
follow the path of least resistance (i.e., development proceeds along lines charted by a 
combination of the complexity of encountered-objects and the power of the extant 
                                                 
42 In biology, this is achieved by making babies. (According to the Biological Species Concept: if 
two groups of individuals belong to the same species, then their babies can make babies—if not, they 
can’t.) 
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schemas and structures, which is itself a function of past constructions).43  
6. The plan for what follows 
To keep things as simple as possible, in what follows, I will begin at the 
beginning: with few snapshots of Piaget as he was first seen by his contemporaries 
(Chapter III). This then provides a solid foundation for the further inquiry into what 
opportunities may still exist by highlighting some similarities and differences in how 
Piaget has been perceived by different groups at different times (i.e., to show, like Kant’s 
view of space, that our conception of Piaget is not “necessary”). I follow this, in Chapter 
IV, by introducing a general method that can help Psychologist-Historians to identify 
differences more easily, taking inspiration from work ongoing elsewhere at the 
intersection between Psychology and the Digital Humanities (e.g., Burman, Green, et al., 
2015; Green et al., 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). Together, the first chapters can then be 
understood as an articulation of the historiographical challenge faced by contemporary 
American psychologists in engaging with this kind of historical material: our present 
perspective affords certain kinds of opportunities, but obscures others. 
Following this, two different kinds of more-traditional histories (presented in 
Chapters V & VI) deliver on some of the new opportunities made visible by these first 
inquiries. The first examines how a change in Piaget’s thinking about logical formalism 
made it possible to conceive of the assumptions of his “standard theory” in new terms. 
(This is important because Piaget’s changing formalisms altered how he modeled the 
                                                 
43 Note that, from this perspective, the role of education is twofold: to teach skills to increase the 
power of structures, but also to reduce the complexity of encountered-objects. To differentiate this from 
“scaffolding,” I called this “chaperoning” (Burman, 2008a). Of course, that now can be simplified in light 
of the preceding. 
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“necessity” upon which his methods relied.) And the second delves still deeper, to 
examine how Piaget’s later related works updated the view of “genesis” imparted to his 
early thinking by the pre-Mendelian thinking of James Mark Baldwin (discussed in 
Piaget, 1982b; see also Cahan, 1984; Cairns, 1980).  
Yet those results are still themselves just a beginning. They also need to be 
situated in order to be more broadly meaningful (especially if this project is going to be 
more than an accounting of the myriad ways in which Piaget has been misunderstood [see 
e.g., Lourenço & Machado, 1996; also Jurczak, 1997; Smith, 1981; 2009a]). That is the 
task for the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
The neglect of the foreign invisible  
 
THIS CHAPTER IS INTENDED first as a contribution to historiography—historical 
method—and only second as a contribution to the history of developmental psychology. 
It picks up where we left off in the last chapter, and therefore provides some further 
biographical details about Piaget. But the focus is shifted. It is therefore intended to be a 
discussion, primarily, of the doing of the history of psychology: my focus is on form, not 
content. Here, this takes the form of an argument about a weakness of American 
psychology in an increasingly globalized world. That then sets up my broader argument 
in Chapter IV, as well as the broader contribution of this dissertation. 
Briefly put: American psychology, including its associated approaches to the 
history of psychology, is not adequately equipped to benefit fully from the contributions 
of “foreign” scholars. To make the resulting (narrow) argument clear, two archive-driven 
microhistories are reviewed, contrasted, augmented with new archival research, and 
synthesized: Yeh Hsueh’s (2004) examination of the nomination process at Harvard that 
led to the awarding of an honorary doctorate to Jean Piaget in 1936, and Marc Ratcliff’s 
and Paloma Borella’s (2013) examination—in French—of a similar process that resulted 
in Piaget’s hiring at Geneva in 1929 and his eventual promotion there in 1940.  
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Comparing the authors’ different approaches to similar content shows that we 
need to broaden our methodological sensibilities. This will allow us to see high-quality 
“foreign” contributions for what they are. It’s also made clear, here, that several 
interesting insights result if we do. Among them: although Piaget’s theory is today 
mistakenly criticized for being asocial, and this serves as justification for countering his 
early works with Vygotsky’s posthumous critique, it emerges from these archival studies 
that Piaget may have in fact chosen to present himself and his work as non-sociological 
(when this was not the case) for reasons unrelated to his intellectual project. Such 
examples then broaden the discussion from the neglect of the “foreign invisible” to 
include suppression—even censorship (by self or other)—which in turn reflects the 
primary problem afforded by internationalization: by what standards are we to judge the 
contributions of “foreigners” into “our” discipline? 
 Thus, my purpose with this chapter is threefold: (1) to highlight a disciplinary 
problem, relating to “our”44 treatment of “the foreign,” (2) to demonstrate some of the 
consequences of this problem, and (3) to highlight some of the associated epistemological 
issues that could be most easily addressed by more clearly articulating what it is that 
we’re doing in our present approaches. The first is accomplished by considering the 
internationalization of psychology and of the history of psychology: the problem arises 
                                                 
44 My use of “our” here is intentional, as is my informal tone, because I wish to speak plainly and 
directly to the dominant power in the discipline: English-speaking authors who publish regularly in major 
American journals like this one. “We” are a big part of the problem, and only “we” can fix it. Conveniently, 
however, “we” then also benefit: not everything that is of interest to us is visible from our vantage, and 
some of it requires the perspective of “the foreign” in order to rise above our horizon (see e.g., Burman, 
Guida, et al., 2015; Burman & Nicolas, revised & resubmitted; Nicolas et al., 2013). 
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from our continuing to follow “American”45 sensibilities even as we become more open 
to international topics and “foreign” authors. The second examines the invisibilities that 
result from the resulting clash of disciplinary cultures, by comparing and extending two 
published microhistories. And, the third, by pointing out that celebration (of which 
historians are rightfully wary) has an inverse: neglect, and worse (of which we seem 
unaware).46 
My point, in short, is that we are being blinded to “foreign” contributions by 
disciplinary norms that are at the same time being left unarticulated. We don’t typically 
                                                 
45 I have put “American” in quotes because it isn’t intended as a national attribution. In this case, 
for example, “American” includes those Canadians who adopt a professional literary persona in order to 
write and publish in the dominant style, in some cases even unconsciously adopting American spellings in 
their “non-professional” writings (e.g., by accidentally but consistently writing “behavior” instead of 
“behaviour” when the result is nonetheless intended for a Canadian audience). From this perspective, 
“foreign” then means everyone who doesn’t adopt this persona—regardless of whether or not doing so is 
their choice. (I am grateful to Stephen Retallick for pointing this out in my own writings for Canadian 
audiences.)  
46 This choice of term is far from optimal: it is fraught with unwanted celebratory connotation. My 
intent is not to argue that there are Great Men who have been disrespected by our treatment of their legacy. 
Rather, my intent is to suggest a more passive meaning, for which we are unfortunately lacking a precise 
term: the opposite of “celebrated,” which is less active than “ignored” while also ideally having the sense 
of an unknowing dismissal—without consideration—as an act performed unconsciously by an individual, 
or a group, to another (or to the products of that other group’s efforts) especially as a side-effect of the 
extant norms. An approximation is provided by “pretermitted,” but this still includes too much 
intentionality; an active disavowal of illegitimate heirs, who are known but denied.  
If I could be allowed license to coin such a term, I might suggest “an-aesthetic” (following 
Burman, 2012b, 2014). By this, however, I would mean the following: contrary to the extant aesthetic in 
such a way as to cause a numbing of one’s faculties. This then has the desired connotation: receiving 
audiences are “an-aesthetized” by their prior knowledge and conflicting norms, such that new and 
divergent potential importations are overlooked, unnoticed, and generally unattended-to. And this is 
consistent with whole other bodies of historiographically-relevant literature (e.g., the “interessement” of 
Callon [1986], although our sought-after term would then become the impenetrably dense 
“uninteressemented” or “disinteressemented”).  
I recognize, however, that coining new terms is awkward and to be avoided if possible. For the 
convenience of the reader, therefore, I will continue to use “neglected” in full knowledge that the choice to 
do so is flawed and the term itself potentially misleading. Thank you to Jacy Young for being the first to 
point out the problem, and especially to Shayna Fox Lee and Kelli Vaughn for each separately suggesting 
“pretermit,” as well as to Eric Charles for insisting on the usefulness of “neglect” over my continuing 
objections. David Jopling subsequently suggested “disciplinary blinkering,” and I have to admit that this is 
also appealing.  
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see this as a problem because the consequences are invisible to us: we follow our 
training, our judgment, and our intuitions to celebrate “good” history while ignoring 
“bad” history. But we can leverage the awareness in other areas close to us, where the 
problem is clearer. With the consequences then made visible—or, alternatively, with 
silenced voices made audible47—we can begin to address the cause and work toward 
fixing the problem: “we” are neglecting a large and valuable source of contributions that 
meet many of our criteria for “good” history but do so simply in a “foreign” way.  
1. Internationalization and the rhetoric of universals 
Jeffrey Arnett (2008) is one of several contemporary psychologists to point out 
how much of “Modern Psychology” is skewed toward “American” interests, methods, 
and subjects. He also provided empirical support for his argument—that 95% of the 
world’s population is ignored, even as they are described—by examining the nationalities 
of the contributors, population samples, and editorial boards of six premiere journals 
published by the American Psychological Association. Briefly put: he showed that these 
samples we rely upon in studying and describing human behavior and mental processes 
are unrepresentative of humanity as a whole.  
                                                 
47 This is my reading of Danziger’s (1994, 1997a) view of the future of the history of 
psychology—twenty years ago—as being found in feminist scholarship and internationalization. This is 
because they both present the views of outsiders who are nonetheless recognizable as being a part of the 
discipline: either women psychologists or the psychology of women, and foreign psychologists or the 
psychology of foreigners. This is the direction in which I have taken some of my own historical work, but 
with what I hope will be received as a friendly amendment: I do not view feminist scholarship and 
internationalization to be separate domains. Simply put: both seek to find the Other, and then to represent 
that perspective. Indeed, on this basis, I believe that their approaches can be unified as seeking to make 
audible subaltern “voices” (see e.g., Burman, Guida, et al., 2015). The historian’s challenge is then one of 
providing an adequate translation of that voice (the Unheard Other), so that it can be made “sensible” in a 
context other than its own. That psychology itself seems simultaneously to becoming more open to foreign 
perspectives is then a bonus. 
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A related critique has described psychology’s narrow focus on particular 
populations as, acronymically, WEIRD: “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic” (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a, 2010b). This view proposes that the 
assumption in psychology is that these “standard subjects” are representative of all 
human variation, but then also argues that—when a fuller sampling is taken—our 
experimental populations instead often appear as outliers. Thus, universal claims cannot 
be generalized from the narrow to the broad. And although some psychologists now 
accept this, many still believe that the brain can be appealed-to for universals: all human 
brains were shaped by the same distant selections-and-reinforcements of evolution, so—
in theory (or, more precisely, according to evolutionary meta-theory)—all of the 
“species-typical traits” ought to be shared. Yet the same concerns apply there as well: 
contextual differences are becoming ever-more biologically relevant, with the rise of 
epigenetics and evo-devo, and so the rhetoric of universals then fails again (Burman, 
2013b, 2014; Chiao & Cheon, 2010; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2013; Robert, 2004, 2008). 
Psychology is thus biased toward “American” perspectives narrowly, and Western 
perspectives broadly. Worse still, this failure also biases the intuitions that guide our 
work (Stitch, 2010).  
If we accept this premise, at least in the abstract, then we must also accept that it 
applies—following the principle of symmetry (Bloor, 1976/1991, 2014)—to historical 
research as well. Indeed, just as Arnett (2009) suggests this as a problem of Modern 
Psychology’s philosophy of science, so too would I like to raise it as a problem of the 
History of Psychology’s philosophy of history (cf. Teo, 2011). We would therefore have 
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a better view if we could take a broader perspective: our participant pool may well have 
stagnated, and so more mixing could therefore be in everyone’s interests (cf. Burman, 
2009a).  
Of course, this is easier said than done: “American” psychology did away with the 
foreign language requirement of doctoral education as the legacy of an earlier educational 
system, no longer used and no longer necessary (S. Rosenzweig, Bunch, & Stern, 1962). 
We therefore have a problem without fully recognizing it: a pain, but one about which 
“we” are not properly aware. The goal here is therefore to make this pain more explicit: 
to share some of what is already obvious to our “foreign” colleagues, while at the same 
time building toward a deeper understanding of the issues under examination in the larger 
whole of this project. 
2. Disciplinary problems 
The elimination of the language requirement no doubt improved times-to-
completion. And, for that, monolingual doctoral candidates are undoubtedly grateful. The 
unintended consequence, however, has been that most psychologists trained since the 
1960s now miss something important in considering “foreign” sources: it’s not just the 
words that need translating. What words mean is also in part a function of sensibility, 
which is often invisible in the text itself: tacit knowledge assumed of the reader by the 
author, which is then lost in translation (Polanyi, 1958/1962, 1966/2009).48 
                                                 
48 Polanyi’s (1966/2009) famous line in this connection is “we know more than we can tell” (p. 4). 
I suggest that this can be formalized: our communications are always necessarily embedded in a larger 
system of meaningful implication, and indeed social pressure, which reflect the extant norms (cf. Burman, 
2009a, 2012d, 2013b, 2014). By analogy to Fechner’s (1887/1987) generalization of Weber’s Law, we can 
thus suggest that “sensibility” accepts contributions within a just noticeable difference from those norms. 
Everything captured within this distance is then what is missed in translation; it’s what’s implied, but not 
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The best-known discussion of the emergence of this tacit background, in 
psychology, was provided by Kurt Danziger (1990) in his book Constructing the Subject. 
There, he described how the methods of contemporary “American” psychology came to 
be institutionalized and accepted as “the way in which members of the discipline defined 
their professional project” (p. 133). His subsequent book, Naming the Mind (1997b), did 
similar work for “American” psychology’s vocabulary. Together, though, they showed 
that the discipline’s ways of doing and describing are social practices; norms to be 
assimilated during each scholar’s professional development, which constrain what’s 
possible in contextually-appropriate and -adaptive ways (cf. Burman, 2013b, pp. 368-
370).  
In other words, the way we do things—indeed, the way we think about 
psychological phenomena and act upon them as Psychologists and Historians of 
Psychology (and as people who experience psychological phenomena subjectively)—is 
not a reflection of natural or universal categories (see Hacking, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2007; 
Martin & McLellan, 2013; Rose, 1990, 1984-1994/1996). That they are thought to be is 
just an assumption, embedded in a history (see e.g., Rutherford, 2011; Rutherford, 
Vaughn-Blount, & Ball, 2010; Teo, 2009; Teo & Febbraro, 2003; Weizmann, 2004). 
                                                 
stated, in the original communication. As a result, in translation, the non-explicit aspects are left invisible: 
the primary source of “neglect” (see Note 46).  
This stretching of a psychophysical law for historiographical purposes may go too far for some 
readers. But as a rhetorical device it seems to make the point clearly. The stretch is also consistent with 
Thurstone’s (1927) broader “law of comparative judgment,” which he intended explicitly to apply to 
qualitative judgments. From this perspective, historiographical sensibility is therefore rather like an 
“attitude” or “value” that could in principle be measured (cf. Thurstone, 1928, 1929). The challenge for 
historians—or perhaps for philosophers of the history of psychology—is thus to define the bona fide 
historiographical criteria necessary for producing high-quality outcomes, regardless of differences in 
international sensibility, and then allow for creativity within those bounds.  
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Thus, the Discipline could easily be different (e.g., Burman, Guida, et al., 2015; Nicolas 
et al., 2013). And indeed, elsewhere, it is (e.g., André, Bloch, & Bornstein, 1994; 
Bacopoulos-Viau, 2012; Carson, 2007, 2014; Guillin, 2004; Hogan & Vaccaro, 2006; 
Lombardo & Foschi, 2003; Parot, 2000).  
3. International sensibilities 
Recognizing the failure of universalism led to the study of indigenization 
(Danziger, 2006, 2009). This is the postcolonial view that the spread of psychological 
knowledge is projected out from centers of disciplinary power and into the foreign 
periphery (see also Pickren, 2009b). The result, however, is not a transmission of “pure” 
knowledge (e.g., Shapin, 1988-2007/2010). Instead, messages are reconstructed—
massaged—to fit more consistently with local interests (e.g., Burman, 2012d; Carson, 
2007, 2014).  
For the discipline we recognize today in English-speaking North America as 
“Modern Psychology,” this is generally accepted to have begun in the late-nineteenth 
century with a projection of knowledge out from Germany: Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) 
attracted hundreds of students to his laboratory in Leipzig, and many of them in turn used 
what they learned to found new psychological laboratories at their home institutions (see 
Benjamin Jr, Durkin, Link, Vestal, & Acord, 1992; Tinker, 1932). That said, however, 
Wundt’s influence was also imported into the U.S. in a very particular way: Edward 
Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) popularized a decanted version of Wundt’s 
experimentalism that omitted the social embeddedness required of the original program 
(see esp. the chapters collected in Rieber, 1980a; Rieber & Robinson, 2001). This 
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indigenized reconstruction then made possible the particular character of its replacement. 
Indeed, it was Titchener—and not Wundt—to whom John Broadus Watson (1878-1958) 
responded in introducing his “Behaviorism” (J. B. Watson, 1913, p. 164; see also Larson 
& Sullivan, 1965; O'Donnell, 1985). It was thus also in this way that “American” 
psychology separated itself from its European roots: “The ‘behaviorist revolution,’ as it 
has so often been called, marks the point at which the ‘new’ psychology achieved full 
American citizenship” (Koch, 1985, p. 25). 
More recently, the center of power has shifted from Europe to the United States. 
And because the “American” style of experimentalism49 has since been accepted as the 
dominant approach to the study of psychological phenomena, worldwide, the projection 
is therefore now out from U.S. centers and into the periphery of the rest of world. But 
many other national psychologies still continue to operate in the background; as with 
Watson’s response to Titchener, they even produce the occasional “backlash” that then 
takes root (see e.g., Teo, 2013b; Weidemann, 2013).  
In other words, there are many ways of doing Psychology. One can even put this 
in stronger terms: there is necessarily a plurality of psychological voices and approaches 
(Teo, 2010a). Or, stronger still: “all psychologies are indigenous psychologies” 
(Marsella, 2013). Yet this then implies—again following the principle of symmetry—that 
                                                 
49 Green’s (1992, 1996) observations in this connection are especially interesting: the “American 
style” includes variations on themes that are substantially different from their original sources. Some 
importations—such as Operationism (or, equivalently, Operationalism)—were even subsequently 
repudiated by their originators. To foreigners who are familiar with those original sources, this can make 
“American” psychology seem very weird indeed. (And yet those who wish to participate in the discipline 
must learn to delight in the Emperor’s finery, lest they be dismissed as “unfit” or even “ignorant” to 
question it.) 
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there must also be a plurality, including perhaps even national differences, in the doing of 
the History of Psychology.50 It follows too that this will occasionally be marked by 
clashes in sensibility, and even backlash, in which high-quality material is omitted from 
consideration for reasons unrelated to merit or quality (cf. the recent debate between 
Robinson, 2013a; Robinson, 2013b, 2014; and Danziger, 2013; Teo, 2013a; also Brock, 
2014a; Pettit & Davidson, 2014). Indeed, we see such a clash exemplified in the 
“American” reading of an important new biography describing Jean Piaget’s (1896-1980) 
nomination to the professorship in Geneva that he held for most of his career (Ratcliff & 
Borella, 2013). This will serve as the narrow illustration of our argument, while 
highlighting some of the benefits of adopting a broader perspective in the following 
chapter. 
4. The problem posed by the new biography 
At issue here in this chapter is, primarily, the way in which Ratcliff and Borella 
(2013) responded to an important implicit question: “How did Piaget get to psychology?” 
(Vidal, 1997b, p. 124). This is because what they said in the English-language abstract to 
their French-language article is highly problematic for “American” audiences: “His 
nomination [to the chair in psychology] put many obstacles in his way, which the young 
                                                 
50 Teo (2013b) points out, for example, that the very focus on Wundt is a function of American 
historiography (via esp. the influence of E. G. Boring [see also Kelly, 1981]). He suggests that an equally 
acceptable alternate approach would be provided by German historiography: shifting the story away from 
Wundt to other “founders,” or to the Prussian requirement that as of 21 August 1824 psychology be a 
required course at university (p. 4). He also suggests that Danziger’s influence in American history of 
psychology is a reflection of his subject’s—Wundt’s—central position in the American historiography of 
psychology (p. 4n7). Yet my intent is not to suggest an alternative origin story. Rather, I propose that this is 
simply the case everywhere: there will always be “a founder” to be celebrated, but who the person is that 
receives this label is a function of the interests of those who apply it. 
71 
 
Neuchâtel conqueror had to surmount” (p. 1).  
Briefly put: presenting Piaget as a great conqueror of psychology is not acceptable 
to the present sensibilities in the History of Psychology as it is done by Americans and 
published in top English-language journals. Yet how such an influential person came to 
adopt and then influence the discipline is indeed an important question. There is, 
therefore, a gap in scholarship to be addressed (see Ball, 2012; also Appendix A).  
If the new biography did not address this gap, at least partially, then there would 
be no story to tell. But it does; ably. And “we” would have dismissed it as celebratory; to 
“our” loss. More troubling still, the authors recognize that their framing is awkward for 
this audience. Yet this recognition is itself useful: the resulting paradox—the appearance 
of celebration, in translation, given the intent not to celebrate in the original—affords all 
that follows.51 
First, therefore, we must make the contribution clear: we must contextualize the 
new biography by reviewing the relevant parts of what we presently know in English. Yet 
the examination of the process whereby Piaget received the honorary doctorate provides 
more than a review of whatever it was that came to be celebrated. The associated archival 
documents also provide us with a deconstruction of the process of assessing a 
contribution as worthy of celebration. The resulting schematic is then applied to the new 
                                                 
51 When I first had the suspicion that the article by Ratcliff and Borella (2013) might be dismissed, 
I simply wrote and asked about the authors’ intent. The answer is revealing of exactly the problem that I 
hope to remedy, and also of the awareness among “foreign” authors that such a problem exists: “I’m afraid 
you're right for the conqueror stuff - I mean it sounds akward [sic] for the anglo audience” (Ratcliff, 
personal communication, 22 November 2013). He then clarified: “My approach is NEVER hagiographical 
or celebratory…. My goal is to attempt to render a sense of the mindset… never to glorify the character” 
(my trans of Ratcliff, personal communication).  
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biography, so that it can be appropriately evaluated: it is situated, deconstructed, and 
discussed according to a standard previously applied to its subject. Finally: we examine 
the consequences (across several epistemic levels), as well as what to do about them. And 
that in turn sets up the discussion in Chapter IV. 
5. What we presently know  
It is difficult to escape the influence on “American” audiences of what has been 
called Piaget’s “resurgence,” “revival,” and “rediscovery” in the late-1950s and early-
1960s (see Müller et al., 2013, p. 52; discussed by Bond & Tryphon, 2007; Elkind, 1979; 
Hsueh, 2005, 2009; Kessen, 1996; Voyat, 1977). Most historical examinations are written 
through that lens—often referred-to, more simply, as “Piaget rediscovered” (following 
Duckworth, 1964)—with early works “anticipating” the findings and arguments of later 
influential works. Still, there is a handful of high-quality historical sources to which we 
can productively turn. And we can simplify the examination further by turning to one 
particularly well-documented microcosm. 
5.1. Harvard. Contemporary English-reading audiences were reintroduced to the 
first American Piaget, as a separate entity from the rediscovered second American Piaget, 
primarily through Jerome Bruner’s (1915-2016) recollections of his time at graduate 
school in the 1940s. This provided a less rosy view than most readers at the time had 
come to expect. As he recalled: 
We all knew about Piaget. I cannot remember a time when I didn’t! I had read 
him on language and thought, on moral judgment, on physical causality [i.e., the 
early translations]. I had found him fascinating, but not as a theorist. He was an 
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astute observer of children and his observations were intriguing—particularly 
those about egocentrism. It never occurred to any of us graduate students at 
Harvard that he had any bearing on anything aside from the phenomena to which 
he addressed himself. The controversy surrounding his work was of that boring 
kind in which pedants complained about the small number of children he 
observed. That was “dust bowl empiricism.” Piaget was simply a self-contained 
one-man show. (Bruner, 1983, pp. 133-134; emphasis as in the original) 
In other words: Piaget was known before the Rediscovery, but he was not celebrated. 
Instead, Bruner recalled, the students’ enthusiasm at the time was for Sigmund Freud 
(1856-1939).  
This is consistent with other reminiscences. For example: Hsueh (2004) notes that 
Henry Murray (1893-1988), a long-serving member of the Harvard faculty, recalled that 
Freud had originally been the psychology department’s first choice for the Tercentenary 
proceedings in 1936 which ultimately awarded honorary doctorates to both Piaget and 
Carl Jung (1875-1961). Yet we also see from Hsueh’s in-depth study of the nomination 
papers held by the Harvard University Archives that the situation at the time was much 
more complex than these reminiscences suggest. And, indeed, the process of coming to 
understand the place and contribution of Ratcliff and Borella’s (2013) new biography—
about how Piaget was raised to his professorship in psychology at Geneva—can be 
simplified greatly by reviewing what we know about how he was nominated for that 
honorary doctorate. 
 5.2. Piaget’s honorary doctorate. The Harvard nomination papers offer a wealth 
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of detail: not only do we get a glimpse of how an elite group of psychologists viewed 
their own discipline at the time, but we also see how much attention psychological 
phenomena had attracted from outside the discipline (from e.g., biology and education). 
To make this clearer, Hsueh’s (2004) narrative has been simplified in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[For the table, see over…]  
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Table 1. A tabular simplification of Hsueh's (2004) narrative, highlighting the top 
nominees from each relevant selection group. 
Psychology Education 
Biological 
Sciences 
Executive 
Committee  
Oct 1934  
(p.22: Boring) 
Dec 1934  
(p.23: 
Boring) 
Oct 1935  
(p.25: 
Allport) 
Nov 1934 
(p.26: 
Holmes) 
Nov 1935  
(p. 25: 
Holmes) 
Dec 1934 
(p. 23: 
Henderson) 
Nov 1935 
(p.27) 
Lashley‡ 
Jung* 
Kӧhler 
Thorndike† 
Tolman 
(Terman 
[p.26]) 
Koffka 
 
Luria 
Stern 
Wertheimer 
Lashley‡ 
Jung* 
Janet* 
 
McDougall 
Freud 
Stern 
Thorndike† 
Dewey† 
Terman 
Terman Pavlov 
Janet* 
Terman 
Piaget* 
* Recipients in 1936 
† Previously awarded, and therefore ineligible  
‡ Harvard faculty, and therefore ineligible (Elliott, 1999, p. 164)  
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This presents something of a Who’s Who of early-1930s American Psychology. 
Yet it is interesting to note that Jung received an award, and not Freud, for two reasons 
unrelated to merit: not only was Freud thought to be too old to travel (p. 22), but Harvard 
president James Bryant Conant (1893-1978) was also reluctant—for personal reasons—to 
support his nomination (p. 22 [citing Murray]). It is even more interesting to note, 
however, that the nomination process as it affected Piaget went much the same way. 
There are thus two additional factors, beyond merit, that need to be examined with 
particular attention when considering such celebrations: “health” (which is about the 
subject of celebration) and “internal politics” (which is about the decision makers and 
their process of determining who or what should be celebrated). 
Taking this perspective, we then see that Piaget emerged as a candidate only after 
Ivan Pavlov’s (1849-1936) declining health prevented him from undertaking the long 
overseas journey from the Soviet Union to the U.S. east coast (p. 25). We see also that 
there was no mention of Piaget’s own health problems; nor were there any mentions of 
his interactions with Sabina Spielrein (1885-1942), who served for a time as his analyst 
(see Vidal, 1995/2001; also Vidal, 1994, pp. 162-181). We will therefore turn to the 
second factor, “internal politics,” which Hsueh (2004) discussed in detail. 
5.3. Decision-making and internal politics. Pavlov was older than Freud, and 
his late withdrawal from the Harvard nominations process—in October of 1935 (less than 
half-a-year before his death in February of 1936)—did not come as a complete surprise.52 
                                                 
52 The Tercentenary records show that Pavlov had indicated in February of 1935 that his 
attendance was always uncertain: there was a possible conflict with an important meeting in Spain, and also 
he had concerns regarding the seasickness that would result from braving “the Atlantic autumnal storms” 
(Pavlov, 1935). His nominator, Walter B. Cannon, was then encouraged to use his influence to convince 
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But it was incredibly inconvenient: the committee had held out hope, until the eleventh 
hour, that he would come. This was because they intended for Pavlov, a winner of the 
Nobel Prize, to provide leadership in anchoring the symposium on “Factors Determining 
Human Behavior” (p. 26).53 With the Tercentenary looming, and the symposium 
scheduled for September of 1936, they then had less than a year to fill the resulting void. 
Hsueh (2004) reports that the committee felt pressured to find a similarly 
interdisciplinary scholar with comparable interests, especially those relevant to 
educational and social psychology. They quickly worked through an initial list of 
nominees, but disqualified them all. The committee then sought a second round of 
suggestions. And a third. Ultimately, they produced the last list themselves:  
the names of Jean Piaget and Lewis Terman [1877-1956] were put forth together, 
not only as possible replacements of [sic] Pavlov to give a keynote speech to the 
symposium but also as most [sic] qualified candidates whose work had important 
implications in the fields of education, human learning, and intelligence, the same 
lines of inquiry that Pavlov inspired. (p. 26) 
In short, Piaget and Terman were initially on equal footing. From the Table, however, it 
is clear that Terman should have been preferred: he had a much broader base of support. 
(Of course, only correcting the misunderstanding of Lashley’s nomination being for 
                                                 
Pavlov to choose to attend anyway. (For more on Cannon and Pavlov, see Todes, 2014.) By August, 
however, this seemed very doubtful: “he has told his son that his recent trip to London was his last journey 
except, perhaps, the trip to Madrid” (Cannon, 1935a). By the time the third round of nominations was 
sought in October of 1935, however, a memorandum in the files indicates that Cannon thought the odds of 
Pavlov attending had improved (Memorandum on Pavlov, 1935). This perhaps explains the committee’s 
delay in seeking a replacement. 
53 The papers presented in this session were ultimately published together in a volume of the same 
name (Harvard Tercentenary Publications, 1937; see also Elliott, 1999, pp. 163, 165-167). 
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Terman—rather than Tolman [p. 26]—made this obvious.) 
We can suggest in retrospect that both men would have acquitted themselves 
admirably, although Terman certainly more intelligibly. And the committee knew this, as 
I discovered when I retraced Hsueh’s steps in the archive: “Piaget speaks English very 
poorly and could hardly have the general influence in the symposium and the round table 
which Terman might well have” (Wilson, 1935b). Indeed, that it was Piaget and not 
Terman who ultimately received the nomination is somewhat peculiar when examined 
without the exuberance of the Rediscovery. As Hsueh (2004) reports, “neither the 
psychology nor the education faculty seemed enthusiastic about him” (p. 28).  
Hsueh’s archival work suggests that Piaget was in fact no one’s first choice. 
Instead, he was known by committee members as a result simply of their connection to 
the Rockefeller-funded Hawthorne Experiments conducted out of the Harvard Business 
School (pp. 31-34; see Gillespie, 1991; Hsueh, 2001, 2002). This then provides a partial 
answer, related to internal politics, to the question of how he received the nomination. 
But the Hawthorne Experiments were at best instances of industrial or organizational 
psychology, not educational or social psychology: the connection from Hawthorne to the 
committee, and its goals, therefore can’t be the whole story. 
Fortunately, the committee’s decision became clearer when I had the opportunity 
to immerse myself in the archives, with the benefit both of hindsight and of being able to 
build on Hsueh’s work. In short: Terman seems not to have been rejected. Instead, we 
find the second part of our sought-after answer in the committee’s comments on his 
health: “Terman is fully worthy of the honorary degree and it would be very nice to give 
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him one because he has been handicapped by tuberculosis (as I am informed) and has had 
to lead a rather quiet life” (Wilson, 1935a).  
Terman was dropped soon after. And I saw no other reason given. Thus, we might 
ask: after the trouble with Pavlov, could they risk it with another less-than-perfectly-
healthy candidate?  It seems not. 
While it is the case that Piaget’s champion on the committee thought him more 
“inspired and novel” (qtd. in Hsueh, 2004, p. 27), the man reflected in the nomination 
papers is clearly not a Great Man whose recognition was inevitable. Indeed, I discovered 
that the committee saw their choice of Piaget as a “gamble” (Wilson, 1935b). But it 
seems to have been the safer option. And, they noted, it also fit with President Conant’s 
goal of balancing established scholars with younger investigators whose contributions 
were not yet well-known (Hsueh, 2004, p. 30). 
Still, Piaget seems like a lightweight when compared to the other candidates. The 
nomination papers make the differences clear: Pavlov was “the most eminent 
physiologist Russia has produce[d],” “awarded the Nobel Prize in 1904,” and “a highly 
stimulating influence in physiology, psychology, and philosophy” (Cannon, 1935b). 
Pierre Janet was “without a doubt the most distinguished French psychologist and 
psychopathologist,” “generally regarded as having founded psychopathology as a 
separate discipline,” “a well-loved public figure… brilliant lectures,” and “in good 
health” (Boring, 1934, p. 2). And Jung was “one of the important pioneers of the 
investigation of personality,” “A man of universal erudition and true wisdom,” “at the 
summit of his career,” and “one of the deepest and most provocative thinkers of the 
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contemporary world” (Boring, 1934, p. 3).  
By comparison, Piaget’s biography was—to put it mildly—more subdued. His 
nomination does not shine as brightly:  
His interests and training involve natural history, philosophy and sociology as 
well as psychology. He has the true imagination of a creator. His work is that of 
systematic research upon the conceptual content and mode of functioning, and 
mode of apprehension of the child mind. These things he has studied in their 
developmental characteristics. He sees the development of children’s concepts 
upon a background of sociology and has in his recent volume, for example, 
investigated such concepts as retributive and distributive justice, collective 
responsibility, etc., in their genetic phases and set up hypotheses which seem to 
correlate the data regarding the origins and successive transformations of these 
concepts during the developmental process. Other illustrations could be given to 
show that his work has important implications for the field of social learning 
although it is not a study of the learning process as such. (Wilson, 1935b; 
referring to Piaget, 1932/1932) 
So then: Piaget was imaginative and creative and systematic, but not a Great Man like 
Pavlov, Janet, or Jung. He was, however, the last man standing. And they needed a body 
to fill a space in the schedule. Thus, Piaget—just one month after celebrating his fortieth 
birthday—received the honorary doctorate originally intended for a Nobel Laureate more 
than twice his age. 
While these discoveries are in keeping with the present “American” 
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historiographical preference for non-celebratory narratives, it is awkward for an 
“American” reading of the new biography by Ratcliff and Borella (2013). This is because 
they seem to present the Harvard doctorate as an irony: the rationalization for framing 
Piaget’s tortured nomination to a full professorship at Geneva as being the story of a 
“conquering hero” (pp. 16, 18). And this framing no longer seems justified (even if it had 
been acceptable). Yet following the heuristic extracted from the Harvard nomination 
process—again appealing to symmetry—their apparently celebratory essay can be 
examined in two ways that extend beyond the fundamental merit of their study: their 
study’s underlying “health” as history (which is about their evidence and its presentation 
[i.e., how they have done their work]), and the “internal politics” of the receiving 
audience (which is about us). 
6. What’s new in the new biography? 
 Ratcliff and Borella (2013) locate Piaget in the years immediately after his first 
moves into psychology, but also immediately before he had begun to publish the books in 
the “infancy trilogy” for which he later became most famous (viz. Piaget, 1936/1952, 
1937/1954, 1945/1962). It includes a depth of archival work that puts their study on par 
with Piaget before Piaget (Vidal, 1994) and the best chapters in Jean Piaget and 
Neuchâtel (Perret-Clermont & Barrelet, 1996/2008). It is also “correctly” motivated: 
Jean Piaget is best known for his theory, the scientific impact of which was—in 
its time—greatest among psychologists. [Yet its very success] has generated a 
kind of epistemological obstacle; as if Piaget’s work is, by its intrinsic qualities, 
ahistorical in nature. Little work has been done to counter this attitude. (my trans. 
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of Ratcliff & Borella, 2013, p. 1) 
Indeed, it is this problem—contemporary psychology’s ahistoricism regarding matters of 
theory (cf. Teo, 2013a)—which then affords their approach: a combination of cultural 
history and microhistory, applied to the life-course of an historical subject. In short, they 
provide some of the story of how the theory came to be. 
The result is not a biography in the traditional sense, because Piaget is not really 
their subject. Instead, Piaget provides the pivot around which their story turns. (It is a 
biographical microhistory.)54 The resulting study, like the study of the Harvard 
nomination process, is therefore properly about internal politics. And that is not only 
acceptable, as history, but it can also be revealing of broader issues not presently visible 
(see e.g., Green, 2002, 2004a, 2007). 
6.1. Geneva. The history of the hiring institution, the Rousseau Institute, is not 
well-known in English. We know that it was founded in 1912 by Edouard Claparède 
(1873-1940) as a research-based teachers’ college, but against the University of Geneva’s 
regulations and thus of necessity with the assistance of a private foundation (see 
Claparède, 1925, p. 93). We know too that the institute became attached to the university 
in 1929, when it affiliated with the Faculty of Letters, and also that its focus then began 
to shift away from pedagogy and toward psychology (Hofstetter, 2004). Yet we know 
little else; the Institute itself has been the subject of a proper inquiry only infrequently, 
and is rarely mentioned in English aside from in the occasional book review (see e.g., 
                                                 
54 In his response to the draft of this essay, Ratcliff (personal communication, 3 December 2013) 
suggested Jill Lepore’s (2001) “reflections on microhistory and biography” as being broadly representative 
of his approach. 
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Jahoda, 2013). We can therefore fill another gap in “American” scholarship by providing 
some of that additional context here. Note, though, that—if we are not to reinvent the 
wheel—we must do this by relying on “high-quality”55 secondary sources published in 
French.  
To that end: Rita Hofstetter has written the most comprehensively, and the most 
recently, about the history of the Genevan approach to “the educational sciences” (see 
e.g., Hofstetter, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Hofstetter, Ratcliff, & Schneuwly, 2012; Hofstetter 
& Schneuwly, 2007). Her habilitation—entitled, Genève: Creuset des sciences de 
l’éducation [Geneva: Crucible for the sciences of education]—is especially illuminating 
for our purposes. She writes: 
Relations between the Institute and the University were not limited to the Faculty 
of Letters. Instructors from other Faculties (medicine, law, and the sciences) 
continued to teach courses at the Institute, or to open their lecture halls to its 
students. And the ties stayed strong between the Institute and the Laboratory of 
Psychology in the Faculty of Sciences, during this period, even if only to provide 
a joint edition of the Archives de psychologie and to organize various courses, 
conferences, and congresses (my trans of Hofstetter, 2010, p. 265). 
She continues, highlighting both the difficult financial circumstances and the importance 
of international assistance after WWI: 
                                                 
55 It’s worth reiterating that this judgment has two aspects: one is about the work under 
consideration, and the other is about the criteria for judging quality. Someone else might therefore disagree 
with me, and suggest another source that ranks more highly according to their perspective. And, indeed, at 
the individual level this is disagreement is fine: the debate is constructive, and everyone benefits. It is only 
at the collective level that it becomes problematic: blind, unexamined, uncritical, prejudicial—
systematically biased. That is what I am targeting. 
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Of course, this collaboration with the University was primarily the result of 
personal relationships and initiatives, and received little formal support.... Instead, 
the State’s large deficits forced it to consider cuts, which led even to the 
suggestion that the Laboratory of Psychology be relocated. Opposing this, to 
maintain its proximity to one of its most precious assets, the Institute undertook to 
rent back the space. This was made possible by the support of the Rockefeller 
Foundation…. (my trans of Hofstetter, 2010, p. 266) 
Hofstetter thus situates the continued operation of the Rousseau Institute in the 1920s, 
and therefore also the hiring of Jean Piaget, in a larger context that includes the projection 
of U.S. power and interests through the operations of its charitable foundations (see also 
Parmar, 2012; Solovey, 2013; Solovey & Cravens, 2012). And this in turn connects back 
with other things we know from later on, in terms of how Piaget and Inhelder were 
supported in the period leading up to the Rediscovery (see e.g., Inhelder, 1989; 
Bronckart, 1980; Hsueh, 1998, 2009). Now, then: to the new biography. 
6.2. Who was this candidate for professor? After what we would today call 
“postdoctoral studies” in Zurich and Paris, Piaget was hired in May of 1921 to serve as 
chef de travaux (director of studies)56 at the then-still-independent Rousseau Institute. He 
also volunteered to serve as Privat-Docent (outside lecturer) for a course at the 
University of Geneva examining “experimental research on the child” (Ratcliff & 
                                                 
56 This is the translation provided in Piaget’s (1952a) first English-language autobiography (p. 
245). 
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Borella, 2013, p. 5n21).57 At the same time, and in parallel, Claparède—who was at the 
time Professor of Experimental Psychology in the Faculty of Sciences—proposed to the 
Faculty that Piaget teach a class on “experimental psychology” (p. 5n22). These 
proposals were sent up the administrative ladder, variously discussed, and received 
formal approval from the Senate in July of 1921 (p. 6n26).  
This arrangement turned out to be conducive to Piaget’s productivity: by 1925—
which is to say, before his thirtieth birthday—he had published two books and 24 articles 
on psychological and philosophical topics (p. 6n28). He had also turned down a call from 
his alma mater, the University of Neuchâtel, to take up the post of professeur ordinaire 
(full professor). His reason was that the proposed workload was “crushing” (p. 6n29). Yet 
this refusal was met with a return offer for a “reduced chair” (p. 6), combining some of 
the responsibilities of the then-vacant Chairs in Philosophy and Sociology but leaving 
much of his time free for research.  
Piaget accepted the revised offer in April of 1925, resigning from his position as 
Privat-Docent at Geneva (p. 7n35). But he stayed active at the Rousseau Institute, 
returning fortnightly for meetings and to oversee continuing research projects (p. 7n37), 
especially at its laboratory-school: the Maison des Petits (Piaget, 1952a, p. 246; see also 
Perregaux, Rieben, & Magnin, 1996). 
When Claparède fell ill in the winter of 1927-1928, the Dean of the Faculty of 
Sciences at Geneva asked Piaget to serve as his replacement (p. 8n43). Piaget assented 
                                                 
57 To preserve and reflect the quality of the archival research reported, references to material 
supported by primary sources will cite page and footnote number in the published original. All quotations 
from this article, including of sources quoted, are translations by the author. 
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easily. As part of this return, however, Piaget also asked that Switzerland’s premiere 
French-language newspaper—the Journal de Genève—publish some of the details: 
“because,” he explained, “I have many friends in Geneva and would be happy to remind 
them of my existence” (qtd on p. 8). (This practice of “self-presentation” is one that he 
later continued, albeit sometimes with less success [p. 9], and it is something to which we 
will return briefly below.) 
In June of 1928, with Piaget set to return to Neuchâtel at the end of his contract, 
the recuperated Claparède proposed that a new Chair be created—in “the history and 
psychology of sciences” (p.8n46)—with the goal of replacing himself over his sabbatical 
and at the same time providing a permanent home for Piaget in Geneva. This proposal 
was warmly accepted by the Faculty in July, but for Piaget’s request that he remain at the 
rank afforded him at Neuchâtel (p. 9n48). Instead, it was decided in September that he 
would be offered the lower rank of professeur extraordinaire (contractually-limited 
visiting professor).  
6.3. Conflict. We thus find the origins of the “obstacles” to be “surmounted” and 
“conquered” that are so rhetorically problematic for “American” audiences. Briefly put: 
in Switzerland, university governance is partially integrated with state governance. 
Appointments at the University of Geneva are therefore made first by the relevant 
Faculty, and then they are confirmed at the Ministry of Education for the Canton of 
Geneva (Département de l’Instruction Publique [DIP]).58 But that’s not how Piaget 
                                                 
58 I am grateful to Marc Ratcliff for providing the correct English rendering (personal 
communication, 3 December 2013), which I otherwise would have translated directly as “the Department 
of Public Instruction.” 
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proceeded: the Rousseau Institute was also overseen by the DIP—prior to its by-then-
imminent affiliation with the university (Hofstetter, 2010, pp. 223-241)—and so he 
appealed through what may well have seemed to him to be his institution’s proper 
hierarchy.  
Because it was the head of the DIP, Albert Malche (1876-1956), who had 
approved in September of 1928 the Faculty’s plan to create the new Chair (p. 9n49), it 
was then Malche to whom Piaget appealed in October in an attempt to secure his desired 
appointment (p. 12). Yet this meant that the same administrative process—to define the 
terms and conditions of the new Chair which Piaget would occupy—were undertaken 
simultaneously at two different levels of governance, each of which did not have the 
support of the other.  
Malche proceeded to create the Chair at the rank of full professor, but without any 
input from the Faculty. He supported this decision by noting that Piaget had not only held 
the rank of full professor in Neuchâtel, but also that he had recently been called to a Chair 
in psychology at Liège in Belgium (p. 12n70). His intent was therefore probably 
strategic: to keep a promising young talent in Geneva. The result, though, was “a dreadful 
scandal”—as Piaget put it in a letter to Claparède in December of 1928—“having the 
effect of a pebble [tossed] in a pond” (p. 12n73). One of Piaget’s earlier supporters, the 
botanist Robert Chodat (1865-1934), even turned against him: Chodat called the 
proposed appointment “parasitical” (p. 13n74). And while the change of heart might have 
been in part because his own son was being considered for the same promotion (p. 13), 
his primary objection was no doubt to an outsider being parachuted in at a higher-than-
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expected level in an out-of-the-ordinary way as a result of an impending institutional 
affiliation. Indeed, Chodat’s sentiment seems representative of the Faculty’s general 
response to the Administration’s meddling. 
In January of 1929, Piaget chose to accept the position as defined by the Faculty: 
three years probationary at the lower rank, teaching one hour per week, with the bulk of 
his salary to be paid by the Rousseau Institute. As he explained: “I prefer the confidence 
of my colleagues over a title that they have not given me themselves” (p. 14n82). He also 
rejected a possible alternative: “I confess that I prefer a limited Chair in the history of 
scientific thought in the Faculty of Sciences than the same Chair as full professor in the 
Faculty of Letters” (p. 14n82). His justification: “I cannot conceive the history of 
scientific thought except as enlivened by its continued contact with the science that 
makes it [possible]” (p. 14n82).  
6.4. Promotion. Piaget’s contract with the Faculty of Sciences was renewed in 
1932. He then received the honorary doctorate from Harvard—which was not in fact a 
doctorate of science, but rather a doctorate of letters (Elliott, 1999, p. 165n)—in 1936. 
Despite this honor, however, he remained unpromotable at the University of Geneva: 
internal politics, in the Faculty of Sciences, would not allow it. The earlier scandal’s 
waves rippled ever on.  
When Piaget was eventually raised to full professor, in February of 1940, it was to 
a Chair in Sociology in the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences (p. 17n99). Then 
Claparède died, in September of that year, and the Faculty of Sciences again found itself 
in need of a replacement. In Claparède’s place, Piaget was therefore named Director of 
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the Rousseau Institute and full professor of Experimental Psychology in the Faculty of 
Sciences (p. 17n100). The promised position was thus delivered, but not because it was 
inevitable. He also certainly didn’t take it by force: nothing was “conquered,” in the way 
that this word is usually meant in English. 
7. So what? 
At the time of his nomination at the University of Geneva, in 1929, Piaget had 
authored four books. These are known in English by their translated titles: The language 
and thought of the child (Piaget, 1923/1926), Judgment and reasoning in the child 
(Piaget, 1924/1928), The child’s conception of the world (Piaget, 1926/1929), and The 
child’s conception of physical causality (Piaget, 1927/1930). And it is true that these 
garnered some attention at the time, but not as contributions to developmental theory. 
To the extent that the books were celebrated, it was for their methods (see e.g., 
Blumer, 1930; Isaacs, 1929, 1931; Lynd, 1927; E. Murray, 1931; Stone, 1929, 1930; C. 
O. Weber, 1927; also Bain, 1937, p. 432). It was these methods that then informed the 
Hawthorne Experiments’ approach to interviewing, and they that in turn launched the 
Human Relations movement and thus provided the foundations for what we now call 
“human resource management” (Hsueh, 2001, 2002; see also Bond & Tryphon, 2009; 
Duveen, 2000; Mayer, 2005; Opper, 1977). As we have seen, it was also this—a program 
totally disconnected from Piaget’s early studies of child development and unrelated to his 
later program in genetic epistemology—that connected up with the internal political 
context at Harvard that led to his being awarded the honorary doctorate in 1936.  
Yet this is not what ultimately makes the new biography important for 
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“American” audiences; it is not that the young Piaget was able to overcome—or 
“conquer”—the challenges that he faced. Rather, the biography’s importance derives 
from the recognition that the meaning of “Piaget” in “American” psychology was for 
several decades a reflection of the same few works that the nominations committees at 
Harvard and Geneva had considered: these books, along with the companion volume on 
moral development (Piaget, 1932/1932), were the only major works made available to 
English audiences until after WWII. We can therefore use the committees’ deliberations 
to provide a new perspective on the state of Psychology—and Piaget’s place within it—
before the blinding explosion of Rediscovered interest in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In short: studying the nomination committees’ archival records can serve as a 
shield against the influence of any later celebratory (or backlash-negationist) sentiment. 
The resulting reframe of the new biography’s contribution is then also more consistent 
with the present “American” historical sensibility—often called by adherents “the new 
history” (see Furumoto, 1989, 2003; Teo, 2013a)—because it places both articles’ depth 
of archival research in their social and cultural context. Here, though, that doesn’t mean 
ignoring the contents of Piaget’s intellectual contributions; instead, we must treat those 
contributions as belonging to the context in which they were received as contributions 
(i.e., “health” and “internal politics”).  
8. What new does this contribute? 
As a result of all of this, we are now able to shift from form back to considerations 
of content. We are therefore now able to answer—at least partially—Vidal’s (1997b) 
question: “How did Piaget get to psychology?” (p. 124). Indeed, from the perspective 
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afforded by the new biography, it’s a relatively short story. Piaget got to Psychology, in 
the sense that he was recognized with a Chair in the area at his home institution, in the 
same way that he received his honorary doctorate from Harvard: directly following the 
death of a preferred senior colleague (first Pavlov and then Claparède), and only in part 
as a result of the quality or impact of his work.  
This is a very different view than that afforded by the Rediscovery hagiography. It 
is also a very different view than we might have come-to had we dismissed the new 
biography as inappropriately celebratory. Given this, and everything reviewed to this 
point, we must therefore conclude that the new biography is not only “healthy” as history 
but also that it is too important for “us” to disregard.  
Still, an objection—anticipated from those interested primarily in Piaget’s 
intellectual output—is that this examination has ignored the ideas that were meant to be 
placed in context: nothing here discusses what he said, when, or why. Yet it is clear that 
Piaget did not have an impact at the time on what we now would consider the “obvious” 
areas of his influence (such as early childhood education [Beatty, 2009]). Indeed, 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987)—who is known today primarily for advancing the 
project introduced in Piaget’s (1932/1932) Moral judgment of the child—later claimed 
that his primary theoretical influence was actually James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934 
[Kohlberg, 1982, p. 280]). Thus: as with the Hawthorne Experiments, Piaget’s influence 
on Kohlberg seems to have been primarily methodological. (Recall too that this is 
consistent with Bruner’s autobiographical reminiscence of Piaget’s place at Harvard at 
the time.) Those are therefore the ideas that matter here; at that time, for this story. 
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 Reflecting also on how the nomination processes compare, at Harvard and at 
Geneva, it is interesting to note the similarities: an unexpected proposal was met with 
resistance, but supported by administrators (i.e., it was “healthy”), with disgruntlement in 
the resisting departments (i.e., it conflicted with “internal politics”). This structure has 
nothing whatsoever to do with Piaget specifically, or his theory. Yet it is also interesting 
to note the common conclusion of the time, which does: that Piaget’s “real merit” was as 
a Sociologist.  
This was surprising to discover once, but it appeared three separate disconnected 
times in the course just of preparing this chapter: at Harvard in 1936, at Geneva in 1940, 
and also previously at Neuchâtel in 1925. (Note also the reviews of his early works in 
sociological journals [e.g., Bain, 1937; Blumer, 1930].) This is rather remarkable, and 
completely unexpected given how Piaget is commonly perceived. 
8.1. Self and social. Piaget’s theory is understood in English today to be distinctly 
asocial (even anti-social). This has long been known by Piaget scholars to be incorrect 
(see e.g., Kitchener, 1981; 1991, 2000, 2009; Smith, 1995; also Lourenço & Machado, 
1996, pp. 150-151). Yet, in the blinding exuberance of the Rediscovery, the role of “early 
social theorist of development” in the American psychological pantheon was instead 
given over to Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934).  
Is that now in question? Perhaps. 
The elevation was supported by Vygotsky’s (1934/1962) apparently-devastating 
critique of Piaget’s early theory. And the corrections provided there then served as the 
justification for using one theory in counterpoint to the other. But this now looks solely 
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like a function of celebration: Piaget’s theory was virtually ignored until the early-1960s, 
and such a critique could therefore only gain the importance it came to have in light of 
that reflected interest. That the celebratory perspective of Vygotsky’s supremacy has 
continued is then itself a function of an associated neglect, because most readers have 
remained unaware that Piaget (1962/1979, 1962/2000) responded. Indeed, he made it 
clear in his comments that the concerns identified thirty years before had been 
subsequently addressed: “on certain issues I find myself more in agreement with 
Vygotsky than I would have been in 1934, while on other issues I now have better 
arguments for answering him than would previously have been the case” (Piaget, 
1962/2000, p. 242).  
Still, the fact remains that Piaget never explicitly assumed the mantle of sociality 
after he had addressed Vygotsky’s critiques; cooperation, for him, became instead “co-
operation” (in the sense of developing individuals following the same trajectory, as a 
result of interactions with the same shared set of influences).59 It now seems possible to 
suggest, however, that Piaget might have chosen to present his work as non-sociological; 
that this focus may have been part of his early trouble with the Faculty of Sciences, so he 
minimized it in favor of increasing formalism. (Is it possible that Titchener could have 
                                                 
59 What Piaget said in this connection is useful, both for his view of the social and for his view of 
the influence of a dominant sensibility: “Under the influence of Durkheim, which was after all immense in 
France, I wasted a fantastical amount of time trying to decide between the social and the individual. That 
lasted up until the moment I realized that cooperation could be spelled ‘co-’, ‘operation.’ When the 
Durkheimians put the whole burden on society, they commit the incredible mistake of forgetting that, 
without the nervous system, nothing at all would happen. So, since Durkheim didn’t dare to say that the 
nervous system was a social product, it was necessary to recognize its existence prior to society and social 
forces. Today, one can no longer imagine the power of the Durkheimians had. Their imperialism was such 
that my friend, Leon Bopp, jokingly told me, ‘You’ll see, next they are going to annex minerology!’” 
(Piaget, 1982b, p. 85). 
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done similarly, in making his importations of Wundt? [see Green, 2010].) 
In addition to the archival documents examined in the microhistories discussed 
above, and consistent with the observation that Piaget actively engaged the media in 
constructing his public image, we find the following presentations of self in his 
autobiographical writings: he dismissed his early concern with the social environment 
and language as “peripheral” (Piaget, 1952a, p. 246).60 He also explicitly denied knowing 
that he had been nominated to the Chair in Sociology at Geneva that he ultimately 
accepted (Piaget, 1952a, p. 253). Furthermore, we know from comments included in the 
preface to Sociological Studies that he had resisted publishing a collection in book form 
of his sociological writings (Piaget, 1943-1963/1965; expanded second edition translated 
as Piaget, 1977, collecting together works published 1928-1960/1995). And, in an 
interview conducted at the end of his life, he limited the effect that the very social 
Baldwin had had on his developing theory to, solely, “the global idea of genesis” (which 
he said twice [Piaget, 1982b, p. 83]).  
Of course, these indications are not conclusive. But even the suggestion that it 
might be the case—that Piaget may have actively sought to present his work as non-
sociological, perhaps in reflection of his perception of the Faculty’s ideal “scientific 
persona” (cf. Vonèche, 2001; for discussions of method, see also Bordogna, 2005; P. N. 
Campbell, 1975; Paul, 2014)—requires a very different investigative approach than that 
                                                 
60 Piaget clarified at the Macy conference held that year, in response to a question from Margaret 
Mead: “the environment does not change the order of succession of these operations, but it can accelerate, 
return, or, even entirely block further development” (in Abramson, 1954, p. 156). In this, he was consistent. 
As he explained twenty-five years later, in his last-known interview: “I believe that cultural factors advance 
or delay, but do not modify, structures. I also believe that structures always have a biological point of 
departure” (in Voyat, Inhelder, & Piaget, 2011, p. 21). 
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previously pursued. 
For the innumerable contemporary scholars seeking to build on a synthesis of 
Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s theories, the obvious approach before the contrast afforded by 
the new biography would have been to set up the two theorists in dialectical opposition: 
Piagetian theory as thesis, and Vygotskian theory as antithesis, with the commenting 
author providing a new synthesis. Now, however, we are drawn instead to look for the 
ways in which Piaget—a man seeking the approval of the Faculty of Sciences at 
Geneva—may have purposefully obscured his theory’s sociality. Given that he had 
indicated in his response to Vygotsky that the antithetical criticisms had been addressed, 
we can also come to no other conclusion than that the sought-after synthesis may already 
exist in his subsequent writings. 
8.2. Neglect, backlash, and suppression. Shifting perspectives now from a focus 
on the particular to a focus on the discipline (from it to us), it is clear that the rise of 
Vygotsky is interpretable as a response to the popularity of Piaget; that his works may 
well have been caught in an updraft of the post-Piagetian backlash, which is itself nicely 
encapsulated by the term “Piaget bashing” (see Seagrim, 1981, p. 422; used more 
recently by Valsiner, 2012, p. ix). Yet the larger issue raised by these studies is not that of 
backlash. Instead, it’s the reverse that seems to matter more in the grand scheme of 
things: a stronger neglect, in the form of suppression.  
The connection between the two concepts is straightforward: were it not for 
suppression, there could be no backlash. Change would simply happen normally—
incrementally—as areas of accidental neglect were discovered and addressed. Yet the 
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result need not be revolutionary, in the sense described by Kuhn (1962/2012) in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Indeed, we know that Kuhn’s model doesn’t apply 
cleanly to Psychology (see e.g., Greenwood, 1999). Still, there is something here that 
needs to be explained (as I argued previously in Hobbs & Burman, 2009). I would 
therefore like to reintroduce the notion as one belonging properly to the indigenization-
colonization discourse; of the importation and reconstruction of “foreign” influences in 
new contexts, with specific reference to “local” interests and norms, leading to different 
views of the same phenomena and followed eventually by the subsequent masking of 
both the original source and the imported thing’s remaking (see e.g., Burman, 2012d). 
Why must this occur? Briefly put, it’s because psychology—and psychological 
meta-theory—is manipulable as a result of its fundamental nature as a normative body of 
knowledge. Despite pretensions to universality, psychology remains a moral science (pun 
intended). And this brings neglect with it as a natural consequence: certain thoughts are 
“thinkable,” and others are “unthinkable.” But these sensibilities then also suppress 
“foreign” contributions, in every sense of that word. And I suggest that it is this 
suppression which produces the backlashes that have been observed as “the rise of 
indigenous psychologies” (see Allwood & Berry, 2006). I also suggest, however, that it is 
doing more than this. 
9. Hurt and remedy 
Where there are different norms, there are different possibilities. Thus, what we 
accept as Psychology shapes how we approach psychological topics. Yet I propose that 
this acceptance is also a form of colonization: it is a frame of mind, or an implicit stance, 
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adopted by those who wish to participate. This then imposes the norms that Danziger 
(1990, 1997b) described as having arisen historically in “American” psychology. And it 
is that which then causes the neglect which leads to problems for “foreigners,” even as 
professional development is otherwise unaffected.  
To wit: if a text is deemed by insiders to be “foreign,” in the sense that it is not 
consistent with the present set of norms that govern the discipline, then it will be 
dismissed as “not relevant” or “out of date” (or of “poor style”). It will therefore be 
excluded and ignored (perhaps as “Sociology”).61 Yet this then implies also the reverse: 
that older texts which are found to anticipate a present aesthetic can be celebrated as 
“ahead of their time” (or “genius”). And this suggests that such dismissals are indeed the 
flipside of celebration, and thus that they are something about which historians should be 
wary: they do not index differences in quality (“health”), necessarily, but differences in 
context (“internal politics”). Indeed, they are “sign-posts” (Ball, 2012, p. 79).  
Dismissing “foreign” contributions solely for reasons of incompatible style is 
highly problematic: readers operating from within the “American” sensibility miss 
important details, the recognition of which would help in the pursuit of other seemingly 
unrelated interests that are nonetheless valuable. What we have discovered about Piaget 
makes this clear. Yet there is even, to put it in stronger words, an ongoing hurt to be 
remedied: a consequence of what we might call, for lack of a better term, “scientific 
chauvinism” or even “epistemological prejudice” (cf. Teo’s [2010b] “epistemological 
                                                 
61 Piaget (1982b) said something similar of Baldwin’s position in biology as a psychologist: “Do 
you know that among biologists the fact that Baldwin was a psychologist is completely ignored? It is a 
point that I had to check out for myself. Biologists do not take psychologists seriously. If they had known 
that Baldwin was a psychologist, they wouldn’t even have read him!” (p. 84). 
98 
 
violence”).62  
The obvious solution is that we ought to encourage psychologists to “think 
bilingually”—as indeed I did in discussing these problems during my first visit to Geneva 
(Burman, 2012e)—but the elimination of the language requirement in the “American” 
psychological curriculum presents an unsurmountable institutional barrier. It also now 
seems clear that this would have been too narrow a solution. Other obvious routes are to 
encourage and support multiculturalism (see Piaget, 1966/1976) and interdisciplinarity 
(Piaget, 1966/1967, 1966/1969, 1970/1973, 1978, 1979). Yet there is no universal 
institutional mechanism which could provide for this in the education of “American” 
psychologists, except perhaps the History and Systems course that was—until recently—
required explicitly for APA accreditation (see Benjamin, 2001, p. 738).  
In fact, it seems to me that the History and Systems course could be the perfect 
vehicle for teaching this valuable and necessary “cultural sensitivity.” Indeed, the kind of 
pluralistic thinking that is encouraged when this course is done well—encapsulated in the 
broader epistemic sensitivity required to engage and understand ideas that are hard to see 
and understand from the present perspective—ought to generalize easily to other areas of 
the discipline (see e.g., Ball et al., 2013; Beins, 2011; Yanchar & Slife, 2004). Another 
benefit is the much-reduced ethical burden in history, since most of the human subjects 
involved are already in the ground. In short: if we accept Hamlet’s observation that death 
is the undiscovered country, then what is History if not exactly the guide our students 
                                                 
62 To put this in different terms, “foreign” scholars have become the subaltern speakers of 
professional history of psychology (cf. Spivak, 1988). The remedy thus proposed is therefore necessarily a 
“political” one (following Spivak, 1998). And while I find the necessity of political action personally 
distasteful, the cause—asymmetry in treatment and inconsistency in action—is far worse. 
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need? (cf. R. I. Watson, 1979). 
10. Final thoughts 
 “Modern Psychology” is already being pushed in this direction. Indeed, the best 
single book-length comparative study by an Historian of Psychology is John Carson’s 
(2007) examination of the differences between American and French approaches to 
intelligence-testing (see also Carson, 2014). Yet witness, too, the recent publication of 
two new volumes intended to aid instructors in helping their students to think 
internationally: Internationalizing the Psychology Curriculum in the United States (see 
esp. the chapter by Pickren, 2012) and The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
Psychology: Global Perspectives (Baker, 2012). Two new textbooks for the 
undergraduate course in History and Systems—reflecting these very concerns—are also 
available (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). But there is as yet 
no similar text that describes international differences in historical sensibility; differences 
in the doing of the history of psychology, or what to do in encountering them.  
This is perhaps a reflection of Danziger’s (1990) popularization of David Bakan’s 
(1967) accusation that psychologists suffer from a kind of method-fetishism, which he 
had memorably called “methodolatry” (p. 158). Given their power and influence in the 
History of Psychology, the subsequent neglect of methods-talk among Historians of 
Psychology is only natural. Indeed, the discussion to this point about the appropriate 
response to recognizing the Americanization of psychology—among professional 
historians of psychology—has been primarily about internationalizing historical content 
(see esp. Brock, 2006). But we need also to extend this discussion to process.  
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To be clear: I am not calling for a celebration of methods. Rather, my intent is 
simply to encourage greater reflexivity in considering our practice as historians (cf. 
Morawski & Bayer, 1995; see also Morawski, 2005). In short: we must situate ourselves, 
as well as our subjects. This is necessary because our practice—the process of doing 
History—is implicitly “American,” even in considering international subjects. And, as a 
result, we neglect valuable “foreign” contributions. 
Where, then, are the lines to be drawn between social norms, individual 
aesthetics, and the right way to do things? Surely there must be criteria according to 
which scholarly quality can be judged without regard for the way in which its product has 
been packaged. We need only articulate them more clearly. 
The present intuition in “American” History of Psychology seems to be that 
standards are set during one’s education as a result of reading “good” examples of “good” 
history (see e.g., Vaughn-Blount, Rutherford, Baker, & Johnson, 2009, pp. 123-125). But 
that normative approach then leads to the abstraction of heuristics—such as the dismissal 
and rejection of apparently celebratory works—which can clearly result in poor 
historiographical decision-making when considering “foreign” contributions. In short, we 
are left with a problem: identifying high-quality scholarly material cannot be merely a 
matter of taste, as if considering a fine wine for either the cellar or the bin (cf. Shapin, 
2012a, 2012b). And the need will only become more urgent: the History of Psychology is 
growing rapidly outside of the United States (Pickren, 2009a). If we don’t adapt, it is 
conceivable that we could someday be left behind (even excluded from our own 
discipline). 
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So, then: should the editors of “American” journals reject potentially-valuable 
“foreign” contributions simply because they feel un-American upon first reading? Surely 
not, for reasons that are obvious to “foreign” authors. As Ratcliff put it—in English—in 
our discussion of his new biography of Piaget: 
In French Le "jeune conquérant neuchatelois" [the young conqueror from 
Neuchâtel], as according to the original abstract was in tune both with language 
style and conceptual needs. of course it is an issue of connotation, which a French 
native speaker is at ease with. And the connotation of this conqueror is simple: 
not at all celebrative as you rightly saw, but, how would you call someone who 
was able to "enroll", as sociologists of science call it, more the 350 people to 
collaborate closely with him ? Are we just authorised to use the politically correct 
word "enroll" because it reflects the connotation of our time?; this is just a paved 
way for censorship. (Ratcliff, personal communication, 22 November 2013; my 
emphasis, with all other typography as in the original; including implicit 
references to Callon, 1986; and Ratcliff, 2010) 
While the purpose of disciplinary norms may indeed be to censor “unthinkable” 
contributions, that—in this case—should not be the intent. The intent should rather be to 
identify the best studies that contribute to knowledge in the best way.  
High-quality material is clearly being neglected accidentally (or rather, as I have 
heard my students say, it is being filtered out “accidentally-on-purpose”). Thus, my 
suggestion is simply this: as we reexamine our sensibilities regarding “foreign” content, 
and refocus away from WEIRD participants, so too must we confront our biases about 
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“foreign” process and presentation. I will now provide a method by which this might be 
achieved in specific cases, although its goal is not to assess quality; rather, its purpose is 
to identify differences.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
Quantifying neglect, formalizing the argument 
 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE STANDARDS of contemporary History, as it is done 
today by contemporary Historians of Psychology, are—from the present historiographical 
perspective—empirical questions. This is because contemporary Historians deal in 
evidence; usually papers, like letter correspondence and unpublished manuscripts, which 
are typically held in specialist archives. The material traces left by the actions of past 
Historians can also thus be examined. And this is how History itself changes: such 
examinations can inform present-day decisions about how best to present new historical 
arguments. 
In a strict sense, however, questions of norms are also beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. This is not a history of the History of Psychology. Rather, my intent here is 
to use a small case in order to speak about a larger issue. I have been following the norm 
of using evidence to pursue that goal. But this chapter takes a different approach: it uses 
evidence, but not in the form of the earlier comparative “microhistory.” (Small stories 
about a big issue.) Instead, I present a new method that enables a generalization of the 
Wundt Argument for application to Piaget. The result is a quantitative examination that 
will be acceptable to Psychologists, while at the same time replicating the form of an 
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argument that has been very important to Historians of Psychology.  
To put it plainly, “Wundt” was reconstructed in a new context: his foreign-feeling 
interests were neglected, and suppressed. The resulting reconceptualization then stood-in 
for the original source: Wundt was actively Americanized by his American followers 
(Rieber, 1980b). Their critics then dismissed him as well; his followers were fruits of a 
poisonous tree, and so critics burned the whole orchard down. It’s then this, as I 
mentioned in Chapter III, that gave us Behaviorism (O'Donnell, 1985).  
Of course, though, this is not about the object “Wundt.” The man himself didn’t 
actually move. It is about meaning, and thus also about implications: for an Americanized 
Wundt to be “the founder” of American Psychology constrained what the founded 
discipline could be defined to be. Subsequent action was then directed down one path, 
rather than another: toward “experimental” psychology, rather than a more “applied” 
approach (O'Donnell, 1979).  
The book that summarized and presented all of this in a single narrative—
Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research (Danziger, 
1990)—has become, along with its author, one of the central influences of contemporary 
History of Psychology (Teo, 2013b, p. 4n7; see also Brock, Louw, & van Hoorn, 2004). 
So my proposal follows simply and incrementally from there: something similar 
happened with Piaget, and the results pushed Developmental Psychology in a direction 
that was more consistent with the American audience’s interests than with the original 
source’s intent.  
Briefly put: Piaget’s texts were imported into a post-Titchenerian Behaviorist 
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context, during the “rediscovery” period of the 1950s and 1960s, and their meanings were 
remade in the image of the Cognitive Revolution. (This, in Geneva, is not a controversial 
suggestion [see e.g., Voyat, 1977].) That then explains the lop-sidedness of Piaget’s 
legacy (Bond & Tryphon, 2007). And it also, in turn, provides a plausible cause for 
subsequent concerns regarding the existence of a “new” theory: insiders became aware 
that the contemporary view of Piaget’s works was skewed, and went looking for what 
had been missed—in the same way as Wundt historians did (see esp. Blumenthal, 1975; 
1977; Danziger, 1979, 1980; Leahey, 1981; also Araujo, 2016; Klautke, 2013). 
 Thus, my goal in this chapter is to provide a general version of this Wundt 
Argument that will be acceptable to both Historians and Psychologists. To do this, I have 
replicated Brožek’s (1980) citation analysis of Wundt’s impact using books by Piaget (cf. 
Bond & Tryphon, 2007). But because I also want to use this to make an argument about 
form, rather than content, I have also gone a step further: my purpose here is not simply 
to report facts, but to use them as evidence. Thus, I aim to present Piaget as a second 
instance of a general “Indigenization Argument,” and to provide the means to replicate 
the discovery with other authors in other contexts. 
1. Generalizing from Wundt to Piaget 
Brožek (1980) situated his study as part of the Wundt Centennial, but explicitly 
distanced himself from its celebrations: “[his] aim was (and is) to contribute new factual 
information, not to join the chorus of Wundt’s admirers or critics” (p. 103). To gather his 
data, he then examined the first 90 volumes of the American Journal of Psychology for 
citations. But he did so by hand: none of the automated tools that now exist could be 
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appealed-to then (cf. Green & Feinerer, 2015). 
Brožek’s (1980) intent was to determine the impact of Wundt’s individual book-
length contributions, as well as a “rate of decay” (p. 104). The result was that he 
demonstrated a “decline of Wundt’s glory” (p. 104). More interesting for our purposes, 
however, is the ranking he produced of Wundt’s individual books.  
This, for Brožek, was a way to confirm that the well-known Grundzüge der 
physiologischen Psychologie was indeed Wundt’s “bestseller” (p. 105). And Brožek 
equates its popularity—with 61% of all citations in his sample—with its “relative 
importance” (p. 106). In retrospect, however, contemporary Historians would likely 
provide a different interpretation. 
We know from subsequent work that Brožek’s aside about the Völkerpsychologie 
having “fared poorly” (p. 106) would soon be taken very seriously. (Its neglect is the 
basis of the Wundt Argument.) Seen from that perspective, his quantitative data can then 
be understood as providing evidence not of each book’s “importance,” but of their 
“reception.” This then enables his study to be interpreted through the lens of 
indigenization that characterizes the Wundt Argument: evidence of what, in Wundt’s 
writings, the audience of American importers found most interesting or useful. That is 
what I have done below for Piaget. Further analyses then highlight differences in the 
reception of those same texts by different groups, differentiating between content 
(message) and form (massage). (Or, to put it in the terms of Chapter III: health and 
internal politics, although I do not use those terms here.) 
To enable such a comparison, I have collected the citation counts provided by 
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Google Scholar for all of Piaget’s books in French, as well as for their English and 
German translations.63 This is a bit skewed toward the present view, of course, because 
Google has access only to those materials that have been digitized. (And also because the 
disciplinary “style” for citations has changed over the period of study [see Sigal & Pettit, 
2012].) But this at least should be skewed consistently: Google has no particular interest 
in one aspect of Piaget’s output over another, so its data should be more than adequate for 
the purposes of my demonstration. (I do not duplicate his calculation of a “rate of decay,” 
however, because Google Scholar does not provide time-based citation data; interested 
readers are directed instead toward Google Books’ NGram Viewer, although this has its 
own problems [see Pettit, 2016].) 
2. Toward a more formal comparative history 
 The great benefit of this approach is the very large ‘n,’ which ought to appeal to 
Psychologists. Indeed, I found 104,814 citations distributed across the three languages. 
(See Figure 1.) And this then affords a kind of null historical hypothesis: if Piaget’s texts 
were not indigenized in the same way that Wundt’s have been shown to be, then their 
impact—as assessed by citation counts—should be the same in French, English, and 
German. (Or rather, the impact would be the same relative to the total number of citations 
made in that language.) Needless to say, however, that is not the case.  
  
                                                 
63 Books and pamphlets are included according to the categorization produced by the Fondation 
Jean Piaget in Switzerland: http://www.fondationjeanpiaget.ch/fjp/site/bibliographie/index.php. The best 
source for titles in all three languages is Richard Kohler’s online bibliography: 
http://www.richardkohler.ch/piagetbiblio.htm  
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Figure 1. Piaget's raw citation data, with no manipulation. Dates are according to original 
source publication. There is one exclusion: The Psychology of Intelligence (Piaget, 
1947/1950), for reasons explained below. 
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 2.1. The raw data, and the cooked. To replicate Brožek’s (1980) study as 
closely as possible, the first step is to present a simple ranking using the raw data from 
Google. Yet this already highlights a problem: at the time these data were first collected, 
in early-2013, there were thousands of citations reported by Google for the English 
edition of The Psychology of Intelligence and very few for the French original (Piaget, 
1947/1950). And yet when a double-check was performed in early-2015, and continuing 
to this day, the situation was reversed: thousands of citations for the French, and very few 
for the English.  
This seemed fatal for the approach, at the time of discovery, but problems like this 
are actually fairly common in the digital humanities. Corrections to “raw” data are almost 
always required. And this need is so pervasive that one commentator recently pointed out 
that “raw data is an oxymoron” (Gitelman, 2013). All such data, in other words, is at least 
lightly “cooked.” (Indeed, Brožek’s [1980] study is full of selections and exclusions.) 
Still, it’s worth noting that no other book seems similarly affected. We will therefore 
simply recognize Piaget’s The Psychology of Intelligence as being akin to Wundt’s 
Grundzüge in its impact—#1 in French and German, and #3 in English—and move on to 
a deeper analysis using the data we do have. A brief word, though, about what it is that 
we are excluding. 
 As Piaget’s books go, The Psychology of Intelligence is relatively straightforward. 
It was developed first as lectures for a course that he ran at the College de France in 1942 
as part of his resistance to WWII: “at an hour when university men felt the need to show 
their solidarity in the face of violence and their fidelity to permanent values” (Piaget, 
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1947/1950, p. vi). Publication and translation were then delayed until after the war was 
over.  
This was the first of Piaget’s books to appear in English since the translation of 
Moral Judgment almost twenty years before (Piaget, 1932/1932). Given this, it’s then no 
wonder that the book was so influential: it marked Piaget’s return to English psychology. 
In German, however, the situation was somewhat different. 
Translated immediately after the war, and published in 1948, Psychologie der 
Intelligenz was the first-ever German-language edition of one of Piaget’s books. Indeed, 
it was the first of nearly three dozen translations. It can therefore be understood to occupy 
the somewhat special position of having provided the first impression of Piaget for 
German audiences. Simply put: every book published afterward would have been read 
through its influence. 
 Comparing the reception of the three editions, the relatively lower status of the 
book’s English translation can perhaps be attributed to the popularity of John Flavell’s 
(1963) introductory textbook: The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. This is 
widely recognized as having been the first major work to make Piaget accessible to 
English-speaking audiences. The two books also cover very similar territory. 
Commentators on the draft of 1957 even dismissed it as having been skewed in its 
perspective by that book’s recent translation (Müller et al., 2013, p. 52). And this in turn 
provides a possible explanation for Piaget’s book’s slightly lower ranking on our 
Brožekian bestseller list: the two books competed for citations in English, but—because 
no translation of Flavell was made—they did not in French or German. (With Flavell’s 
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book’s citations added to Piaget’s, the combination then ranks #1 on the English list.) 
From this perspective, what “Piaget” means for the contemporary audiences is 
old: his ideas are WWII-era. And everyone knows, of course, that huge amounts of work 
have been done since then. So why would a contemporary Psychologist bother with such 
an archaic text?  
At the same time, Piaget’s view is also clearly foreign. Rather than treating 
intelligence in psychometric terms, he considers it to be the consequence of a developing 
sequence of “operational” structures and groupings. (More on this in Chapter V.) That’s 
not archaic; it’s weird. 
For an Historian, though, this finding is ideal: as an introduction to the ideas that 
informed the “standard theory,” one could do much worse than The Psychology of 
Intelligence. Now, though, we want to see beyond its influence. Excluding it from our 
analyses is therefore not only necessary for practical reasons, but it’s also very useful: we 
won’t be blinded by it, and our illustrations of the quantitative data won’t be compressed 
by its much-greater impact. 
2.2. Basic figures. To derive the remainder of a bestseller list, we can report some 
basic figures. Thus, for example: the means and standard deviations for citations in 
French, English, and German were 186.2 (261.1), 1461.4 (2114.5), and 172.6 (182) 
respectively.  
Immediately, this suggests a powerful reason for why European funding agencies 
are so anxious to have their grantees publish in English-language journals: the impact in 
English is eight times greater than in French or German, for the same input. But the 
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differences also provide us with a simple way of assessing the impact of books across 
different languages: it’s clear that each language group needs to be treated separately, 
before they can be compared. Thus, those books that received more citations than two 
standard deviations above the mean in each group are listed in Table 2, along with their 
translated titles. 
The consistency is remarkable: The Origins of Intelligence in Children (Piaget, 
1936/1952) and The Moral Judgment of the Child (Piaget, 1932/1932) appear in all three 
lists, and—if one is interested only in reading the Great Books by Psychology’s Great 
Men—they are clearly key companion texts to read alongside The Psychology of 
Intelligence. But they are also very early texts. In fact, with only one exception related to 
the French reception of Biology and Knowledge (Piaget, 1967/1971), all of the 
“bestsellers” were published prior to the end of WWII. The exception need not be 
discussed here, however; it will appear several times later, and its importance will be 
discussed in detail (especially in Chapter VI). 
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Table 2. Piaget’s “bestsellers” by citation count (total citations in that language) 
French English German 
La naissance de l'intelligence 
chez l'enfant, 1936 (1167)** 
 
The origins of intelligence in 
children, trans 1952 
The origins of intelligence in 
children, 1936/1952 (8174)** 
Das moralische Urteil beim 
Kinde, trans 1932/1954 (711)** 
 
The moral judgment of the child 
La construction du réel chez 
l'enfant, 1937 (1029)** 
 
The construction of reality in the 
child, trans 1954 
The moral judgment of the child, 
1932/1932 (8093)** 
Das Erwachen der Intelligenz 
beim Kinde, 1936/1969 (567)* 
 
The origins of intelligence in 
children 
La formation du symbole chez 
l'enfant, 1945 (1016)* 
 
Play, dreams and imitation in 
childhood, trans 1962 
The child's conception of the 
world, 1926/1929 (7280)* 
 
Le jugement moral chez l'enfant, 
1932 (911)* 
 
The moral judgment of the child, 
trans 1932 
Play, dreams and imitation in 
childhood, 1945/1962 (5921)* 
 
Biologie et connaissance, 1967 
(791)* 
 
Biology and knowledge, trans 
1971 
The construction of reality in the 
child, 1937/1954 (5781)* 
 
 
2.3. Citation density. A simple next step is to calculate a slightly different kind 
of bestseller list by accounting for the number of years since publication. This then 
allows us to get to a more temporally-sensitive version of what Brožek (1980) referred-to 
as “the relative ‘weight’ of… individual publications” (p. 103).  
Citation density indexes impact per year in which it was possible to cite a text. 
This can be calculated easily by dividing the total citation count by the number of years 
since publication. That then provides a time-weighted “citation density” metric that 
enables the comparison of works produced across a long lifespan, although it will be 
especially useful when we compare translations made of the same text that were 
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themselves published at different times. It also provides a better assessment of “perceived 
importance” than does the raw citation count: a more important text will have a greater 
number of citations per year, even though a more recent text may have fewer total 
citations.  
We can again use means and standard deviations to narrow in on the most 
significant books in the group. Thus, to summarize: the original French works were cited 
an average of 3.5 times per year since publication (with a standard deviation of 4.6 
citations per year), the English translations 28 times per year (33.2), and German 4 times 
per year (4.1). Focusing on the works that received citations at rates greater than two 
standard deviations above the mean then gives the results in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Piaget’s “bestsellers” by citation density (cites per year since publication) 
French English German 
L'équilibration des structures 
cognitives, 1975 (17.9)** 
 
Equilibration of cognitive 
structures, trans 1978 and 1985 
The origins of intelligence in 
children, 1936/1952 (136.2)** 
Die Psychologie des Kindes, 
1966/1977 (13.4)* 
 
The psychology of the child 
Biologie et connaissance, 1967 
(17.6)** 
 
Biology and knowledge, trans 
1971 
The psychology of the child, 
1966/1969 (109.8)* 
Das Erwachen der Intelligenz 
beim Kinde, 1936/1969 (13.2)* 
 
The origins of intelligence in 
children 
La naissance de l'intelligence 
chez l'enfant, 1936 (15.4)** 
 
The origins of intelligence in 
children, trans 1952 
The construction of reality in the 
child, 1937/1954 (99.7)* 
Das moralische Urteil beim 
Kinde, 1932/1954 (12.3)* 
 
The moral judgment of the child 
La psychologie de l'enfant, 1966 
(13.5)** 
 
The psychology of the child, 
trans 1969 
  
La prise de conscience, 1974 
(12.8)** 
 
The grasp of consciousness, 
trans 1976 
  
Réussir et comprendre, 1974 
(11.8)* 
 
Success and understanding, trans 
1978 
  
Logique et connaissance 
scientifique, 1967 (10.2)* 
 
[untranslated] 
  
Introduction à l'épistémologie 
génétique, 1950 (10.0)* 
 
[untranslated] 
  
Psychogenèse et histoire des 
sciences, 1983 (8.3)* 
 
Psychogenesis and the history of 
science, trans 1989 
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The results are interesting: the French originals are both more numerous and more 
diverse than the English or German translations. And although the highest “density” 
books from the English and German lists are contained within the French list, the French 
list also includes many more recent books.  
Two of the identified French texts haven’t been translated. Of course, this isn’t 
especially meaningful in terms of differentiating impact across groups (because interested 
foreign scholars would have had to cite the originals). But there are some things here that 
we ought to mention. Actually, the French #1, L’équilibration des structures cognitives 
(better known as The equilibration of cognitive structures [Piaget, 1975/1985]), requires 
some explicit discussion. 
This book is the first theoretical summary of the New Theory period: it reviews 
and integrates the first three volumes of experiments published immediately after the 
changes in Piaget’s logic and biology that are discussed at length in Chapters V & VI 
(Piaget, 1974/1976, 1974/1978, 1974/1980b). It also represents Piaget’s return to 
theorizing the primary constructive mechanism required of his system: “équilibration 
majorante,” which—lacking explicit access to the updated logical framework discussed 
in Chapter V—the English translators rendered unhelpfully as “optimizing equilibration.”  
As has often been noted, this translation is insufficient to convey the intended 
meaning. Among other things, it misses the transcending step implied by the level-change 
that was made more explicit in Piaget’s later untranslated discussion of dialectics (Piaget, 
1980b). Yet even with that reference in-hand, this book would have been very difficult to 
render in another language: as a summary of new ideas, it assumes a huge amount of 
117 
 
material that is not discussed explicitly (much of which had not yet been published). This 
then had real consequences in moving its meaning across contexts. 
In English, this book has the dubious distinction of having received two 
translations. To put it plainly: the first attempt was “seriously defective” (Smith, 2009a, 
p. 28). What’s worse, though, is that the earlier translation has actually received more 
citations than the higher-quality replacement. The result is that the bulk of readers in 
English have actually not read even an approximation of the text read by French 
audiences. 
Given the book’s position on our second bestseller list, this is itself quite 
significant. But it’s not the only book with problems. Indeed, one of Piaget’s better-
known translators, Eleanor Duckworth, told me in 2010 that Origins of Intelligence—
which sits at #1 on both of our English bestseller lists—also needs to be replaced (noted 
in my translation of Ducret & Schachner, 2011, pp. 1n-2n). Doubtless there are many 
others too: the original translators of Equilibration and Origins were responsible for 
several volumes, including the bestselling The construction of reality in the child (Piaget, 
1937/1954). It therefore seems likely that many of Piaget’s most important books contain 
substantial divergences from the originals. 
Recognizing this, it’s obviously possible that “indigenization” isn’t the only 
intervening effect at work here. As with Wundt, there’s some incompetence too. 
Unfortunately, however, that is a very difficult thing to quantify. For this reason, I will 
concentrate solely in this chapter on what can be shown with the evidence that can be 
mustered. I will then use the following chapters to follow the example of contemporary 
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Historians and delve more deeply into what cannot be shown quantitatively. 
2.4. Comparing across language groups. Listing top-ranked publications is easy 
so long as one has access to the data. But we want to compare all of Piaget’s books, in 
multiple languages, and in a systematic and direct way. As a result, we must now begin to 
move beyond what Brožek (1980) attempted, although—since the technology is quite 
different today—we do so simply by taking advantage of the available computational 
tools.  
In addition: the recognition that all such data are “cooked,” to one extent or 
another, enables us to play with the numbers in ways that are more revealing than would 
be the raw citations that most such studies focus on. Yet the resulting manipulations are 
mathematical, rather than statistical. And they are as simple as can be managed: although 
more complex manipulations might reveal more, their rhetorical power would decline in 
proportion to their complexity. The resulting approach may therefore seem a bit foreign 
to Psychologists, but it should be close enough for comfort. It is also consistent with 
work presently being done by Psychologists and Historians working in the digital 
humanities (see e.g., Burman, Green, et al., 2015). 
 The first manipulation is a kind of scaling. This is necessary if we are to compare 
across language groups, but it requires only that the citation count for each book be 
rescaled relative to the most highly-cited book in that group. This then allows for the 
relative impacts in each language to be compared without concern for the external causes 
of differences in citation patterns (e.g., the number of people working in each group, 
citation styles, etc.). We can then consider internal differences, and use them to identify 
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new questions worth asking. 
This first manipulation is easily done in an Excel spreadsheet using the LARGE 
function: with book title, publication date, and raw citation count in the first three 
columns, a new column is calculated by dividing the relevant cell in each row (the 
individual book’s citation count) by the largest number from the “raw” column (the book 
with the highest citation count in that language). Once defined, the formula can then be 
populated across the rows. Of course, Excel will automatically increment the cell-
references during this process. And although this is convenient for updating the reference 
to the “raw” column, it introduces an error inside the function. As a result, the function 
needs to be corrected for all rows. With this done, the corrected column can then be 
copied and pasted into another column (or to another sheet) for application with another 
language group. 
 Presenting these results graphically is relatively simple. The tallest bar of each 
color represents the highest-impact text in that language group. But the results are 
powerful: they afford the first qualitative test of our null hypothesis. Simply put: had the 
impacts been the same in each language, then the bars in Figure 2 would be flat three-
across for each book in all three languages. That is clearly not the case.  
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Figure 2. 
 
To make the point conclusively, one might be tempted to add error bars and 
asterisks showing significant differences (to represent the degree of certainty one has that 
Google’s sample is representative of the population of published citations). But these 
graphic are already overly complex. And it’s not necessary to focus on close calls or 
near-misses: this is an investigative took, not a replacement for History. An example will 
suffice to make the value of such an approach clear.  
Looking to the first experimental books of the New Theory period—The Grasp of 
Consciousness (Piaget, 1974/1976) and Success and Understanding (Piaget, 
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1974/1978)—we see that they are widely cited in French, and yet hardly known at all in 
English. But because these data have been scaled relative to impact in each language, this 
difference should not be much smaller. If texts were received according to their innate 
importance, rather than according to the meaning that they have in a particular scientific 
context, then the scaled impact would be very similar. This would also apply to all books, 
rather than just the few from early in Piaget’s career. 
This needs a word more: only the early books were received at similar levels in all 
three languages. The blue bars illustrating the impact that these texts had in French are 
much taller later in his career, especially in the 1970s: the period of the New Theory. 
That is suspicious, but nothing more. We must dig deeper. 
In addition to rescaling and comparing the raw citation data, we can also rescale 
and compare the calculated citation densities. (Figure 3.) The effect is then to normalize 
the impact relative to publication date in each language. We are then able to see the 
earlier bestseller list in a new light: individual bestsellers seem often to be bracketed on 
either side by other high-performing texts, as if certain topics or times became 
momentarily fashionable. 
Something to note quickly: because there were two versions published in English 
of Equilibration of Cognitive Structures, it appears twice in the graph. This is the double-
bar located at 1975. Even despite this potential confusion, however, it’s clear that the 
French texts are much more highly represented more recently. Indeed, with only a few 
exceptions, the most densely-cited English and German texts are still mostly older: pre-
WWII. To say more, though, we will need to continue to dig. 
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Figure 3.  
 
 
 2.5. Controlling translation impact with source impact. To assess 
“indigenization” is to make a comparison between source and target. For Wundt, this was 
done historically: the early New Historians realized that the understanding of the target 
group (American psychologists) had gaps relative to the source (German psychological 
texts). Brožek (1980) then showed this both quantitatively and qualitatively by making 
lists. My visualizations in replicating his work with Piaget have been more complex. But 
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the resulting comparisons have so far been very similar. We can go much further. 
To build my argument, I have added a new layer of complexity at each step. Until 
this point, however, they have each been simple. Now, though, we must do something 
relatively complex. Briefly put: making a quantitative comparison requires controlling for 
the impact of the source texts in the source language while at the same time presenting 
the impact of the target translation in the target language.  
This can’t be done using the raw citations. Instead, we need to use the scaled 
language-controlled data. In what follows, we are therefore leveraging everything done to 
this point. 
To construct the illustration in Figure 4, I first removed from consideration those 
works for which there is no translation in the target language. Then I constructed a new 
formula, which required several columns. I subtracted the scaled language-controlled 
source (French) impact from the scaled language-controlled target impact (separately in 
English and German), and then—to preserve the scaling—I used the ABS function and the 
LARGE function to divide by the highest-density text in the target language. This enabled 
the division to use the absolute value of the product of the subtraction, which then 
ensured that the results remained within the expected range for a scalar comparison (+/-
1). 
The resulting illustration is a kind of scaled “over-under.” Where values are 
negative, sources are cited more highly than translations. That the overall trend is more 
negative than positive, for both target languages, then suggests that—although individual 
texts may have been cited at higher rates—the relative impact of Piaget’s writings were in 
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the aggregate reduced in translation. This is then consistent with our intuition in 
considering Table 3. In short: the impact of the scaling is higher on the low side (-1 vs -
0.75). 
 
Figure 4. 
 
These results also provide the means to construct two new lists, which will be 
useful in simplifying the illustrations. Yet these lists are quite different from the earlier 
ones. Rather than identifying “bestsellers,” as Brožek (1980) did, we can instead identify 
those books which have been “celebrated” in translation, and those which have been 
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“neglected.” By this I mean of course that their reception in translation is at odds with 
their reception in the original French. Following contemporary Historians’ discomfort 
with “celebratory” narratives, however, I will instead refer to these texts “over-rated” and 
“under-rated” (relative to the impact of the source text in the original language). 
Inclusion on the “over-rated” list suggests that rather too much fuss has been 
made of these books in translation, relative to their original impact (see Table 4). And 
with the exception of Genetic epistemology—which is a very short collection of four 
lectures intended for an American audience, and hence quite citable by English-speakers 
(Piaget, 1970/1971)—both texts are known to us from earlier analyses: both The child’s 
conception of the world (Piaget, 1926/1929) and Das moralische Urteil beim Kinde 
(known in English as Moral Judgment [Piaget, 1932/1932]) are on our first list of 
bestsellers (Table 2), and the latter is on our second list too (Table 3).  
 
Table 4. Piaget’s most “over-rated” texts (by raw indigenization score) 
English vs. French German vs. French 
The child’s conception of the world, 1926/1929 
(0.70)* 
Das moralische Urteil beim Kinde, 1932/1954 
(0.59)* 
 
The moral judgment of the child 
Genetic epistemology, 1970/1971 (0.62)*  
 
By contrast, inclusion on the “under-rated” list suggests that rather less has been 
made in translation of those texts than perhaps was warranted given the way in which 
they were received in French (Table 5). Surprisingly, no German texts were identified by 
this process. But the later work from the second French bestseller list is included on the 
English side of this new list (Table 3). So are the two translations of Equilibration of 
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cognitive structures. (Note, though, that this effect goes away when citations for both 
versions are added together; the entry in the table is struck-out.) And one book is entirely 
new to us. 
 
Table 5. Piaget’s most highly “under-rated” texts (by raw indigenization score) 
English vs. French German vs. French 
The child’s conception of space (-1)* [none reach the level of 2SD] 
Biology and knowledge (-0.91)*  
The equilibration of cognitive structures (-0.85)*  
 
This new book, The child’s conception of space (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956), 
was discussed briefly in Chapter II as part of the discussion situating Piaget’s genetic 
epistemology as a programmatic experimentally-derived response to Kant. For this to 
have been received so underwhelmingly by English-speaking audiences then reinforces 
Piaget’s impression, in commenting on Flavell’s (1963) introductory textbook, that the 
view presented of his work in English was more psychological than epistemological—
while his own perspective was the reverse (see Piaget, 1963, pp. viii-ix).  
From a psychological perspective, this book on space presented yet more results 
from the Genevan factory: replications of things already known or suspected from earlier 
works, albeit often using interesting new methods to demonstrate them. From an 
epistemological perspective, however, the book was quite significant: it connected 
Piaget’s psychological research with problems in the history of science, and delivered on 
the promissory note included in his inaugural speech as the new Chair in Psychology at 
Neuchâtel (Piaget, 1925). It also did so experimentally, rather than through theoretical 
argumentation. 
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In French, the book is included on the Top 10 list. (It also only just narrowly 
missed the cut-off for inclusion in Table 2 as a bestseller.) In English, however, it ranks 
in the middle of the second tier. It is, in other words, perceived as having been of 
middling importance. 
2.6. Controlling for language while using citation density. Similar results can 
be derived from these data after taking citation density into account. (Figure 5.) Yet, 
curiously, no book is “over-rated” from this perspective (Table 6). It seems that taking 
historicity into account eliminates this category from both the English and the German 
texts. From there, delving deeper would require stepping out of the internal dataset to 
enquire as to why certain texts were omitted from translation. This is important, but 
outside the scope of this chapter. (However, I will discuss untranslated works in what 
follows.) 
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Figure 5.  
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Table 6. Piaget’s most “over-rated” texts (by density-weighted indigenization score) 
English vs. French German vs. French 
[none reach the level of 2SD] [none reach the level of 2SD] 
 
The main difference in using citation density, as compared to raw counts, is that 
more recent books are highlighted (Table 7). Thus, for example, Biology and Knowledge 
(Piaget, 1967/1971) is identified as a highly “under-rated” text in both English and 
German, while Success and Understanding (Piaget, 1974/1978) is listed only for English. 
Both will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. (The two translations of 
Equilibration of cognitive structures were identified as well, but this effect disappears 
when their counts are combined.) 
 
Table 7. Piaget’s most highly “under-rated” texts (by density-weighted 
indigenization score) 
English vs. French German vs. French 
The equilibration of cognitive structures, 
1975/1985  
(-0.94)* 
Biologie und Erkenntnis, 1967/1974 (-1.0)* 
 
Biology and knowledge 
Biology and knowledge, 1967/1971 (-0.90)*  
Success and understanding, 1974/1978 (-0.79)*  
 
 
3. Toward a generalized Indigenization Argument 
 It seems reasonable to conclude from the material reviewed thus far that Piaget 
was affected by the same sort of importation process as was Wundt: changes were made 
in the meaning of his research program while it was being re-interpreted for a new 
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audience, and certain materials were stressed, deemphasized, or left out according to the 
audience’s interests. The goal now is to show this more conclusively; to remove as much 
of the time-related variance as possible from a simple temporal model of the texts’ 
impact, such that what remains can be attributed solely to error or indigenization. 
 3.1. Raw citation data. Beginning at the simplest possible place, we start with 
the basic figures. The mean publication date and standard deviations for the books 
examined are as follows: 1959.8 (16.3) in French, 1969 (16.5) in English, and 1973.4 
(7.4) in German. Given that Piaget was born in 1896, the very late average in the original 
French is surprising: for most people, “retirement age” is not the midpoint of a career. 
Beyond this, however, there is very little of substance to say about dates alone. Still, even 
treated as trivia, these data merit a few comments. 
The earliest translations into English all fall more than two standard deviations 
from the mean on the low end. This supports the accepted belief that Piaget’s works were 
later rediscovered: the early translations fall far outside the expected range, and were 
followed by a decades-long gap. What is more interesting, however, is that I recall—but 
cannot now find the reference—that Piaget dismissed his earliest works prior to Moral 
Judgment as juvenilia. That this matches up exactly with our findings is coincidental, of 
course, because the choice of two standard deviations is conventional. But it is certainly 
made more interesting by our having identified The child’s conception of the world 
(Piaget, 1926/1929) as having been highly over-rated by English audiences (Table 4).  
On the high end, all of the books published in English and French fit within two 
standard deviations but for one exception: the recently completed edited volume on 
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“reason” (Henriques, Dionnet, & Ducret, 2004). This project was started in the last year 
of Piaget’s life, and was assumed until recently to have been abandoned. That belief was 
clearly incorrect. Unfortunately, however, as with many of Piaget’s later works, this new 
book has not yet been translated (but see Piaget, 2004/2006). 
The German case is somewhat more complex. Two books in our sample sit 
beyond two standard deviations from the mean on the distal side: Das moralische Urteil 
beim Kinde in 1954 (known in English as Moral Judgment [Piaget, 1932/1932]), and Die 
Bildung des Zeitbegriffs beim Kinde in 1955 (The Child’s Conception of Time [Piaget, 
1946/1969]). The first is an obvious choice for an early translation: it is one of Piaget’s 
best-known books in both English and French. (And yet also highly overrated in its 
German reception [Table 4].) But the second seems a very peculiar choice. It is 
considered a lesser work in English, and of slightly better than middling importance in 
French. Yet it is tied to the Kantian program mentioned earlier, and—given the American 
discomfort with grand theories—that is perhaps why it was considered more “relevant” to 
the German audience.  
However, there is also a contextual element here that is worth considering: 
Einstein died in April of that same year. And it was his questioning of Piaget on this topic 
in the early 1930s that had originally inspired the project (see Sauer, in press). So perhaps 
its early publication in German was related to this connection; interest reflected by 
context. To know for sure, of course, we would need to examine the relevant papers at 
the Piaget Archives. Unfortunately, these are not among the processed papers. 
Two German translations also sit above two standard deviations on the proximal 
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side: Die Entwicklung des inneren Bildes beim Kind, translated in 1990 (Mental imagery 
in the child [Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1971]), and Intelligenz und Affektivität in der 
Entwicklung des Kindes, translated in 1995 (Intelligence and Affectivity [Piaget, 
1954/1981]). Neither is especially well-known in English.  
The first is a study of spatial and geometrical reasoning, and can thus be 
considered a sequel to The child’s conception of space (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956). 
The second is an extended treatment of lecture notes from a course presented at the 
Sorbonne in 1953-1954, in which Piaget discussed the “energetics” and “structuring” of 
reason. This is of course in conflict with the “cognitive” interpretation that American 
audiences apply in interpreting Piaget, but the reason for the German publisher’s choice 
of this volume over another is not clear. (Again, those papers are not yet accessible at the 
Piaget Archives.) 
 3.2. Periodization of raw citation data. In addition to the identification of books 
published at unexpected times (which is so superficial as to be almost not worth 
mentioning), we can use the raw citation data to get a sense of the relationship between 
time-of-publication and impact in each language. This then highlights certain features of 
Piaget’s different publishing careers, such as the long gap prior to the “rediscovery” in 
English and the large cluster of translations in both English and German in the late-1960s 
through the late-1970s. (Figure 6.) But it’s the regressions that provide us with our 
sought-after model. 
An astonishing 42.2% of the variance in the English raw citation counts can be 
accounted-for simply by the date of publication (r = -0.65). The German figure is lower, 
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but still substantial: 15.9% (r = -0.40). But compare these figures to the French data: only 
6.4% of the variance in citations can be accounted for by date of publication (r = -0.25). 
This difference is very suggestive.  
In short, it does indeed appear as though something happened in the movement of 
these works from French into English and German: there is a strong order effect. (Works 
published earlier received more citations.) Our goal, in the following manipulations, is 
then to eliminate this effect from the simple temporal model. The remaining variance can 
then be attributed to other factors, such as indigenization. 
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Figure 6. 
 
3.3. Periodization of citation density. The shift from raw citation counts to 
citation density has immediate and readily-apparent consequences, especially in English 
(Figure 7). The slope of the regression is reduced massively (from m = -82.9 to m = -
1.0). And the modelled variance is reduced to 23.4% (r = -0.48). In German, the change is 
proportionally similar (from m = -9.3 to m = -0.1). And variance is reduced to 4.2% (r = -
0.21).  
It’s with the French data, however, that our goal is first achieved. The slope is 
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nearly flat (from m = -4.0 to m < 0). The variance is also reduced practically to zero (r = -
0.04). In other words, when citation density is taken into account, there is no relationship 
between the impact of a text in its source language and its original date of publication. 
The order effect is thus effectively removed. From this, we can then proceed confidently 
to re-examine the earlier language-controlled analyses: with these manipulations applied, 
differences in impact will be due to differences in reception.  
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Figure 7. 
 
3.4. Periodization of raw citations, controlling for language. By controlling for 
both language and publication date, we eliminate differences in the quality or importance 
of the underlying text. The focus is then entirely on how the audience has perceived the 
text. And the results are again dramatic. (Figure 8.) In English, the slope of the 
regression is flatter still (from m = -0.97 to m = -0.001). And the variance is reduced to 
14.1% (r = -0.38). In German, the slope is almost perfectly flat (m < 0). Variance is 
effectively eliminated (r ≈ 0). However, it’s possible that the clustering of the bulk of 
German translations in the 1970s could be masking the effect. To be sure, we need to 
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look at citation density when controlled for language. 
 
 
Figure 8. 
 
 
3.5. Periodization of citation density, controlling for language. The same 
analysis using citation density shows no appreciable change: the slopes are effectively the 
same, and the variance is only minimally different (from 14.1% to 13.7% for English). 
(Figure 9.) From the perspective of trying to control for impact per year, this suggests 
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that the relative impact per year in French is the same as the relative impact per year in 
English. As a result, no further change is made in the model. And that in turn implies that 
the remaining variance is due to factors not accounted for by differences in time or 
language. 
Eliminating the first five English translations as outliers has only minimal effect: 
the slope is effectively unchanged (from m = -0.007 to m = -0.009). And variance drops 
only minimally: from 13.7% (r = -0.37) to 8.7% (r = -0.29). In other words, it seems safe 
to suggest that we have achieved our goal: with citations per year and language taken into 
account, publication date is no longer relevant—in German. But the English data show an 
order effect that is sizeable enough to be of interest to Psychologists. This then suggests 
that there is more of Piaget that could be gleaned from deeper readers, and that this 
contribution is being masked by the extant understanding. 
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Figure 9. 
 
4. Insights and questions arising 
 Generalizing from the work done by New Historians examining Wundt’s works, 
and applying these insights to an examination of Piaget’s works, I have shown that it is 
possible to go much deeper than previously thought with a quantitative analysis of the 
impact of historical texts. Indeed, on the basis of the work done here, I am confident that 
we can declare an indigenization effect: when both the impact in the source language and 
the publication dates are controlled-for, the order in which texts appeared in translation 
accounts for a small but significant amount of the impact that texts had on the English-
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speaking audience. 
That said, however, my purpose in doing this work was not to suggest that 
Piaget’s status ought to be on a par with Wundt as a Founder of Modern Psychology. 
(This would be celebratory, and therefore forbidden by the norms of the discipline.) 
Rather, I think it’s the argument that has been strengthened by this examination. This 
stronger version of “The Wundt Argument” can then be called “The Indigenization 
Argument.” That not only formalizes some of the discussion in Chapter III, but it also 
suggests that the comparison of reception could easily be replicated with the other 
importations of works by other authors.  
In short, therefore, the more general version of the argument is this: when 
meaning moves, different audiences will interpret it in different ways (cf. Burman, 
2012d). In other words: differences in reception reflect differences in the audiences’ 
interests, and we can use those identified differences in order to learn something new 
about those audiences.  
To that end, for example, we can extend the methods above to take a further step 
and compare the language-controlled impacts against each other. This then identifies only 
one book that is over-rated by the English relative to its impact in both French and 
German. And the identified-text is exemplary exactly of the way in which the American 
view was criticized in Geneva: Science of education and the psychology of the child 
(Piaget, 1930-1965/1970).  
4.1. The American Question. Piaget lamented the American obsession with 
using the experimental findings of developmental and child psychology in order to design 
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interventions that might speed up educational progress. He called this the American 
Question. And he explained his concern clearly in a magazine interview:  
Is it a good thing to accelerate the learning of these concepts? Acceleration is 
certainly possible but first we must find out whether it is desirable or harmful…. 
No one has made studies to determine the optimum speed. (in E. Hall, 1970, p. 
31) 
He continued, responding to a question about preparing students for entry into the 
workplace in a more efficient way: 
It is difficult to decide just how to shorten [the children’s] studies. If you spend 
one year studying something verbally that requires two years of active study, then 
you have actually lost a year. If we were willing to lose a bit more time and let the 
children be active, let them use trial and error on different things, then the time we 
seem to have lost we may have actually gained. Children may develop a general 
method that they can use on other subjects. (in E. Hall, 1970, p. 31) 
These are all empirical research issues that he is raising. He treated the question seriously 
as a question for science to resolve. For me, though, that misses the deeper point. I think 
there is an historical reason for why this is the “American” question. 
4.2. Pursuing the issues arising. French and German parents are equally 
interested in having their children “do well” in life. But the American national obsession 
with “doing better” that manifests itself here seems actually to be something different.  
Indeed, I propose that the American Question is not about children, but about 
War. In particular, I suggest that it is tied up with the series of policy changes that led 
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among other things to the Rediscovery. Namely: the massive governmental shift in 
response to Sputnik that produced, among other things, the National Defense Education 
Act of 1958. That, however, is an Historical topic for another time. My focus, for the 
moment, is on pursuing the “foreign invisibles” related to the interests of Psychologists 
that have been hinted-at in the texts identified above.  
In pursuing this goal, in Chapter V, I lay out the formal structures behind the New 
Theory. Its discussion therefore precedes the experimental works summarized in 
Equilibration of cognitive structures that were included in the French citation density list: 
The grasp of consciousness and Success and understanding (Table 3 & Table 7). But it 
also made them possible.  
Another of the key texts discussed from this list is the untranslated Logique et 
connaissance scientifique (Table 3). This was edited by Piaget in response to what he 
called “the Gödelian crisis,” and in fact his appeals to Gödel changed just prior to its 
publication. That change then also provides the narrative thread that we follow 
throughout the chapter. 
This thread then continues in Chapter VI, which builds directly on the logical 
framework. But it focusses on ideas introduced in Biology and knowledge (Table 3, 
Table 5, & Table 7). These ideas were then developed further in other seemingly-
disconnected writings, including Psychogenesis and the history of science (Table 3).  
The result on the psychological side is the New Theory. But the biological side 
should not be dismissed. These works articulate the basis for a new and powerful 
evolutionary-developmental theory which has not been received in a way that recognizes 
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it as such. That then has implications for Psychology that tie into changes now underway 
in contemporary Biology. My goal is therefore to show more clearly how those ideas 
make sense, so that they are not lost in translation. This first requires examining the 
changing formalism underlying Piaget’s theory (Chapter V), and then we can consider 
the biology (Chapter VI). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
First foreign invisible: Piaget’s neo-Gödelian turn 
 
WHILE PIAGET’S EARLY WORKS were being “rediscovered” in the United States, in 
the late-1950s and early-1960s, he was simultaneously working on a complete revision of 
the underlying theory using approaches drawn from biology, cybernetics, and something 
he came to call “the epistemology of logic” (see esp. Piaget, 1967b; also 1970a, p. 487; 
1970/1972, pp. 63-68). The result of these efforts was the construction of a new meta-
theoretical framework formalizing the processes driving developmental change 
(Gallagher, 1972/1977; also R. L. Campbell, 2009). And this then informed more than a 
decade of new experiments (see Ducret, 2000).  
This later work extends far beyond the limits of the earlier stage theory of child 
development (popularized esp. by Flavell [see Müller et al., 2013]). For this reason, it is 
referred-to in the secondary literature as “Piaget’s new theory” (see esp. Beilin, 1992b). 
The most well-known aspect of this is his unfinished move toward “relevance,” and its 
formalization in a logic of meanings (Piaget & Garcia, 1987/1991). And thus that is what 
we will examine here, albeit by contextualizing that move rather than reviewing the 
contents of the book that presents it (see Ducret, 1988). 
Of course, Piaget’s attempts to formalize his theory—and especially his writings 
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on logic—have been the subject of innumerable critiques. Yet most of these have been 
presented by outsiders who failed to fully understand his intent (see e.g., Piaget, 1963). 
What follows therefore pursues a quite different goal than that typically sought: even as 
we recognize the present interests of the discipline, we focus on providing the view “from 
within” (following M. Chapman, 1988a, p. 1).  
The task is accomplished by tracing the ways in which Piaget himself described 
the formal aspects of his theory. And we simplify this by focusing on a particular change 
in his appeals to the works of Kurt Gödel (1906-1978). The resulting history is then of 
necessity incomplete: there are many more aspects of the New Theory that need to be 
developed further, and a change in formalism was not the only change that occurred. (In 
the next Chapter, for example, we will discuss some of the similarly-timed changes in 
Piaget’s biology.) Yet what follows does usefully clarify some of what Piaget said about 
the assumptions that underlie his later works, and so some new translations are also 
provided where space permits.  
To be clear, though: we are not imputing to Piaget any variation of the loose and 
relativistic crypto-Gödelian interpretations that have subsequently come to be criticized 
for their abuse of the primary source texts (see e.g., Franzén, 2005). Instead, we trace the 
emergence of a “neo-Gödelian” view: a view that makes sense of Piaget’s (1967/1971) 
later observation that “Gödel’s theorems supply impressive arguments in favor of 
constructivism” (p. 80). And while we first find these arguments in Gödel’s own writings, 
their influence on Piaget came through the efforts of his French-speaking contemporaries. 
But, to get to these, we must begin at the beginning. 
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1. Kurt Gödel and his proofs of “incompleteness” 
The program that interests us emerged from Gödel’s (1929/1986) doctoral 
dissertation. This included a proof of the “completeness” of first-order predicate calculus: 
it demonstrated the non-contradiction of arithmetical methods and thereby provided a 
firm foundation for the proof-making activities of mathematicians. (He showed that their 
tools are trustworthy in a strong sense: proofs, if constructed using such methods, are 
true.) Building on this, he then undertook the project that became synonymous with his 
name: a multi-part proof of the “incompleteness” of all general systems of number theory 
that are sufficiently complex to allow arithmetical methods to function within them 
without inconsistencies. That work was presented in 1930, published—in German—in 
1931, and accepted as his Habilitationsschrift in 1932.64 
The key assumption of Gödel’s (1931/1986) discovery is that statements about 
arithmetic, if formally presented, can themselves be treated as arithmetical propositions. 
Using a technique based on prime factorization that he invented for this purpose (now 
called “Gödel numbering”), he showed that certain properties of these meta-mathematical 
statements could be understood to correspond to truth, falsity, provability, etc., in a 
systematic way. He then showed that these statements could be manipulated using 
standard arithmetical methods: they could be made to make strong and trustworthy 
claims, including about themselves. These claims could thus be shown to be either true or 
false.  
                                                 
64 For additional biographical details, see esp. Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt 
Gödel (Dawson Jr., 1997). Each of the articles cited from Gödel's Collected Works also have introductory 
notes, which often provide more useful specifics about any individual piece than the glosses provided 
elsewhere. 
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The incompleteness project took this one step further. By building on the Liar 
Paradox—typically presented as, simply, “this statement is false”—Gödel was able to use 
his numbering technique to set up a self-referential contradiction: “If this statement is 
true, then it is false.”65 And this corresponds to an arithmetical impossibility (i.e., 1 = 0).  
The discovery that such a claim could be proven afforded a peculiar conclusion: 
“truth” and “proof” are not formally identical. This was then generalized: not every 
statement can be proved to be true or false, within the system that contains it, despite the 
completeness of that system’s methods. 
Gödel showed, in other words, that every formal system above a certain degree of 
complexity is afflicted by “undecidable” propositions. (This was demonstrated by his 
“first” incompleteness theorem.) Furthermore, if such a system claims—of itself—that it 
is complete and consistent, and thus not internally contradictory, then it also suffers from 
the Liar Paradox and is therefore necessarily incomplete and inconsistent. (This was 
demonstrated by his “second” incompleteness theorem.) The details of how this was 
accomplished, exactly, have been discussed by several well-known secondary sources 
(most famously by Hofstadter, 1979; but earlier, and most influentially, by Nagel & 
Newman, 1958). But it’s what happened afterward that’s of special interest to us. 
Gödel’s (1931/1986) proof was important because it explicitly undermined a key 
assumption of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861-1947) 
Principia Mathematica. This had been intended to provide a solid justification for the 
                                                 
65 Gödel explained this directly to Hao Wang, who reproduced the explanation in A Logical 
Journey (Wang, 1996, pp. 82-83).  
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relationship between mathematics and logic: if formal systems were complete, Russell 
and Whitehead argued, then all of mathematics—and, indeed, all of mathematical 
philosophy (perhaps even all human knowledge)—could be adequately described with, 
and fully reduced to, logico-mathematical first-principles without any loss of meaning. 
(This position is called “logicism,” and is traceable ultimately to Gottlob Frege [1848-
1925; see van Heijenoort, 1967; also Smith, 1999].) After Gödel’s discovery of 
incompleteness, however, this goal became formally untenable: there is no single, static 
formal system that can decide all mathematical truths.  
This eventually made Gödel famous. That said, however, the initial reception of 
his result was chilly (see Dawson Jr., 1997, pp. 53-79). Although it has since come to be 
interpreted as having undermined David Hilbert’s (1862-1943) Principia-invigorated 
program to provide a formal foundation for all of mathematics, it did not start out that 
way. Indeed, Gödel had set out originally to contribute to Hilbert’s program (Davis, 
2005; Feferman, 2008). Yet aside from a handful of professionals (including John von 
Neumann [1903-1957]), virtually no one noticed his result at the time.  
The first major expositions of “incompleteness” for a non-specialist audience 
were published twenty-five years later (Nagel & Newman, 1956, 1958; see Feferman, 
2007). That’s when the idea really began to take off. But that’s not how Piaget 
encountered it (see Note 72). 
2. On the changing implications of incompleteness 
The relationship between Piaget and the evolving Gödelian view is a complicated 
thing to trace. Although Piaget and Gödel almost certainly met at the Institute for 
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Advanced Study, when Piaget was a visiting fellow there in 1954, there is no 
correspondence between them held in the accessible collections at any of the archives I 
consulted. (This is not in itself especially meaningful, though: the majority of the 
collection held by the Piaget Archives is unprocessed and not available for consultation 
[Burman, 2013a], although things are indeed expected to open up starting in 2018 
[Ratcliff, personal communication, 24 Jan 2016].) As a result, we can only trace the 
changes in the larger discourse in which they both participated: preparatory spadework, 
in anticipation of future in-depth archival excavations (e.g., Heinzmann, Trognon, & 
Tremblay, 2014; Ratcliff & Burman, 2015).  
It is toward this end that I undertook a variation on the approach taken by Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984) in his early works: an “archaeology.” I traced Piaget’s appeals to 
Gödel in order to identify the “ruptures” that mark out the sedimentary layers separating 
different “discourses” (see esp. Foucault, 1969/1972). And this in turn led me to examine 
the changes in the formal justification for Piaget’s theory of “grouping” (groupement)—
which can be defined most usefully here as that formalism the contents of which are 
“equilibrated”—in order to help the mass of archaeological findings cohere. The result is 
a narrative that extends our present understanding of how Piaget’s New Theory came to 
be. 
2.1. The importance of logic. The value of a formal logical framework is that it 
enables the valid inference of truth or falsity about a conclusion drawn from a set of 
propositions that are themselves known to be either true or false, but without reference to 
the content of the claims represented (i.e., if you have trustworthy methods, then the rest 
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follows necessarily). And, indeed, this can be put in terms understood of Piaget’s 
“standard” theory of developmental stages. To explain this, though, we must make 
explicit an assumption inherited from his earliest works: a “stage” is the product of 
internally-consistent groupings of “structures,” inside of which transformations can be 
made which do not change the quality of the whole (i.e., they are “equilibrated”). These 
structures then produce actions that either lead to the desired outcome or don’t (i.e., they 
are functionally true or false).  
This assumption, on its own, is supported by Gödel’s completeness theorem: 
transformations are formalizable as arithmetical statements. In application, it is further 
supported by the argument that formal principles can be used to understand the operation 
of the mind (see Boden, 2006). The result is that Piaget’s “structures” (referred-to 
variously in translation as “schemes,” “schemas,” and “schemata” [see Brown, 2001, pp. 
181, 189n2]) are theorized as coherent action-producing systems with internal workings 
having formal characteristics. 
Thus, to infer the existence of a particular structure, a Piagetian developmentalist 
might engage a child in a series of questions related to what is now referred-to as a 
Conservation task. For example: When it is true that a volume of water is moved between 
a tall-thin-cup and a short-fat-cup, then what must also be true about the volume of water 
during the transformation? And then, crucially, in terms of the Piagetian method of 
differentiating kinds of groupings in the children’s responses: Why? (see Bond & 
Tryphon, 2009). 
Such an approach is all well and good for constructing a classification, because—
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contrary to expectations at the time—children at different ages do not all reply in the 
same way. But things then began to fall apart as a result of how Piaget (1942, 1949, 
1952b) formalized this insight further, in an attempt to explain his otherwise-acceptable 
empirical descriptions of child development by positing the existence of different kinds 
of structures in operation at different ages: “our real problem is to discover the actual 
operational mechanisms which govern behaviour [sic], and not simply to measure it” 
(Piaget, 1953, p. xviii). 
Briefly put: if the stages of child development are the product of grouped-
structures, then Piaget reasoned that the expected outcomes for each stage could be 
formalized in a kind of behavioral “truth table” listing all of the possible transformations. 
Different stages would thus have different possible outcomes associated with them, as a 
consequence of what must follow necessarily given their different operations. (A young 
child’s response to a problem like Volume could then be internally-coherent, even though 
incorrect; the result of their truth table indexing only the level of the water in each glass, 
rather than coordinating height, width, and depth.) Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 
suggested, however, that—even if such a table could be constructed for each stage—then 
there would still be functional truths of that system which could not be contained within 
the structural table as provable statements: children would be able to produce responses 
and behaviors that didn’t belong to their “appropriate” stage. (There would, in other 
words, be unevennesses in development: décalages [which he had in fact discussed in 
detail earlier—albeit in species terms—in Piaget, 1941, pp. 251-270].) All of the stage-
tables, not just the “formal operational” one, would therefore be functionally incomplete. 
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And thus so too would be the theory that produced them. QED. 
In short: it would have been devastating for Gödel’s discoveries to have become 
widely understood within developmental psychology before Piaget had prepared a 
response. The entire formal foundation of Stage Theory had been undermined, using the 
same language in which it had originally been supported.  
For Gödel, however, proving the incompleteness of complex formal systems was 
just a result: a necessary consequence. And, contrary to what one might now think after 
reading about it in popular commentaries, he didn’t just stop working on or with 
incompleteness once he had proved that Russell and Whitehead—and subsequently 
Hilbert too—had been wrong to insist that logicians could reduce all of mathematical 
philosophy (perhaps even all human knowledge) to logico-mathematical first-principles. 
Thus, we must now ask: How did Gödel’s ideas change, and how did these changes 
enable the emergence of Piaget’s later functional-structuralism?  
2.2. From “Godelian” incompleteness to a “neo-Gödelian” hierarchy. In 
December of 1933, Gödel delivered a lecture at Cambridge in which he argued for the 
continuing importance of finding a means to achieve Hilbert’s goal of grounding 
mathematics on firm foundations (published as Gödel, 1995b; see Feferman, 2008). He 
also argued that, because of incompleteness, a proof of non-contradiction would have to 
be found by “constructive” means. (In mathematics, a formal system is “constructive” if 
it produces the object it intends to prove: the proof is in the production, not in the 
inference.)  
Gödel then delivered a similar lecture at Yale, in April of 1941, in which he 
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described how “intuitionistic” logics—which treat mathematics and logic as internally-
consistent tools for thought, rather than as revelations of the natural order—could be 
considered “constructive” in this way (published as Gödel, 1995a; see also van Atten, 
2014; van Atten & Kennedy, 2003). Still though, as he later explained of the work’s 
reception at the time: “Nobody was interested” (Gödel qtd in Wang, 1996, p. 86).  
A much longer (and more formal) version of the Yale talk was published, in 
German, in December of 1958. And it had such an impact that it became known among 
logicians as the “Functional interpretation” (Gödel, 1958/1990; see Avigad & Feferman, 
1995). That is also the basis for what we are calling the “neo-Gödelian” perspective, as it 
came to influence Piaget through the writings of Gödel’s French-speaking 
contemporaries. 
 2.3. The Functional interpretation. Gödel’s Functional interpretation was 
published at a time when interest in his early work was on the rise (via esp. Nagel & 
Newman, 1956, 1958). His purpose, however, was not to preempt the various 
misunderstandings that would emerge following its popularization. Instead, he 
approached a quite different problem: Where do the insights mathematicians rely upon in 
constructing new proofs come from?  
His solution is once again too complex to go into here in detail, but he introduced 
the effort simply enough: “in the proofs we make use of insights… that spring not from 
the… properties of the sign combinations representing the proofs, but only from their 
meaning” (Gödel, 1958/1990, p. 241; italics as in the original). In this view, proofs do not 
result from the arrangements of the letters and numbers and symbols which comprise 
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them. Nor are they a function of the contents of a truth table, in which a result could be 
looked-up. (Such a result would be “trivial.”) Instead, the elegance of proof-making is a 
function of the theorist’s competence in manipulating the implications entailed by those 
symbols; by the theorist’s ability at transforming the symbols’ signified relations, using 
accepted operations, to say something new and non-obvious. In other words, from this 
perspective, success in the genesis of mathematical knowledge is a function of the 
mathematician’s understanding. It is not a function of the symbols themselves.  
This is interesting in itself, and Piaget’s work certainly did move in that direction 
in the first published experimental works of the New Theory period (esp. Piaget, 
1974/1978). But Gödel’s intent was different: to formalize this fundamental mathematical 
concern, and thereby make the meaning of “meaning” more rigorously examinable. 
To do this, Gödel relied on the notion of “recursion” to distinguish between levels 
of complexity in mathematical explanation: a proof requiring one operation is simpler 
than one requiring a transformation of that operation. (Similarly: a statement that relies 
on recursive self-reference is more complex than one that doesn’t.) “Meaning,” from this 
perspective, could thus be understood as that abstraction which is reflected down through 
the levels of this many-layered system, from the nuanced understanding of the 
constructing mathematician to constrain the elegance-in-formalization of the final proof. 
The result is so, therefore, because it must be according to what it says and also because 
of what it means. Once constructed, the proof then simply is: it exists, whether or not 
there is a formal system to make sense of it. 
In contrast to earlier logicist conceptions of the activities involved in proof-
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making, Gödel’s Functional interpretation implies that the necessity of results is 
constrained both “bottom-up” (by the denotation of the given symbols) and “top-down” 
(by the understanding, competence, and insight of the proof-making mathematician). In 
other words: meaning-signification is projected upward, while meaning-implication is 
projected down.66 All proofs thus exist in a middle realm, between the structures which 
comprise them (having signification) and the functions that they have (having 
implication). 
Piaget’s later works contain elements of all of this. Indeed, it is our contention 
that the two approaches are intimately related: the “neo-Gödelian” insight of the 
Functional interpretation—that there are levels of relative incompleteness, and that these 
exist in a hierarchy—informed Piaget’s reconstruction of his “standard” theory at a new 
level with greater scope. But without direct evidence of contact, between Piaget and 
Gödel’s Functional interpretation, how can such a claim be supported? 
3. Archaeology and its results 
To conduct a Foucauldian archaeology is, in broad strokes, to adopt an agnostic 
approach to history. Instead of bringing my own interpretive lens to the events as I 
perceive them to have occurred, the following analysis has been guided simply—as it 
were—“by the fact that words have happened, that these events have left traces behind 
them” (trans by Gutting, 1989, p. 228). These words have thus been excavated, laid out, 
explained as clearly as possible, and presented as the product of an evolving “discourse” 
                                                 
66 I am indebted to Tyson Gofton for highlighting this crucial distinction, and to Jagdish 
Hattiangadi for helping me to understand it. 
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(Gutting, 1989, pp. 244-245). Of course, because there can’t be a discourse without 
discussants, I have also traced the influence of specific individuals as well. For reasons of 
space, however, only the key figures of the neo-Gödelian excavation are introduced (see 
also Ratcliff, in press-a). And, once again, we must begin at the beginning: with the 
“groupings” that provide the basis for Piaget’s stages. 
3.1. Back to “grouping.” Piaget’s theory of grouping originated in his earliest 
studies. As I mentioned before: in around 1914-1915, when he was in his late-teens, he 
realized—while half-paying attention in a course on logic taught by Arnold Reymond 
(1874-1958)—that the coherence of biological species as “wholes” could be defined as 
being a consequence of the relationship between their individual “parts.” He then began 
to generalize this insight to all systems with similar whole-part relationships. As he 
explained later in his autobiography:  
I suddenly understood that at all levels (viz. that of the living cell, organism, 
species, society, etc., but also with reference to states of conscience [sic], to 
concepts, to logical principles, etc.) one finds the same problem of relationship 
between the parts and the whole; hence I was convinced that I had found the 
solution…. In all fields of life (organic, mental, social) there exist “totalities” 
qualitatively distinct from their parts and imposing on them an organization. 
Therefore there exist no isolated “elements”; elementary reality is necessarily 
dependent on a whole which pervades it. (Piaget, 1952a, pp. 241-242) 
This, he felt, could provide the basis for a scientific epistemology: if knowledge claims 
could be treated as formal wholes, in the same way as could the biological species 
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examined to that point in his early studies,67 then strong logical tools could be used in the 
examination of different conflicting knowledge-claims.  
 Coupled with the training he subsequently received in clinical interviewing at 
Zurich in 1918, this insight is the source of his interest in grouping children according to 
their own justifications: why the Parisian children he examined in 1919-1921 responded 
to his test questions in particular ways, rather than whether their answers were correct. It 
also thereby provided the basis for his “standard” theory of stages: different groupings of 
children, at different ages, justify their knowledge claims in different ways that are 
nonetheless coherent relative to each other. The later Traité de Logique (1949) then 
attempted to formalize these results more completely. That is also where Gödel is 
mentioned in Piaget’s writings for the first time. 
3.2. A misleading appeal. In the Traité, a “grouping” (groupement) is defined 
formally as the theoretical intermediary between a “mathematical group” (groupe) and a 
“mathematical lattice” (réseau). It was therefore intended as a way of recognizing and 
preserving the relationship between a whole and its parts (Piaget, 1949, pp. 91-103). This 
combination enables several parts to be grouped as wholes at different levels, each of 
which is then coherent and separate from the other, but with lower levels subsumed by 
the functional “operations” of the higher levels.  
This move is similar to Russell and Whitehead’s replacement of Frege’s “general 
set” with a hierarchy of set-types, in Principia Mathematica, as a way to avoid self-
                                                 
67 For more on Piaget’s early life, see Vidal (1994), Perret-Clermont and Barrelet (1996/2008), 
and Ratcliff (2010). On his intellectual influences, see esp. Ducret (1984). 
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referential contradictions like the Liar Paradox. But a simpler way to explain the result is 
to refer back to Piaget’s early background and training in biology.68 
Just as a species is composed of individual organisms, collected together in a 
group, so too is the next higher level up (genera) composed of individual species. And so 
it goes: up from species and genera to families, orders, classes, phyla, and kingdoms 
(extending up still further to life and even to existence). This is then logically coherent, 
relative to the definition of a grouping, because each rank in the taxonomic hierarchy can 
be formalized in ways that are consistent with Gödel’s original completeness theorem: a 
species is complete, for example, because its members form an inter-breeding (intra-
translatable) functional whole. Higher taxonomic levels are also complete in the same 
way because they are relatable by reference to their evolutionary history (as an inter-
generational lineage of structural transformations), while at the same time remaining 
qualitatively (functionally) distinct in the present: by definition, couplings between 
members of different species produce no fertile offspring (cf. “vicariance” in Note 73). 
Piaget’s approach in the Traité thus attempted to provide the formal means to describe 
complex nested wholes within a single interconnected structure d’ensemble des parties 
(typically translated as “structure-of-the-whole,” or “structural whole,” but more 
appropriately rendered as “power set” [Campbell in Piaget, 1977/2001, p. 122n]).  
The philosophical challenge posed by this formulation is in determining its 
relationship to Piaget’s later constructivism, especially given what he came to say about 
Gödel’s arguments providing support for it. Although Gödel is indeed mentioned in the 
                                                 
68 The most comprehensive source on Piaget’s biology is Messerly (1996, 2009). 
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Traité de Logique (and referred-to again in a similar way in the 3-volume Introduction à 
l’épistémologie génétique [1950]), it seems clear from those texts that Piaget had not yet 
digested the implications of Gödel’s incompleteness for groupings: early on, Gödel is for 
Piaget simply a footnote in the history of logic. He is not used, early on, in the same way 
that he is referred-to later. As a result, there is no formal support within the early 
conception of grouping for species-change—or indeed stage-change—except by 
forbidden Lamarckian mechanisms, which Piaget (1952a) had indicated at the time as 
being a source of discomfort (p. 241).  
The problem with this early version of the theory, then, is this: although the 
children’s different groupings of knowledge-justification could be shown to exist 
empirically, at different age-ranges, there was no biological explanation for 
developmental change between the groupings except by the old Haeckelian doctrine of 
“recapitulation” (as Piaget was criticized by e.g., Gould, 1977, pp. 144-147). From this 
perspective, earlier stages of evolution are complete wholes through which development 
simply proceeds; they are given, a priori. And while this could indeed move children 
through the required evolutionary-developmental lineage, in the sense of recapitulating 
different “species of mind” at different “stages of development,” it did not have 
associated with it an acceptable constructive cause (aside from “re-equilibration,” which 
remained inadequately defined until after the neo-Gödelian turn).69 
That said, however, there was indeed a possible non-constructive cause: 
                                                 
69 Piaget (1975/1985) noted that Equilibration of Cognitive Structures represents “a complete 
reworking” (p. xvii) of the models presented in an earlier book: Logique et Équilibre (Apostel, Mandelbrot, 
& Piaget, 1957). The discourse examined here is therefore part of how that earlier material came to be 
describable as “inadequate.” 
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“maturation.” And this explains the initial impression by several Americans, during the 
“rediscovery” period, that Piaget’s works were “neo-maturationist” (noted by Piaget in 
Evans, 1973, p. 39; also in Voyat, 1982, p. xiii). Yet that is only really a problem if 
species, and thus also stages, are real in a strong sense. While this seems to be required 
by Piaget’s logic, that interpretation is undermined by his biology. 
As Piaget (1952a) had noted in his autobiography, he was a “nominalist” when it 
came to species definitions. (A species is what one calls a grouping of intra-translatable 
organisms, not what that grouping is: “The ‘species’ has no reality in itself and is 
distinguished from the simple ‘varieties’ merely by a greater stability” [p. 241].) Yet this 
perspective conflicts with the fundamental assumption of the logical model to which he 
appealed: hierarchical “types” are separate and distinct. They are formally real: they exist 
independently from our thinking about them, like Platonic objects. And that’s how Gödel 
conceived of them (see Davis, 2005; van Atten & Kennedy, 2003). But that’s not how 
Piaget used them. Instead, for Piaget, even the a priori categories of experience are 
constructed. This is a fundamental assumption of his research program (see esp. Piaget, 
1925, 1950, 1968/1970). 
In short, it seems that it was Piaget’s appeal to logic in subsuming both his 
original biological interests and the results of his subsequent psychological 
experimentation to a larger epistemological structure—and specifically the reference to 
“groups” and “lattices” in defining groupement—that was misleading: as meta-theory it 
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departed from his avowed “nominalism,”70 and introduced hard separations where he 
needed smooth gradations. This is because it is only through the continuity of species that 
it would be possible to “move” from one grouping to another on the basis of assimilation 
and accommodation alone. Therefore, from this inconsistency we see that Piaget’s early 
logic was incompatible with his intent. Indeed, as he recognized explicitly much later, his 
formalisms needed to be “clean[ed] up” (qtd. in Piaget & Garcia, 1987/1991, p. 157; see 
also Piaget, 1971a). 
3.3. Beth and the changing formal discourse. We can now consider dismissing 
claims that Piaget’s early attempts at formalism were anything more than a tool for 
thinking with. As he put it later: philosophizing in this way is a source of “wisdom,” to be 
sure, but also one of “illusions” (Piaget, 1965/1971). Reflection must be tempered by 
engagement with reality, as well as with the facts of historicity and development. Hence 
his life-long insistence—referring to, among others, James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934)—
on the need for a “genetic [constructive] logic” (e.g., Piaget, 1928/1977/1995, p. 184; 
1970/1972, p. 15). This, however, was not a concern shared by the logicians who read his 
work. 
Evert Beth (1908-1964), for example, lampooned him: the big book that 
formalized these early proposals—Traité de logique (Piaget, 1949)—was called 
“mediocre” and “negligent.” Worse, Beth described it as redolent with “failures hidden 
by pretenses of technicality capable of impressing only a reader naïve in logic” (my trans 
                                                 
70 Beth (1960) later reminded Piaget of the importance of this nominalism in a letter that discusses, 
among other things, both Gödel and constructivism (p. 2; citing Chapter 16 of Beth, 1959). 
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of Beth, 1950, p. 258). Indeed, this was a common reaction among professionals. Willard 
van Orman Quine (1908-2000) even referred, in correspondence with Beth, to “Piaget’s 
persistent and evidently incorrigible stupidity over matters of logic” (Quine, 1960; see 
also 1940a, 1940b).  
Still, Piaget’s response was conciliatory: recognizing the failure, he invited Beth 
to collaborate on a project aligning their perspectives (Piaget, 1951, p. 244). This led to a 
sustained correspondence (Heinzmann et al., 2014). And that in turn led Beth—and 
ultimately Quine too—to join the International Center for Genetic Epistemology as a 
member of Piaget’s advisory board (Burman, 2012c, p. 284).  
Beth participated in symposia at the Center in 1956, 1959, and 1960 (Beth & 
Piaget, 1961/1966, p. 5). They also undertook a series of writing projects together. These 
then informed an important book: Mathematical Epistemology and Psychology (Beth & 
Piaget, 1961/1966).  
In this book, Piaget’s appeals to Gödel followed Beth’s. Indeed, Beth wrote his 
entire first half of the book before Piaget wrote his own half in response (p. xxi). They 
then commented on each other’s work, revised their respective halves, and wrote the 
general conclusions together. In other words, after the failure of the Traité to achieve his 
aims, Piaget showed that Quine’s assessment was incorrect: rather than being truly 
incorrigible, in matters of logic, Piaget followed Beth’s lead. 
In the final published text, Beth discussed the results of Gödel’s 1931 paper on 
incompleteness in great detail: he introduced the proof historically, albeit using more 
complex and rigorous terms than we have used here, and developed it following in the 
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style of Gödel’s application of recursive self-referential meta-mathematical statements 
(Beth in Beth & Piaget, 1961/1966, pp. 54-55; also pp. 70, 120-122). He then generalized 
the results to all formal systems, showing that even a new system brought in to replace an 
earlier one (proven to be incomplete) will itself be incomplete in a different way.  
This is not yet “neo-Gödelian” in the way I intend to mean the phrase, but it 
comes close: Beth cited Gödel’s (1944/1990) first extended philosophical statement, 
which expanded upon his earlier critique of Russell and introduced into print the notions 
of “construction” that would later be formalized in the Functional interpretation (Beth in 
Beth & Piaget, 1961/1966, p. 112). He then pointed to work showing that unprovable 
truths could become provable—with their supervening system “rendered more adequate” 
(Beth in Beth & Piaget, 1961/1966, p. 122)—through the addition of new axioms. He 
also indicated that the resulting system would be “more powerful” (Beth in Beth & 
Piaget, 1961/1966, p. 59). Yet he was clear: one can never predict, in advance, what the 
innovations will be. Otherwise, they would already exist; a new proof would have been 
constructed. (Or, in biological terms, a new species introduced: it would exist, whether or 
not there is a taxonomic system to make sense of it [cf. Note 73].) 
3.4. Ladrière and levels of relative incompleteness. In December of 1960, less 
than a year before the publication of Beth’s book with Piaget and almost exactly two 
years after the publication of Gödel’s Functional interpretation, a French-speaking 
Belgian logician—Jean Ladrière (1921-2007)—published in the same journal a 
commentary in French examining the same sorts of problems discussed by Beth. And he 
began, as did Beth, by explaining Gödel’s result of 1931. But it is where Ladrière took 
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the discussion afterward that seems to have pushed Piaget toward the neo-Gödelian 
perspective that came to characterize the New Theory. 
 There are two ways to read Gödel, explained Ladrière in 1960, referring only to 
“recent research” (p. 287).71 The first is to disabuse oneself of the notion that one fully 
understands the implications of the operations used in constructing any individual 
proposition. (This, as it happens, is consistent with Piagetian methods [see Bond & 
Tryphon, 2009].) The second is to posit an open system with indefinite extension: 
If this second way is taken, one is brought to envision an infinite, and even 
transfinite, hierarchy of systems.... On the first level, one can formalize a given 
domain; then, while grounding oneself on this first level, one can then formalize a 
larger domain, and so on. One can thus also go as far as one wants, but without 
ever arriving at an end. (my trans of Ladrière, 1960, p. 299) 
This second response to the necessity of incompleteness, for Ladrière (and for Piaget’s 
subsequent understanding of Gödel), was therefore the necessity of constructivism itself. 
Systems shown to be lacking at one level are simply reconstructed at a higher one. Ever 
larger in scope; ever broader in reach. 
3.5. Piaget’s uses of Ladrière. While I have not yet found any reference by 
Piaget to Gödel’s later works (there is only the rupture in Piaget’s use of Gödelian ideas), 
the earliest citation that I did find by Piaget to the Ladrière commentary is from a 
subsequent article that was published the year of Beth’s death. Indeed, while arguing for 
                                                 
71 Ladrière (1960) doesn’t cite Gödel’s Functional interpretation directly (he cites nothing directly 
in that piece and includes no references), but it seems likely—since his own article was also published in 
Dialectica—that this paper is included in the “recent research” to which he did refer (p. 287). The reference 
was then made explicitly later (see Ladrière, 1981, pp. 298-299). 
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the use of the limits of formalism as a means to bridge the gap between logic and 
psychology—and thereby also provide the means to “reintroduce an operatory 
constructivism which refers… to the subject’s activities” (the original intent of the Traité 
de Logique)—Piaget referred specifically to “the great work by Ladrière” (Piaget, 
1964/1971, p. 135).  
Piaget expanded on these initial comments in a large volume that he edited in 
response to what Beth had earlier called “the Gödelian crisis” (Beth in Beth & Piaget, 
1961/1966, p. 53; see Piaget, 1967c, p. 8). There, he highlighted Ladrière’s suggestion 
that “formal systems are the abstracted objects [objectivation] of mental activity” (my 
trans of Ladrière, 1960, p. 321; cited by Piaget, 1967b, p. 378). And, more importantly 
for our purposes here, Piaget pointed explicitly to Ladrière—not Beth, although he is 
mentioned—as the source of the insight that levels of relative incompleteness must exist 
in a hierarchy (Piaget, 1967b, p. 383; citing Ladrière, 1960; 1967). He also repeated 
Beth’s comment about power, but in slightly different terms: in Piaget’s interpretation, 
each higher level is “stronger” than the last (e.g., Piaget, 1964/1971, p. 146; 1967/1971, 
p. 319; 1970/1972, pp. 67-68, 70, 90; 1977/1986, p. 307).  
That said, however, the most significant discussion of Ladrière’s contributions is 
made in Structuralism.72 Those passages are so revealing of the reasoning informing 
Piaget’s later works that I will provide an extended retranslation of the most relevant 
section. Then we will build, from there, toward a conclusion. 
                                                 
72 This book also contains the only reference I have found by Piaget to Nagel and Newman’s 
(1958) popularization of Gödel’s theorem (p. 33n). Yet that reference was added by the translator. And 
because the change in Piaget’s appeals to Gödel precedes this usage, it would be inappropriate to suggest 
that it was they who caused it. 
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3.6. New translations from Structuralism. Piaget began by blending the insights 
of logic with the facts of biology, integrating Ladrière’s neo-Gödelian perspective into 
his earlier framework: 
The first point of interest of such observations is that they introduce, into 
structures, the notion of greater or lesser strength and weakness (relative to the 
domains in which they are comparable). The hierarchy thus introduced therefore 
suggests the idea of construction, just as in biology the hierarchy of characters 
suggested evolution. Indeed, it seems reasonable that a weak structure uses more 
elementary means and that more powerful forces correspond to instruments whose 
development is more complex. (my trans of Piaget, 1968, p. 30; cf. Piaget, 
1968/1971, pp. 33-34) 
He continued, updating his earlier descriptions of how knowledge evolves: 
The second fundamental lesson of Gödel’s discoveries is… that to complete a 
theory in the sense of demonstrating its non-contradiction, it is no longer 
sufficient to analyze its presuppositions. It has also become necessary to construct 
its replacement. Before this, one could justify believing in a lineage of theories as 
a kind of beautiful pyramid, resting upon a foundation of self-sufficiency; the 
lowest stage the most solid, since it had been formed of the simplest instruments. 
But if this simplicity itself becomes a sign of weakness, and reinforcing a stage 
requires the construction of its replacement, then the overall consistency of the 
pyramid as a whole is in reality suspended from its peak. With this height itself 
unfinished (and having to be unendingly high), the image of the pyramid must 
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then be reversed and—more precisely—replaced by that of an upwardly 
broadening spiral. (my trans of Piaget, 1968, pp. 30-31; cf. Piaget, 1968/1971, p. 
34) 
In other words, the requirement for a firm (Hilbertian) foundation is here replaced. There 
need only be an initial spark—an inclination—followed by construction driven by 
exploratory behavior (see esp. Piaget, 1976/1979) 
Piaget finished his exposition in Structuralism by abridging—and then finally 
citing—Ladrière’s 1960 article. Here, again, the levels are made explicit: 
The idea of the structure as system-of-transformations thus becomes 
interdependent with a constructivism of continuous formation. However, despite 
its general significance, the reason for this is simple: one can draw from Gödel’s 
results important considerations regarding the limits of formalization. One can 
show, for example, the existence of levels—in addition to the formal levels—that 
are distinct levels of semi-formal and semi-intuitive knowledge… that are 
awaiting, so to speak, their turn at formalization. The frontiers of formalization 
are thus mobile, or “vicariant,”[73] and are not closed once and for all like a wall 
marking the limits of an empire. J. Ladrière proposed the ingenious interpretation: 
“we cannot survey, at one glance, all the operations possible of thought....” (my 
                                                 
73 “Vicariant” is erroneously translated as “vicarious” in the English edition. This is a regrettable 
error, and one repeated in another New Theory-period work that would also otherwise be extremely 
important (Piaget, 1977b, pp. 353-356). But we can make the correction: it is properly to be understood as 
an allusion to the evolutionary process in which a new species first emerges from an earlier grouping: 
“vicariance,” such that—prior to that moment of speciation—members from either proto-grouping can be 
substituted for each other without functional impact (see also Piaget et al., 1990/1992, pp. 45n, 54-57, 91-
109, 224-226). Otherwise, change occurs solely as a function of drift.  
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trans of Piaget, 1968, p. 31; citing Ladrière, 1960, p. 321; cf. Piaget, 1968/1971, 
pp. 34-35) 
From this perspective, Piaget’s view of children is not unlike Gödel’s view of 
mathematicians: novelty emerges from the projection of meaning, and the results take on 
a life of their own according to the logic extant at the levels they pass through along the 
way. Note, too: we can’t always predict the outcome, even if we can see all the inputs. 
3.7. Implications for the standard theory. In the sequel to Structuralism—a 
short volume published in the same series, and translated as The Principles of Genetic 
Epistemology—we begin to see the emergence of the New Theory’s version of the well-
known stages of child development. Here, though, the hierarchy of levels acquires traits 
associated with both “form” and “content.” 
Sensorimotor structures are forms in relation to the simple movements they 
coordinate, but content in relation to the actions that are internalized and 
conceptualized at the next higher level. Similarly: ‘concrete’ operational 
structures are forms in relation to sensorimotor actions, but content in relation to 
the formal operational level of 11-15 years. And these are in turn just content with 
respect to operations acting on them from still-higher levels. Likewise, in the 
example given by Gödel, elementary arithmetic is a form that subsumes as 
content the logic of classes and relations… and it is itself content… from the 
perspective of transfinite arithmetic. (my trans of Piaget, 1970b, p. 84; cf. Piaget, 
1970/1972, pp. 67-68) 
Concrete operational reasoning—thinking about objects that can be felt and acted upon as 
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parts and wholes, like the water in a glass—is therefore made possible by the sensori-
motor and pre-operational structures that come before it: reaching, grasping, 
manipulating, etc. Similarly, formal operational reasoning about “imaginary objects” 
(like those involved in mathematics) cannot be achieved without first inventing the notion 
of “an object” that it relies upon and refers-to.  
 Piaget expanded on similar themes in his discussion of a talk delivered by 
Ladrière at the International Center for Genetic Epistemology in 1970 (published in 
1973). There, he explained, Ladrière had mentioned two other things that were of 
particular interest. The first relates to this notion of possibility made possible by past 
constructions: 
in the deductive branches of knowledge, one always finds “opacities” to 
illuminate, whether as a result of paradoxes or—more generally—because, once a 
system is constructed and has become internally consistent, it remains to find the 
reason for its existence and for its global [higher-level] properties. (my trans of 
Piaget, 1973, pp. 215-216)  
Indeed, for Piaget, the discovery of such “opacities” is an invitation for enlightenment. 
More importantly, though, it was also after this that the pursuit of such “possibilities” 
came to serve in partnership with the dictates of “necessity” as a key driver of 
exploration-without-end (Piaget, 1977/1986; citing Ladrière, 1973, pp. 55-56).  
In the second highlight, we see this insight extended to explain how new 
knowledge—nominally, “an explanation” (but treated functionally, in the abstract, as a 
reflection producing desired outcomes)—is actually constructed: 
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Ladrière’s response is doubly instructive with regard to what we call reflecting 
abstraction (that which proceeds from operational coordination and not from 
objects) and the reciprocal assimilation between superior [higher-level] and 
inferior [lower-level] structures…. Explanation consists in deriving from the 
preceding structure that which is reorganized on a higher plane, while also 
enriching it by disengaging what it contained implicitly and then reassembling 
those functions in a new structure. (my trans of Piaget, 1973, p. 216) 
This insight was then developed further in a book on exactly this topic: Studies in 
Reflecting Abstraction (Piaget, 1977/2001).  
We end our discussion of what Piaget learned from Ladrière’s neo-Gödelian 
interpretation of incompleteness by referring to how he used these ideas to make the 
connection back to biology and psychology: 
The relationship between two levels is neither one of reduction from ulterior 
[further] to anterior [closer] nor of simple subordination from one to the other 
[lower to higher], but is rather one of reciprocal assimilation.... The explanatory 
relationship between the superior [higher-level] system and the inferior [lower-
level] system is a reciprocal assimilation in the sense, not—of course—of 
identification, but of mutual dependence, and thus of a sort of integration 
according to the biological or psychological significance of the result. (my trans 
of Piaget, 1973, p. 216) 
In short: the formal processes are the same, for mind and body, but they have their action 
each at their own level. These levels also complete each other, and make each other 
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possible, such that the level of biology is as necessary to that of the mind as the mind is to 
that of knowledge (see esp. Piaget, 1967/1971; Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989).  
 4. Conclusion 
Before the publication of the Functional interpretation, and the subsequent 
commentaries by Beth and Ladrière, Gödel was to Piaget simply a footnote in the history 
of logic. (Gödel’s results on completeness supported Piaget’s use of truth tables, but were 
no more interesting than that.) Afterward, however, changes in the meaning of 
incompleteness provided the means to reconstruct the Genevan research program at a new 
level. And it was outward from there that the New Theory was built. 
That said, of course, it is important to note that Piaget delighted in his role as “one 
of the chief ‘revisionists of Piaget’” (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 703n). We are, in other words, 
discussing change within a lineage. There is therefore no hard or transcendent 
philosophical rupture here, despite what is implied by Beilin’s (1992b) use of the term 
“new” in referring to the New Theory. Yet there is indeed an historical rupture, in the 
sense meant by Foucault (1969/1972). And that is why it was examinable using an 
“archaeological” method: tracing evidence though historical layers, identifying the 
boundaries, and seeking influences that can be named. 
Curiously, though, the result of identifying the neo-Gödelian turn is that we now 
see that the New Theory is not really a theory of “stages” at all. Rather, it is a theory of 
constructive processes in which stages play a role as part of the hierarchy of levels but—
being potentially infinite in scope and extension—lose their interest as a fundamental 
feature of the theory. Indeed, from this perspective, the New Theory is not at all about 
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what children can’t do at different stages of their development. It is rather about what 
happens before, during, and afterward.  
Piaget explained this in an interview, but assuming a background that has until 
now remained implicit: 
Too many people take the theory of stages to be simply a series of limitations. 
That is a disastrous view. The positive aspect is that as soon as each stage is 
reached, it offers new possibilities to the child. There are no “static” stages as 
such. Each is the fulfillment of something begun in the preceding one, and the 
beginning of something that will lead on to the next. (in Piaget & Duckworth, 
1973, p. 25) 
Of course, this is likely to be something of a surprise. But it can be made consistent with 
what we know by referring to the results of our archaeology. 
Reflecting back on Piaget’s nominalism, one might now suggest that “stages” 
might always have been little more than a name for something much more dynamic and 
complex than the name itself implied. This is of course a philosophical claim, rather than 
an historical one; akin to Piaget’s own musings about the meaning of “species” (see 
Vidal, 1992). Still, it follows that a constructive mechanism was always underneath the 
descriptive label. And the neo-Gödelian turn seems to provide such a mechanism, at least 
formally. From this, though, it also follows that it’s the structures that count. And so the 
insights of the neo-Gödelian turn apply not only to cognitive functions like memory 
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1968/1973), but also to affect (Piaget, 1954/1981, 1970/1976) and the 
will (Piaget, 1962c). What, then, is the result? 
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 We are left with a relatively simple theoretical statement: change is driven by the 
assimilation of the world to structures, followed by the accommodation of those 
structures when they are found to be incomplete. This is a minor variation of the old 
assimilation-accommodation-equilibration story that is presently reflected in textbooks. 
But then the New Theory adds a new layer of complexity: change occurs within and 
across levels of decreasing relative incompleteness and increasing scope, resilience, or 
power (see esp. Piaget, 1980b).  
That said, however, children—or, more generally, “developing knowledge 
users”—don’t experience this as a kind of Popperian conjecture and refutation. This is 
because they assume their structures are complete (i.e., they are “egocentric” [see 
Kesselring & Müller, 2011]). Proofs of incompleteness must therefore be delivered in a 
“relevant” way; they need to be “meaningful,” according to how this has already been 
defined in the extant context. And that can now be characterized, formally, according to 
how found-incompletenesses relate to the extant levels from which structures derive their 
significations and their implications (see esp. Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989, 1987/1991; 
Piaget & Henriques, 1978; Piaget et al., 1990/1992).  
This has important repercussions. Among other things, we come to see “the 
social” in a different guise: it’s just another level (Burman, 2013b). And while even 
mentioning this may sound like it extends our discussion beyond the limits of what Piaget 
actually said, that is not the case (Burman, 2015). Indeed, as Piaget put it explicitly 
during the neo-Gödelian turn: “society is the supreme unit, and the individual can only 
achieve his intentions and intellectual constructions insofar as he is the seat of collective 
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interactions that are naturally dependent, in level and value, on society as a whole” 
(Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 368; also Piaget, 1977/1995). The turn toward “logics of meaning” 
that are considered to characterize the New Theory can thus now be reinterpreted as a 
way of modelling this necessary context-dependence. Yet these are, in large part, new 
issues requiring substantially more discussion; another view can be had by examining the 
changes to Piaget’s biology that occurred just afterward.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
Second foreign invisible: Update of the Baldwin Effect 
 
AT THE BEGINNING OF PIAGET’S career, when he received his doctorate in natural 
history from the University of Neuchâtel in 1918, the maturation of children was thought 
by many developmentalists to recapitulate the evolution of the human species (Koops, 
2015b; Noon, 2005). This was due primarily to Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), who was in 
his time the most influential continental popularizer of Darwin’s ideas about evolution 
(see Sapp, 2003, pp. 31, 36-41; also Gould, 1977; Levit, Hossfeld, & Olsson, 2014; R. J. 
Richards, 2008). 
In psychology, Wilhelm Preyer (1841-1897) was explicit in his endorsement of 
his Jena colleague’s recapitulationism. For example: in The Mind of the Child 
(1882/1888), he explained that understanding child development requires understanding 
the evolution of the human species (see the special section edited by Eckhardt, 
Bringmann, & Sprung, 1985, pp. 175-280). In the U.S., G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924) 
thought similarly (Green, 2015a). As did both John Dewey (1859-1954) and James Mark 
Baldwin (1861-1934; see respectively Fallace, 2011; Young, 2013, p. 357).74 Yet 
                                                 
74 Note, though, that Piaget dismissed Hall’s version as “weak” (Piaget, 1928/1977/1995, p. 201), 
“strange” and “false” but nonetheless “valuable” (Piaget, 1945/1962, p. 156), and—eventually—“quite out 
of date” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1969, p. 60). Instead, he preferred the theoretical approaches of Baldwin 
and Pierre Janet (see e.g., Piaget, 1928/1977/1995, p. 201). That is the thread we follow here, although 
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recapitulationism was ejected from evolutionary theory in the early 20th century during 
the lead-up to the “modern synthesis” of Darwinian selection with Mendelian inheritance 
(Churchill, 1980).75 And so too was Piaget, from biology (Vonèche, 2003).76 
This disciplining of biology in favor of Evolution came at the expense of 
Development. Indeed, it is now recognized that Development was actively suppressed 
from the Evolutionary discourse following the modern synthesis (Amundson, 2005).77 
The focus was instead on “genes” as the primary cause determining organisms’ present 
and future physiology. Yet the result was that evolutionary biologists also came to ignore 
individual organisms even as they took dominion over them: evolution was reconceived 
as a phenomenon of populations, in which shifting distributions of genes drove the 
changes observed in physiology (see Sapp, 2003, pp. 147-151).  
By the 1950s, however, so-called “dissidents” from the modern synthesis had 
begun to explore the reincorporation of development into evolutionary theorizing (see 
e.g., Gilbert, 1994; Levit, Hossfeld, & Olsson, 2006). Or, from another perspective, ideas 
                                                 
following the convention in English of focusing on Baldwin (e.g., Cahan, 1984; Morgan & Harris, 2015; 
Wozniak, 2009). (For Janet, see Amann-Gainotti, 1992; Amann-Gainotti & Ducret, 2002; Burman & 
Nicolas, revised & resubmitted). 
75 Hamburger (1980) noted that this ejection happened earlier in the disciplining of Development 
than it did in that of Evolutionary thinking, and that that is part of what pushed the two fields apart: “Roux, 
a student of the major German prophet of evolution, Haeckel, and with impeccable credentials as a 
selectionist... broke away from Haeckel in the matter of recapitulation. He founded experimental 
embryology or Entwicklungsmechanik in the 1880s as a deliberate countermove against Haeckel's 
categorical verdict that phylogeny is the sufficient cause of ontogeny, and that there is nothing else to 
explore in this matter. Roux's decisive move from ultimate or remote to proximate causes... started the 
alienation of embryological from evolutionary thinking” (pp. 98-99). 
76 Piaget quoted Preyer directly, albeit in the French translation of his book: L’Âme de l’Enfant 
(see esp. Piaget, 1936/1952, pp. 30n, 63). Baldwin quoted him in English (e.g., Baldwin, 1896b, p. 540). 
77 Hamburger (1980) was more charitable: “I do not imply a criticism of the originators of the 
modern synthesis for their neglect of developmental genetics. On the contrary, I would assert that it has 
always been a legitimate and sound research strategy to relegate to a 'black box,' at least temporarily, wide 
areas that although pertinent would distract from the main thrust. No great discoveries or conceptual 
advances are possible without this expediency” (pp. 99-100). 
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regarding development were themselves starting to be “modernized” (e.g., Noble, 2015). 
And these changes in turn enabled Piaget to “return,” as he put it, to his “first loves as a 
biologist” (my trans of Piaget, 1950-1976/1976, p. 40). 
Of course, this chapter is not really intended to be about Piaget’s biology (see 
Messerly, 1996, 2009; Moessinger, 2000). Nor is it about the ideas his biology inspired 
(see Carey & Gelman, 1991; Langer & Killen, 1998; Parker, Langer, & Milbrath, 2005). 
Rather, this is a continuation of my earlier examination of the discourse in which his 
theory was reconstructed: because changes were also occurring in other disciplines that 
he had relied upon in building his “standard” theory of stages—such as Logic (Chapter 
V)—his return to earlier interests helped to reinvigorate the entire framework that had 
originated in his first works. And this is ultimately what led to the emergence of the New 
Theory, which is of course my focus in this project.  
Here, therefore, I examine another example of a change in Piaget’s meta-theory 
that made the New Theory possible. This is then given additional contemporary relevance 
by showing how the change also resulted in the extension, and ultimate updating, of the 
“Baldwin Effect” (so named by Simpson, 1953). After tracing some of Piaget’s more 
recent biological influences, we then see in addition how a deeper reading of those 
authors can be used to augment our understanding of Piaget’s later proposals that built 
upon them. And this includes further developments of his so-called “neglect” of the 
social (pace Morgan & Harris, 2015). The result is then a totally new view of the New 
Theory, and an entry-point to understanding how the open hierarchy of levels applies 
more broadly than simply as a merely-semantic replacement for stages (see also 
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Appendix A). 
That said, however, the result of this discussion need not be a “New Piagetian” 
approach. (Indeed, if that were my goal, I would coin a more distinctive term without a 
similar-sounding competitor in “neo-Piagetian.”) Rather, the larger justification for this 
discussion relates to contemporary changes presently underway in Biology, which 
themselves have their origins in many of the same works that were cited by Piaget. 
Briefly put: after many years of separation, Evolution and Development are now being 
synthesized anew to provide an approach known colloquially as “evo-devo” (see esp. 
Laubichler & Maeinschein, 2007). Indeed, from this perspective, Evolution and 
Development ought to be conceived-of as being on the same continuum (Carroll, 2005; 
Robert, 2004).  
These ideas are now making their way slowly into Psychology, which otherwise 
still remains largely gene-centric in its biological meta-theory (see e.g., Chomsky, 2010; 
Griffiths, 2007; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003, 2013; Masterpasqua, 2009; Meaney, 2010; 
Robert, 2008; Szyf et al., 2009). As a result, the timing seems right for considering how 
the earlier incarnations of these contemporary ideas were used by Piaget to inform his 
“stages,” and how they were updated in the New Theory. We can then project the results 
forward, to replace the notion of an evolutionary-developmental continuum with one of 
levels in a system (cf. Hooker, 1994). In the process, we also thereby reconnect the 
discipline itself with its historical roots in Haeckel’s recapitulationism, as well as with the 
related idea that similar mechanisms are at work in evolution, development, learning, and 
even the advance of knowledge itself (see Koops, 2015a; cf. Piaget, 1967/1971; Piaget & 
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Garcia, 1983/1989). 
1. An introduction to the Baldwin Effect 
 The simplest place to start in this penultimate chapter is with the Haeckel-
influenced background that informed and then was updated in Piaget’s later biological 
works: “the Baldwin Effect” (Depew, 2000; Young, 2013). This is now understood, 
generally, to be the process whereby learning alters evolutionary trajectories. But it is 
also important to note that the proposal originated before the modern synthesis of 
evolutionary biology, that it was named afterward, and that it didn’t gain the currency it 
now has until the late-1980s (i.e., after  Hinton & Nowlan, 1987). It therefore has both an 
historical aspect and a contemporary one, with boosters and skeptics actively involved in 
exploring the continuing importance of both perspectives (see B. H. Weber & Depew, 
2003; Turney, Whitley, & Anderson, 2007). In order to understand Piaget’s use of those 
same ideas that now are popular for different reasons, we therefore need to step out of the 
present perspective and try to see it from the inside.  
 1.1. Context. The intellectual context in which the Baldwin Effect was introduced 
was very different from today’s. Inheritance was understood to be necessary, but its 
mechanisms had not been discovered: genes existed, but they were not known. As a 
result, discussions were broader; based more on principles than particles. And, in this, 
two important theorists loomed especially large: Darwin, of course, and—before him—
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829).  
 Today, Darwin is the archetypal hero of such stories: an explorer who 
encountered the unknown, and returned with the principles that inform virtually all 
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discussions of contemporary evolutionary thinking. These principles were then 
formalized following their synthesis with the discovery of the action of particulate genes, 
providing the basis for the system now called “neo-Darwinism” (i.e., the product of 
continued advancement after the modern synthesis). But the name we know is not the 
man that was. As with Piaget, there was a Darwin before “Darwin” (e.g., Gruber, 1974; 
cf. Vidal, 1994). And I don’t just mean this biographically.  
 Recognizing that even Darwin has a context provides us with an uncontroversial 
way to get to the Baldwin Effect, as well as to a clearer understanding of how it 
contributes both to evolutionary and psychological theory, why it has occupied a 
precarious position in the public understanding of biology (including by psychologists), 
and why Piaget’s update was in turn so easily misunderstood. Simply put, Baldwin 
occupies the space between Darwin and Lamarck. He is therefore located in the grey zone 
between the great hero and the great villain of contemporary evolutionary theory. Yet 
because Lamarck is himself a part of Darwin’s context, we can begin with the later 
thinker and then work backward. This reverses our usual trajectory, but is necessary 
given the focus of this chapter: my primary goal is to show something new of Piaget, not 
of Darwin or Lamarck (the discussion of whom in what follows should be itself 
uncontroversial). 
 1.2. Darwin and Lamarck. Darwin’s main contribution was twofold: to present 
evidence for evolution in a coherent and very rigorous way, and to provide a mechanism 
that could explain that evidence simply. The evidence that Darwin accumulated is now all 
but forgotten. But his primary mechanism is well-known: “natural selection” (discussed 
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most popularly by Dawkins, 1976/1989; Dennett, 1995).78 
 Natural selection is driven by a simple observation: over the long-term, organisms 
that can make more babies will make more babies. This then eventually puts pressure on 
other organisms that compete for the same resources (including members of the same 
species), such that those organisms which are less able to compete for those resources 
will also be less able to make babies that can in turn make babies. The result is that those 
organisms that are most often observed in nature are the descendants of the most fecund 
earlier ancestors: future generations reflect the results of past competitions. This 
reproductive prowess then also defines “success” and “fitness” in both the Darwinian and 
the neo-Darwinian frameworks: they make more. 
 Most important, however, is that the physiology of those future generations 
reflects the inheritance of the traits that enabled their ancestors to out-compete their 
rivals in relevant baby-making domains. The changes in physiology seen in the fossil 
record can therefore be explained by differences in the relative competitive strength of 
different traits that altered the likelihood of one’s babies having babies (e.g., sight, 
foresight, and sociality). That same mechanism then also explains why there are so many 
different kinds of organism with so many different kinds of traits: each individual 
observed by the naturalist reflects the entire history of selection pressures leading up to 
the moment of that observation.  
 This is obviously a powerful proposal: every present-day organism reflects their 
ancestors’ ways of living in the world. And Darwin showed this through innumerable 
                                                 
78 He offered others too, like “sexual selection,” but the primary proposal will be our focus here. 
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natural-historical studies. (My favorite bit of Darwin trivia is that he published four 
separate full volumes on barnacles.) But it was also not an entirely original proposal. 
Darwin’s big idea relied on five earlier big ideas, each of which was equally as rigorously 
presented and defended as his own:  
1. Organisms that are physiologically similar to each other can be considered to be 
related according to the degree of their similarity, and therefore they can be given 
similar names (Linnaeus). 
2. Organisms that are found in fossils located in adjacent geographical strata, and 
which are physiologically similar to each other, are the same species even though 
the paleo-ontological record itself sometimes shows discontinuities and 
catastrophic endings (i.e., “extinctions”). Because the most recent fossils are 
physiological similar to organisms found living in the world, they thus reflect the 
same origin (Cuvier). 
3. The Earth shows evidence of massive geological changes occurring gradually 
over vast timescales not accounted-for by a literal reading of the Biblical tale of 
Creation (Lyell). 
4. Competition occurs naturally as a consequence of population growth outstripping 
resource growth (Malthus).  
5. Evolution occurs naturally as a result of the preservation of traits that are well-
used (and the elimination of traits that aren’t used), such that the direction of 
change is from the simple to the complex. A consequence of this is then the 
gradual accumulation of modifications passed from generation to generation: “the 
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inheritance of acquired characteristics” (Lamarck). 
The combination of these ideas, when coupled with the evidence collected, then affords 
the Darwinian conclusion—the origin of species by means of natural selection—as a 
consequence. Yet it is the last influence that is of the most interest to us.  
Briefly put: Darwin provided a simpler mechanism for natural change than had 
Lamarck. It explained more and demanded less. Evolution is driven by inheritance down 
the generations, but not because the willful actions of great individuals rewrite the 
fortunes of all those who follow. Thus, famously: an individual giraffe’s efforts at 
stretching to reach the high branches of scarce trees is not the cause of evolutionary 
change, because—according to Darwinian theory—it is not that effort itself that drives 
change. Rather, long-necked giraffes sometimes have longer-necked babies. These babies 
can then reach higher, and so they are able to gain access to more scarce resources and 
have more babies which might themselves have longer necks. As a result, longer necks 
are then also “fitter” relative to the need (and subject to constraints like managing blood 
pressure). 
This seems straightforward today. Yet it was also only a simple corollary of the 
other proposals upon which Darwin built. With an old Earth, for example, it is not 
necessary for change to occur as quickly as Lamarck had thought. A slow accumulation 
of traits—over a stupendous number of years, rather than a few thousand—could 
plausibly account for the variety observable both in the wild and in the fossil record. The 
earlier progressivism of Lamarck’s proposal was also weakened, because change became 
relative to the selection pressures imposed by competition rather than undertaken by 
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sheer force of will leading to use and disuse. Evolutionary advancement thus lost its 
directionality: not “progress toward,” but “progress from” (see also Burman, 2008a, p. 
176n). But the role of the individual changed as well, because the locus of evolution 
shifted from individual effort to species-specific traits held in different quantities by high-
achieving families.  
From here, we see the direct connection from Darwin to a dark history of the 
intentional selection of people by other people: “eugenics” (see esp. Bashford & Levine, 
2010; Fancher, 2001). We also see the influence on psychology of this style of thinking 
through Darwin’s cousin—Francis Galton (1822-1911), who actually coined that term—
and his correlational studies of how “eminence” runs in families (see Fancher, 1983; 
2009; also Diamond, 1977). These interests were then carried forward in not-always-
obvious ways, although especially through intelligence-testing (esp. Fancher, 1985; 
Gould, 1981/1996; Zenderland, 1998; also Minton, 1988, pp. 51-55, 143-150; Weizmann, 
2010).  
In short: several other important areas of psychology, beyond developmental and 
child psychology, are bound-up tightly with the issues that are discussed in this chapter. 
Of course, our goal is to follow a different path than other historians in examining this 
lineage of ideas (e.g., Degler, 1991; R. J. Richards, 1987; Tucker, 2002). Before moving 
a step closer to Piaget, though, I can’t resist an historian’s aside. Specifically: it is curious 
that both theories—Darwin’s and Lamarck’s—are so consistent with the demands of the 
context in which they were proposed.  
The French view, provided by Lamarck, can be located directly in the French 
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Revolution that toppled the aristocracy during The Terror. Yet this upper echelon of 
society remained in place in England, and Darwin’s family (the Darwin-Wedgwood-
Galtons) aspired to reach its lofty heights through their great works. (Note that Darwin 
himself was a gentleman, but not an aristocrat: he inherited wealth, and thus opportunity, 
but not position.) It is then still-curiouser that an attempt to find a path between their two 
positions was provided by an American: Baldwin, the son of a southern slave-freeing 
abolitionist, sent north to be educated at the College of New Jersey (now called Princeton 
University) and eventually hired there in 1893 to serve as the Stuart Chair in Psychology. 
(For some further details about Piaget’s own context, but presented following the levels-
perspective developed in this project, see Appendix A.) 
 1.3. A new factor. Baldwin’s goal was to provide a mechanism to fit in the space 
between Darwin and Lamarck, but in terms acceptable to Darwinians. He called this “a 
new factor in evolution” (Baldwin, 1896a, 1896b; see also 1896c, 1897). And it was 
necessary, for a philosopher with interests in psychology, because August Weismann 
(1834-1914) had just recently shown that the Lamarckian individualistic view was 
untenable: only germ cells (sperm and egg) carry information into the next generation, 
and no amount of effort to change the body could have any import (Weismann, 1881-
1888/1889).  
For psychology, and for those interested in finding an evolutionary role for action 
and learning, Weismann’s findings were problematic: it subjugated the possibilities for 
the individual to the whims of history, and past competition, while also drawing a much 
sharper line than had existed before between “inherited” and “acquired” behaviors 
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(Johnston, 1995). From the perspective of biology, however, it was foundational. Indeed, 
Weismann’s work was so important in setting biology on its current track that it is today 
considered the origin of what later became the modern synthesis (Sapp, 2003, pp. 68-69, 
92-94).79 As a result, from this perspective, the Baldwin Effect has always been at least a 
bit unorthodox: in responding to Weismann, Baldwin set himself apart from what soon 
afterward became the mainstream. But what had he proposed? 
 Baldwin’s two papers introducing the “new factor” synthesized a series of earlier 
publications into a single short and coherent narrative. He began by asking a question: 
“What is the method of the individual’s growth and adaptation?” (Baldwin, 1896a, p. 
444). He then explained what he meant by this, and gave the sought-after solution a 
name: 
Looked at functionally, we see that the organism manages somehow to 
accommodate itself to conditions which are favorable, to repeat movements which 
are adaptive, and so to grow by the principle of use. This involves some sort of 
selection, from the actual ontogenetic variations, of certain ones—certain 
functions, etc. Certain other possible and actual functions and structures decay 
from disuse. Whatever the method of doing this may be, we may simply… apply 
the phrase, “Organic Selection,” to the organism's behavior in acquiring new 
modes or modifications of adaptive function with its influence of structure. 
(Baldwin, 1896a, p. 444) 
                                                 
79 Piaget was influenced by this as well: his later writings interpret Lamarck through Weismann’s 
germ theory (Morss, pp. 70-71n16; see also pp. 64-65). 
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In other words, the organism has to make selections between the causes of its own 
actions: some lead to good results, and it is beneficial that those couplings between 
actions-and-results should be repeatable. The resulting mechanism is then “new” because 
this “selection” is not made across generations. Simply put, it was more a general view: 
successful actions reproduce to make more of themselves.  
Every individual in the population performs this new kind of selection in their 
own unique situation. It is in this way that they “accommodate” themselves to their local 
situation. The result seems Lamarckian because the proposed factor requires only use and 
disuse. But it is also compatible with Darwinian theory because such a facility could have 
arisen through natural selection: inherited capacities produce both relevant and irrelevant 
outcomes, and organisms will derive advantages by being able to select the relevant 
causes of those successful outcomes. 
From this perspective, only the results matter. Baldwin’s is therefore a 
“functional” argument (see Green, 2009; also Beilin, 1983). And although the selection is 
made at the level of the organism, it is also a purely automatic (natural) process. No will 
is required to drive the use or disuse. It is therefore not Lamarckian in a problematic 
sense.  
Still, though, the choice of name wasn’t clear about this. It was also perhaps too 
close to “organismic selection.” It was therefore soon after renamed “functional 
selection” (see e.g., Baldwin, 1887-1897/1902, p. 165n; 1902, pp. 94, 165-167; 1909, pp. 
15-20). And this is just as well. It’s much clearer: selections are made—naturally, and 
without intervention—in favor of functions that fulfill a need, regardless of their cause. 
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This renamed form of the argument is then also more obviously compatible with the later 
turn by evolutionary theorists toward genes, even while it applies more broadly than just 
to particulate inheritance: if it works, use it. (The coincidence of its naming with Gödel’s 
“functional interpretation,” discussed in Chapter V, also foreshadows Piaget’s update.) 
1.4. Mechanism. Baldwin’s first paper didn’t provide a mechanism for how this 
selection would occur. Instead, his argumentation was grounded in an assumption: “we 
simply assume what everyone admits in some form, [namely] that such adaptations of 
function—‘accommodations’ the psychologist calls them…—do occur” (Baldwin, 
1896a, p. 444; emphasis as in the original). A mechanism was only proposed after 
reviewing the myriad observations this assumed factor would need to address. This then 
came in the second paper: the “circular reaction” (Baldwin, 1896b, p. 543). 
The circular reaction is both recursive and vitalist: life moves toward “the good,” 
and away from “the bad.” Individual adaptation is then the result of life’s many iterations. 
But Baldwin also pointed out that social organisms don’t do this randomly, because they 
have access to a form of non-biological inheritance that is made possible by imitation.  
Imitation is a special kind of copying. And it is wholly unlike the copying of 
genes.  
Genes are copied chemically. Strands of inherited-particulate (DNA) split in half, 
and then each half is used as a template. Using the machinery of the cell, this template is 
then read and the amount of particulate is doubled directly. Imitation, however, is 
different.  
Imitation is an endogenous reconstruction of an exogenous source: a reproduction 
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by internal structures of something observed externally—with no template (Burman, 
2012d)—which is found to have beneficial functional consequences (or not) and then 
used (or not). As a result, new variations do not emerge by “mutation.” Instead, they 
reflect their origins. In a way analogous to the discussion in Chapter IV, imitations 
“indigenize” the external object and re-represent its features according to the functions of 
internal structures. Yet Baldwin’s new factor then applies equally as well: the imitating 
organism “moves toward” those variations with pleasurable results, and “moves away 
from” others. As this is repeated, the organism then produces “habits” of internalized 
imitations-and-variations (as a learned-alternative to the “instincts” evolved by blind-
variation-and-selection).  
Note, though: because the imitated behaviors exist, they can be assumed to be 
functional. They must produce “good” ends, or they would have been selected-against. 
Copying them then requires no special “will.” And thus the imitator need only imitate 
and move in the direction of “the good.” The rest follows from there: “These then give 
renewed pleasure, excite pleasurable associations, and again stimulate the attention, and 
by these influences the adaptive movements thus struck are selected and held as 
permanent acquisitions” (Baldwin, 1896b, p. 543). Thus, imitations persist across 
generations to the extent that they are not pressured away: an acquired characteristic, 
inherited by other-than-Lamarckian means (i.e., inherited indirectly through social 
learning). 
1.5. A further step. Baldwin didn’t stop there. His goal was not simply to provide 
a new evolutionary mechanism. He was also making a contribution to psychology. 
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Thus: to the extent that pleasurable results, easily achieved, are less costly than 
those which come at the end of a long competition, the principle of movement provides a 
means of exploring new territories not “foreseen” by evolution. And that in turn—as a 
result of Darwinian competition—provides a new evolutionary impetus toward wider 
exploration, as well as toward greater intelligence. As Baldwin put it: 
The intelligent use of phylogenetic [evolutionary] variations for functional 
purposes [for “the good”]… puts a premium on variations which can be so used, 
and thus sets phylogenetic progress in directions of constantly improved mental 
endowment. The circular reaction which is the method of intelligent adaptations is 
liable to variation in a series of complex ways which represent phylogenetically 
the development of the mental functions known as memory, imagination, 
conception, thought, etc. (Baldwin, 1896b, p. 547) 
The development of even minimally-cognitive functions then returns a direction to 
evolution, which is in turn afforded by each organism’s individual psychology.  
This is already an important leap forward for psychologists. Yet he continued. 
And the result was the reversal of Haeckel’s recapitulationism: 
We thus reach a phylogeny of mind [evolution of mental abilities] which proceeds 
in the direction set by the ontogeny of mind [child development], just as on the 
organic side the phylogeny of the organism [evolutionary biology] gets its 
determinate direction from the organism’s ontogenetic adaptations [embryological 
and developmental change]. And since it is the one principle of Organic Selection 
[Functional Selection] working by the same functions to set the direction of both 
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phylogenies, the physical and the mental, the two developments are not two, but 
one (Baldwin, 1896b, p. 547). 
In other words, physical change and mental change are driven by the same mechanism. 
But developmental change also does not recapitulate the evolutionary history of the 
species. Rather, development—especially the further development of intellectual 
capacities—foreshadows evolution’s future advances by opening up new territories in 
which different inherited structures can become functional, used, and selected-for.  
This creative role of the mental in evolution bears repeating in different terms, 
because the Baldwin Effect is often presented by biologists as a shield against the 
selection pressures that would otherwise be responsible for the production of novel forms 
following the mutation of genes. (This is also referred to as “masking” [see e.g., Deacon, 
2003, p. 92].) Briefly: genetic predispositions are inherited, but these only become 
functional in specific situations and contexts. Because vital movement is always toward 
“the good,” different predispositions provide different benefits according to where the 
organism finds itself. And this then opens up new possibilities for further exploration. 
The way in which this proposal was made compatible with gene-driven neo-
Darwinian theory is discussed next. And it was by referring to that version that Piaget 
updated the Baldwin Effect: he leveraged the neo-Gödelian hierarchy of levels to provide 
a general mechanism that is as compatible with neo-Darwinian (particulate) theory as 
Baldwin’s view was with Darwinian (principled) theory. Before we move another step 
toward this, though, it must also be said that the publication of these proposals by 
Baldwin coincided with the publication by other authors of similar ideas, and all were 
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collected together subsequently—by G. G. Simpson (1902-1984)—under Baldwin’s 
name well after all of their deaths. (Hence, “the Baldwin Effect” [Simpson, 1953].) 
However, the multiple origins of the idea itself is not relevant for our purposes because it 
was Baldwin whom Piaget read and discussed in the greatest depth and detail. 
2. Genetic relates to the genesis of novel forms, not to genes 
I quoted Piaget (1982b) in Chapter III as saying that he considered “the global 
idea of genesis” (p. 83) to be the most important among his inheritances from Baldwin. 
And because both authors found themselves outside of the modern synthesis, this is then 
what they both meant by the term “genetic.”80 This is also in turn why their writings 
about “genetic epistemology” are broader than the contemporary evolutionary 
epistemologies proposed and espoused since the modern synthesis: neither Baldwin nor 
Piaget was concerned with the application of “blind variation and selective retention” as a 
meta-theoretical method, but instead were interested in the growth of knowledge as a 
natural extension of human development itself (see discussion by Apostel, 1987; 
Vonèche, 1985). And both offered similar mechanisms to explain that growth. Indeed, 
one might say that Piaget’s early writings were less an inheritance from Baldwin, and 
more of an imitation (see e.g., Cahan, 1984; Cairns, 1992). Of course, our interest is in 
his later variations.  
2.1. The biological meaning of equilibration. Functional selection appears in 
both Baldwin’s and Piaget’s writings, most notably in the form of the recursive “circular 
                                                 
80 (In this sense, genetic is therefore a “false friend” in the linguistic sense: the same term is used 
to refer to different ideas, but separated by enough time and context that those differences become invisible 
behind the word itself [Burman, 2012a].) 
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reaction” (Parker, 1993; Sánchez & Loredo, 2007). This is the source of ideas regarding 
the constructive pairing of “assimilation” and “accommodation,” which both Baldwin 
and Piaget used to explain the genesis of novel forms. It also provided the basis for 
Piaget’s well-known developmental triad: assimilation-accommodation-equilibration. Yet 
this language can also itself be misleading. (For example: Piaget’s triad is not the 
equivalent of Fichte’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis, despite Piaget’s frequent appeals to 
dialectics, because for him equilibration is a process and not a result [see also Burman, 
2008a, p. 174].) As a result, we must define our terms carefully. Again, though, we can 
do this most simply by translating them through Piaget’s biological origins. 
Thus: if the environment never changes, then the organism is born equilibrated. 
There is no circular reaction at the level of the organism; the inherited evolutionary 
history of the species has shaped its individual fitness, into which it must simply mature. 
Assimilations of environmental stimuli are easy: the responses are innate, and the 
organism needs only to manifest its destiny. But if the environment does change (perhaps 
because the organism itself has moved), then the organism must respond if it is to retain 
its fitness: first it must assimilate the effects of any change it encounters, and then it must 
move in such a way so as to accommodate its way of life to that change. In other words, 
the organism must adapt. 
This is a core tenet of Piagetian theory: biological systems are always re-
equilibrating (see the discussions by Boom, 2009; M. Chapman, 1992; Ducret & 
Cellérier, 2007; Gallagher, 1972; Moessinger, 1978). It is also a core proposition of the 
Baldwin Effect: it is possible to change how selection pressures affect an organism by 
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learning to respond differently to aversive stimuli, such that subsequent evolutionary 
change might follow in the path laid out by prior behavioral and developmental changes. 
But an explanation for how this could work that was also consistent with neo-Darwinian 
(gene-driven) theory remained elusive well into the 1950s. Indeed, no less astute an 
observer than Simpson claimed—at a conference held in 1956—that the origin of 
adaptation was both “the central problem” and “the prime problem” of evolutionary 
biology (Roe & Simpson, 1958b, p. 338; Simpson, 1958, p. 521). This is because 
adaptation is not really a problem of species; it is rather a problem of individuals, and 
thus was dismissed by the modern synthesis. 
The modern solution to this problem—one that is just now beginning to be 
popularized—was outlined originally by two authors: the Russian-speaking Ivan 
Schmalhausen (1884-1963) and the English-speaking Conrad Hal Waddington (1905-
1975). Piaget cited them both, but preferred Waddington for reasons discussed below. 
Yet this was contrary to the disciplinary norm at the time: Schmalhausen was preferred 
by Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-1975), one of the main architects of the modern 
synthesis (Gilbert, 1994). And that in turn provides part of the further justification for this 
history: it is Waddington who is now celebrated as the father of modern “epigenetics,” 
and who is thus also one of the grandfathers of the new synthesis between evolution and 
development in “evo-devo” (see e.g., Noble, 2015; Slack, 2002; van Speybroeck, 2002).81  
                                                 
81 The prefix epi- means “above” or “beyond.” Epigenetics, for Waddington, therefore means 
“above genetics” (see Figure 2, below). An older variation is epigenesis, which should be understood 
specifically in contradistinction to preformation (Young, 2013; also Sapp, in press). To compare the two—
epigenesis and epigenetics—see van Speybroeck (2002). For an examination of how related ideas have 
been used in psychology, see Kitchener (1978). 
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2.2. “Epigenetics.” Waddington called his version of the Baldwin Effect by a 
different name: “genetic assimilation” (Waddington, 1953b, 1953a). Briefly put, he 
proposed the means whereby an acquired character could be copied from the phenotype 
to the genome, such that it could be reproduced in a subsequent generation even after the 
earlier cause had been removed. 
These proposals were dismissed. Indeed, for Simpson (1953, p. 116), it was not 
necessary to appeal to other-than-orthodox processes in order to explain change. At the 
same time, however, Simpson noted that it was not correct to dismiss Waddington for 
having appealed to forbidden Lamarckian mechanisms. Simpson was simply not 
convinced by the explanation, just as he had not been convinced about the necessity of 
the Baldwin Effect. Waddington also himself defended against such a reading of his 
work, while simultaneously making clear how his proposals were themselves distinct 
from the Baldwin Effect (see also Crispo, 2007). The result was then a way to achieve the 
goals sought by Lamarckians, but by more acceptable means (see also Waddington, 
1957, 1959a, 1961a).  
Waddington appealed to a similar notion as had Gödel in grounding his 
Functional interpretation of 1958: circular recursion in the form of feedback, but across 
levels, such that natural selection could be understood as acting at a different level than 
that of the operation of individual genes. In his view, too, development could also be 
understood to have a role in exposing inherited traits to different selection pressures. 
Indeed, it was this inclusion of development in evolutionary theory that could achieve the 
sought-after solution to the problem of adaptation. He explained: 
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the existence of feed-back systems in development… makes possible the 
appearance of another feed-back system, in relation to natural selection and the 
environment, which results in the genetic assimilation of acquired characters; and 
this exactly mimics, by quite another mechanism, the type of result which 
Lamarck and others have wished to explain…. (Waddington, 1962, p. 96) 
In other words, adaptive change occurs because different levels of biological organization 
interact.  
From this perspective, the engine driving change is not the individual’s high-level 
efforts in the world, nor is it their repetition. (Therefore, it is not “Lamarckian.”) Instead, 
the mechanism is to be found in much lower-level interactions: just beyond the level of 
the genes. Yet, as a result, the organism’s place in its ecology—the source of selection 
pressures that have their effect at this low level—can be conceived as belonging to the 
same interconnected and interacting system as its ways of responding to selection 
pressures: learning, development, and evolution (see esp. Waddington, 1959c; also 1977).  
2.3. Impact on Piaget. This insight provided the biological basis for Piaget’s 
(1974/1980a, 1975/1995) later biological proposals that were most harshly criticized (see 
esp.  Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979/1980; 1994; also Deacon, 2005; Parker, 2005). And 
indeed, the reception of those ideas was not unlike the initial treatment of Piaget’s logic. 
The biggest difference is that, in biology, he had no disciplinary insider to assist him.  
There is, in short, no Ladrière in this story. Waddington’s role was rather akin to 
Beth’s (serving as a kind of reorienting catalyst), and there was therefore no one of 
similar stature and influence to take the second step. Yet, in terms of how the changes 
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still-ongoing in Biology affected his thinking, that is the end of the story. Its beginning 
can be found at an in-house conference held in Geneva in 1964, when Waddington 
provided the means to connect Piaget’s interest in biology with the changes in his 
conception of logic that we have called the neo-Gödelian turn. As Piaget recalled: “he 
made a very profound comparison between epigenetic construction and a progression of 
geometric theorems” (noted in Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 14).82  
The question then under discussion is by now familiar: From whence do novelties 
originate? Are they innate, or do they arise from a more complex process? Piaget then 
grouped himself with Waddington, whom he identified as “the embryologist,” against the 
objections of an unnamed physiologist: 
The physiologist was probably right as far as his own field was concerned, 
because it is a fact that homeostatic regulations do not contain the necessary 
regulatory organ…. But the embryologist and even the psychologist (myself) 
were perhaps right, too, the former because he was thinking of epigenetic growth, 
…and myself because I was thinking of cognitive functions…. (Piaget, 
1967/1971, p. 36) 
The regulatory organ found in embryology and cognitive development—but not found in 
physiology—was for Piaget equilibration itself. This then became a fluid kind of 
homeostasis, but without a static set-point: “homeorhesis,” in Waddington’s (1957, 
1961b) terminology, and Piaget cited him in this connection from then on (see e.g., 
                                                 
82 Why it was, exactly, that Waddington was invited is unknown. If those papers are held at the 
Piaget Archives, they are in the unprocessed collection.  
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Piaget, 1966/1971, p. 47; Piaget, 1967/1971, pp. 19, 23-25; 1968/1970, p. 710; 
1968/1971, p. 49; 1970/1972, p. 60; 1970/1973, p. 52; 1975/1985, p. 4; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1969, p. 122; also in Evans, 1973, p. 8).83 
The effect of this encounter was so great that, soon after the conference, Piaget 
returned to biology ex professo and began publishing again in biological journals (Piaget, 
1965b, 1966).84 These renewed studies—of the same snails from his doctorate, about 
which he had published nothing for nearly four decades, and also of plant development—
were then intended to provide the material counterpart to the formalisms discussed in 
Chapter 5. To understand that, however, we need to reach back once again to the very 
beginning of the standard theory. 
3. From snails to children, and back again 
As I have said, Piaget’s standard theory was informed originally by a conception 
of the logic of grouping: underlying a grouping’s organization as a whole is a formal 
cause that is in turn describable as a structure. But this wasn’t initially a psychological 
insight. It started as a musing on the relations between parts and the whole they belong to, 
                                                 
83 Homeorhesis is the broad category inside of which the better-known “canalization” is a specific 
type (see Waddington, 1957, pp. 32, 43-45, 58, 149-150, 189). Today, however, this idea is typically 
referred-to as relating to “developmental pathways” (see e.g., Gottlieb, 1991, 1997). 
84 Before this, by which I mean after 1929, Piaget was not working a professional biologist. 
Indeed, he even referred to himself in 1975 as a “novice” (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979/1980, p. 60). The use 
of the expression, however, is necessary to draw attention to this because he also said in 1975 that he had 
never left biology: “I haven’t come back to it—I’ve never left it” (in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 110). 
Indeed, without the distinction it provides, it is hard to make sense of this relative to his claim in 1976 that 
he had made a “return” to his “first loves as a biologist” (my trans of Piaget, 1950-1976/1976, p. 40). Yet, 
with it, we can simplify easily: biology was always important to Piaget, for inspiration, but he did not work 
as a biologist for very long after the completion of his doctorate. Instead, he turned to philosophy with a 
view to applying biological methods to the study of human values (Liengme Bessire & Béguelin, 
1996/2008). He then found work in a variety of fields, including as an experimental psychologist (Ratcliff 
& Borella, 2013; discussed in English by Burman, 2015). But it was not until after the conference of 1964 
that he chose to once again publish his thoughts regarding biology. 
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in the greater context of his work in natural history cataloguing snails. It was then this 
that led to Piaget’s rejection of the singularly upward causation demanded by the 
Mendelians—from genes to phenotype (from parts to whole), with no possibility for the 
downward influence argued-for by Lamarckians (from whole to parts)—followed by his 
professional embarrassment and ejection from the discipline (Vonèche, 2003). 
Biology, however, was changing. The intervening decades highlighted the one-
sidedness of the gene’s eye point-of-view. And it was Waddington who ultimately 
explained the continuing importance of Piaget’s original work, referring to his own 
formulation of the phenomena captured by the Baldwin Effect: 
The most thorough and interesting study of genetic assimilation under natural 
conditions concerns the well-known pond snail Limnaea stagnalis. It was made 
by the great Swiss psychologist Piaget, and was begun in 1929 before he had 
taken up the study of psychological development in man for which he has become 
so well known. (Waddington, 1975, p. 92; alluding to Piaget, 1965b) 
In other words, Piaget’s original tentatives that had been dismissed as incorrect at one 
time were redeemed at another: the trans-generational changes that Piaget had observed 
in shell shape, which he had posited as being due to the snails’ adaptation to turbulent 
water and strong currents, could indeed be accepted as having been acquired and 
conserved across generations. The problem was then to find an acceptable explanation for 
how that happened. 
3.1. From snails to psychology. The importance of this to psychology is that—
despite having had to abandon his earliest ideas as anti-Mendelian at a time when Mendel 
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was in ascendance, and thus having been forced to move on from his first loves (Vidal, 
1992; Vonèche, 2003)—the influence of Piaget’s earliest biological thinking on his 
psychological theories cannot be as easily dismissed as his earliest logical ideas. 
Although his later biological proposals were rejected in a similar way to his earlier 
appeals to logic, the situation as regards his biology is quite different: Piaget began his 
career in biology, and was trained in it, while he only ever dabbled in logic. This merits 
some further discussion. 
For the snails of Piaget’s doctoral studies, the grouped-deformation of each 
individual’s shell was caused materially by tension in the muscle used to hold onto a 
stone in rough water. Briefly: the rougher the water, the greater the tension, and the larger 
the deformation. Over time, Piaget (being an anti-Mendelian) then thought that this might 
itself lead the deformed snails to join a different species-grouping. His biometrical 
methods also supported this view explicitly (Burman, 2010; Vidal, 1994). 
After his departure from Biology, these early methods were applied to his studies 
of belief justification in children. Thus, similarly: for the children of his earliest studies of 
intelligence in Binet’s former laboratory-school at Granges-aux-Belles in Paris, the 
differences between age-groupings in answering test questions could be conceived-of as 
having been caused by differences in the “mental tension” that Pierre Janet talked about 
in the lectures that Piaget had attended at the College de France (Burman, 2007c; 
Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000). So, in short: children hold on tightly to their early 
justifications, then eventually give up, let go of childish things, and thereby “re-
equilibrate” to a higher “species of mind” (with the underlying mechanism remaining 
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undefined).  
3.2. From snails to stages. If one were to construct an assessment tool based on 
the synthesis of Piaget’s early biology with the theory of mental tension that he learned 
from Janet, the result would be a conception of change that is consistent with stages. 
Indeed, Piaget talked about Janet’s work in exactly these terms (Burman & Nicolas, 
revised & resubmitted).85  
From this perspective, the only difference between a “series of groupings” and a 
“sequence of stages” is the existence of a set of transformations which unite them in a 
lineage. Piaget’s resulting studies showing these transformations—a natural history of 
childhood, following the broad pattern set out in his dissertation (viz. what you find when 
you look)—were then reported in dozens of books. And it’s these that informed his 
standard theory. 
Of course, the results of that work came to be widely criticized (see e.g., Morra et 
al., 2008). Yet the changes that followed the popularization of these criticisms also led to 
a series of alterations to the theory itself, shifting the focus from the fact of “stages” to 
the question of “process” in their emergence. And this, in a nutshell, is the problem of 
“genesis.” It is also the most important of Piaget’s theoretical inheritances from Baldwin 
(see Piaget, 1982b). That puts us back on track. 
4. A new look at the problem of genesis 
After the in-house conference in 1964, an important subtext in Piaget’s writings 
                                                 
85 This is almost certainly why he referred to Janet as his “true mentor” in psychology (see 
Amann-Gainotti, 1992; Amann-Gainotti & Ducret, 2002). 
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was to refer to these new biological ideas in terms of their causal role in generating novel 
forms (e.g., Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 36). He even referred to the possibility of replacing 
then-standard conceptions of linear causation with new ideas regarding “cybernetic 
circuits” inspired by Waddington’s use of feedback (Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 294n). This 
was then followed by a book in his house-series, Études de l’épistémologie génétique, on 
cybernetics and epistemology that included a paper that had garnered severe criticisms at 
the in-house conference in 1965 (noted by Piaget in Cellérier, Papert, & Voyat, 1968, p. 
2). And he followed that up with his own book—again citing Waddington (Piaget, 
1974/1980a, p. 10)—in order to explain his view of how these mechanisms might work in 
better-known biological systems. 
Until recently, however, all of this made very little sense in terms of Piaget’s 
workflow in psychology: although he did indeed revisit his earlier writings on the child’s 
understanding of causality—in two short volumes (Bunge, Halbwachs, Kuhn, Piaget, & 
Rosenfeld, 1971; Piaget & Garcia, 1971/1974)—his publications from this time do not 
reflect the same kind of experimental intensity that characterize his subsequent New 
Theory writings (e.g., Piaget, 1974/1976, 1974/1978, 1974/1980b). Indeed, there is a gap 
in his non-theoretical publications at exactly this time: between 1968 and 1974. Although 
his collaborators continued to publish in his house-series, his own productivity dropped 
off uncharacteristically. But this is where archival study becomes so important for 
historical projects. 
Although there isn’t space here to go into detail, I recently discovered a series of 
unpublished manuscripts among the newly-processed materials at the Piaget Archives. 
203 
 
These report on over one hundred experiments that seem to have been inaugurated in the 
period immediately following the 1964 conference. And they are all about causality. 
So far, I have identified three full books’ worth of material that appear to have 
been intended for publication starting in around 1970, along with a partial fourth book. 
The reconstruction of these books has since become a major project in its own right 
(Burman, 2016; Burman & Ratcliff, 2015; Ratcliff & Burman, 2015). But suffice it to 
say, here, that many of the concerns that later characterize the later New Theory are 
reflected there in embryonic form.  
In Chapter 5, I argued that these concerns arose as a result of a new interpretation 
of Gödelian incompleteness: change occurs across a hierarchy of levels as a result of the 
proof of the incompleteness of functional structures. This was a history of Piaget’s 
“logico-mathematical” argumentation; a discussion of formal causation. There, he 
appealed to the works of logicians: Gödel, Beth, Ladrière, and others. In his subsequent 
biological works, however, Piaget appealed instead to biologists: Waddington, of course, 
and also to Paul Weiss (1898-1989). In other words, he began to move toward 
explanations incorporating material causation. And now we see that the unpublished 
psychological experiments looked at how causality itself comes to be represented during 
child development; not a study of how a knower’s relationship with the world could be 
conceived-of, but of how the world pushes back. To put it in terms more consistent with 
its origins in the material presently under consideration: Piaget sought to understand how 
the world inflicts selection pressures on developing organisms, and forces them to 
change in ways that accommodate—and, indeed, anticipate—those pressures. 
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We are now moving beyond Piaget’s earlier nominalism: perturbations caused by 
selection pressures aren’t dismissible in the same way as a convention about what to call 
a thing. These effects are real, although not in the sense of logical realism—for reasons 
previously discussed (see also J. Richards & Von Glasersfeld, 1980). Rather, they 
provide the functional proofs of the incompleteness of an organism’s extant structures. 
By examining his appeals to the changes being made in Biology, we can therefore see 
that the emergence of the New Theory was embedded in a much larger discourse than 
that examined earlier.  
4.1. Weiss’ hierarchy. In constructing the biological aspects of the New Theory, 
Piaget’s appeals are exactly consistent with what we would expect from having excavated 
the neo-Gödelian turn: he cites authors especially for their thoughts about the interactions 
across levels in multi-level systems. Indeed, Piaget mentions both Waddington and 
Weiss—in the same sentence—in his published “afterthoughts” to a paper presented by 
Inhelder at the Alpbach Symposium held in Austria in 1968. From his perspective, their 
views can be synthesized with his own as different levels reflecting the same fundamental 
set of principles: 
From the embryological regulations, whose fundamental stage Paul Weiss called 
“reintegration”, or from the numerous cybernetic circuits described by 
Waddington at the heart of his “epigenetic landscape”, up to self-regulations 
which the study of mental development is continually bringing to light, we find a 
quite remarkable functional continuity. And if we remember that the thought 
operations, with their anticipations and retroactions (operational reversibility) also 
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constitute regulations, but that they are “perfect” regulations (with precorrection 
of errors and not only correction after the event), we are struck by the generality 
of these vital fundamental processes, whose knowledge is just as indispensable to 
the psychologist as to the biologist (Piaget, 1969, p. 158). 
In other words, Piaget thought that Weiss and Waddington had provided tools for thought 
from which psychologists could benefit. But what was it, in particular, that had caught his 
eye? 
 Weiss’ (1969) view, as presented in his talk at Alpbach, was informed by a study 
of the lifespan of neurons and the macromolecules which constitute them. He noticed that 
the unitary mind is maintained despite the turning-over of its constituent elements. At the 
same time, however, these elements do not—as individuals—have any meaning except as 
part of this whole. (They have no innate “essence.”) Thus, he reasoned, the whole can be 
reified as a supervening structure which completes the lower level neurons by providing 
the means of organizing them: they have stability as a whole in consequence of their 
membership in that grouping. The mind is thus not only a consequence of neuronal 
activity, but it is also a product of neuronal organization. Its properties are afforded 
bottom-up (by the biology and chemistry of neurons), just as it is constrained top-down 
(by their organization). 
A similar realization applies to genes: genes are not innately meaningful, as life-
essences, but rather become meaningful as a consequence of their relationships to other 
living things. Alone, genes are incomplete. As Weiss explained: 
…genes, highly organized in themselves, do not impart higher order upon an 
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orderless milieu by ordainment, but [rather are themselves] part and parcel of an 
ordered system, in which they are enclosed and with the patterned dynamics of 
which they interact. The organization of this supra-genic system, the organism, 
does not ever originate in our time by “spontaneous generation”; it has been ever 
present since the primordial living systems, passed down in an uninterrupted 
continuity from generation to generation through the organic matrix in which the 
genome is encased. The organization of this continuum is a paradigm of 
hierarchical order. I have schematized it [see Figure 10]… by concentric shells 
which, in this case, coincide with physical enclosures. The diagram is self-
explanatory. The profusion of arrows indicates pathways of all possible 
interactions that must be taken into account in studying the dynamics of this 
system, organism. (Weiss, 1969, pp. 37-38) 
Although this was illustrated as the relationship between each level of the organism 
relative to its environment, we can also understand it schematically using a more general 
perspective of the levels of our interaction with the larger world: from molecules to 
minds, from neurons to neighborhoods, and—as he explained in an earlier essay (Weiss, 
1960)—from observed data to scientific theories too. 
Weiss’ connection between the process of biological assimilation and theory 
construction is exactly consistent with Piaget’s program of research in genetic 
epistemology (noted by Piaget, 1976/1979, p. 57; see esp. Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989). 
Indeed, Piaget saw the similarity as a further endorsement of the kind of thinking that 
informed his standard theory of stages: “This parallel is so close to what I have always 
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argued apropos of cognitive assimilation that there is no need for me to press the point” 
(Piaget, 1976/1979, p. 57).86 The two can therefore be connected; at least in Piaget’s 
mind, one a continuation of the other. But, importantly, Weiss didn’t reciprocate. After 
Waddington’s endorsement, Piaget was left to fend for himself. 
 
Figure 10. Paul Weiss’ “self-explanatory” illustration of the hierarchy of 
levels. Reprinted figure with permission from Weiss, Reviews of Modern Physics, 31, p. 
18, 1959. A copy of the image is also included in his Hierarchically Organized Systems, 
which Piaget later cited directly (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979/1980, pp. 197, 387; Weiss, 
                                                 
86 Their agreement runs deep. And not just on substantive issues. For example, Weiss (1960) even 
makes the same parallel as Piaget in comparing learning with eating: “Knowledge grows like organisms, 
with data serving as food to be assimilated, rather than merely stored” (p. 1716; cf. Piaget, 1960/1973, p. 
70; see also Piaget in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 42). 
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1971, p. 40). The original is copyright 1959 by the American Physical Society (reuse 
license #3944070900942).87 
 
  
                                                 
87 Readers may view, browse, and/or download material for temporary copying purposes only, 
provided these uses are for noncommercial personal purposes. Except as provided by law, this material may 
not be further reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, adapted, performed, displayed, published, or 
sold in whole or part, without prior written permission from the American Physical Society. 
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4.2. “Phenocopy.” As Piaget returned to Biology, he conducted a systematic 
review of all of the ideas developed since his doctoral training which could also be 
applied to the ideas that he had first pursued in making the transition from Biology to 
Psychology. (This was published under the title, Biology and Knowledge [Piaget, 
1967/1971.) It is perhaps unsurprising that the result of his survey was a reciprocal 
endorsement of Waddington’s work. But it is also interesting to find, in Waddington’s 
writings, some of the sources and ideas discussed in Piaget’s later biological books. 
 For example: Waddington discussed “phenocopy” at some length, as part of his 
discussions of the Baldwin Effect and genetic assimilation.88 Unfortunately, Piaget’s 
version of this has been badly misunderstood. And it seems this was entirely his fault. 
The gist, though, is that selection pressures can be understood to have their impact 
according to the levels—and the functional reaction ranges of the pressured structures—
which come to be perturbed (i.e., their plasticity).89 
Recalling Weiss’s view of biology as an ordered system—which Piaget cited only 
after endorsing Waddington—these reaction ranges can be understood to operate at 
different levels in a neo-Gödelian hierarchy. In certain special circumstances, this 
separation of levels can then have the effect of “copying” a specific phenotype to the 
level of the genes, such that an adaptive change comes to be preserved across 
                                                 
88 François Jacob defines this simply: “Phenocopies in biology are modifications due to the 
environment that imitate genetic effects…. But this represents only a slight variation within the realm of 
what the genotype allows. In the case of the small animals from the bottom of Lake Geneva [Piaget’s 
snails], the observed variations are always those allowed by their genotype. One always remains within the 
working margin authorized by the genes, and one simply has a slight variation due to temperature, osmotic 
pressure, and so forth” (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979/1980, pp. 61-62). Piaget wanted to go a step further. 
This chapter describes how he sought to do so. 
89 The best contemporary source for this kind of argumentation is West-Eberhard (2003). 
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generations. The result is then a Lamarckian outcome by different means (Piaget in J.-C. 
Bringuier, 1977/1980, pp. 112-113). And that, of course, was not allowed unless one is 
both extremely careful and very convincing. 
 The controversy that resulted, and the confusion, is nicely represented in the 
discussion that followed Piaget’s debate with Noam Chomsky at Royaumont in 1975. 
However, it is especially noteworthy that Nobel laureate François Jacob—whom Piaget 
had previously cited (in 1967/1971, p. 294n; 1974/1980a, pp. 8, 62n)—objected simply 
that “phenocopy” did not have the meaning Piaget intended (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 
1979/1980, p. 62). Indeed, the word suggested by subsequent critics is “genocopy” (see 
e.g., Deacon, 2005). With that clarified, the rest of the confusion then diminishes to mere 
trivia. 
4.3. On the abuse of a discipline’s specialist vocabulary. Of course, for the 
dismissal of Piaget’s biology to come down to the choice of a word seems ridiculous. We 
must therefore pursue it: was Piaget aware of both terms, and of the distinction between 
them? 
With the terminological suggestion in-hand, we find it easily in the primary 
sources. It was even included directly in the preliminaries of one of the main books under 
discussion at Royaumont. There, he wrote: “Konrad Lorenz, writing of behavior patterns 
which become hereditary in certain species of ducks…. proposed the term ‘genocopy’” 
(Piaget, 1974/1980a, p. 11n; citing Lorenz, 1963/1969, pp. 72-73). This reference was 
then also included in Piaget’s response to Jacob: “I would like to question this point [i.e., 
Jacob’s objection to the use of the term ‘phenocopy’]… When Lorenz gives an example, 
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he calls it ‘genocopy’ to indicate the difference… Anyway, this is a mere detail” (in 
Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979/1980, pp. 63-64).  
This dismissal is important for understanding what happened in the reception of 
his later biology: he dismissed a possible error in the choice of a technical term—a 
name—in favor of focusing on what to him was the underlying meaning. Indeed, in this 
sense, Jacob was exactly right to object. But it also seems that Piaget knew about the 
terminological problem in advance. He just didn’t care.  
Of course, this is also an easy thing to check. Piaget didn’t always provide explicit 
references, but he did in this case. Simply following the citation, we therefore find the 
following in the English translation of the cited text by Lorenz: 
For those interested in the laws of heredity and phylogenetics it may here be said 
that the process described above is the exact opposite of a so-called phenocopy. 
We speak of this when through extrinsic individually acting influences, an 
appearance, a phenotype, is produced which is identical with one that, in other 
cases, is determined by hereditary factors. In ritualization, a newly arisen 
hereditary disposition copies forms of behaviour formerly caused phenotypically 
by the concurrence of very different environmental influences. We might well 
speak of a genocopy. (Lorenz, 1963/1966, p. 59) 
The two terms are therefore opposites, and this was known to him. At Royaumont, 
however, Piaget justified his continuing stubborn use of the problematic term by referring 
back to Waddington: “If the term phenocopy gives rise to alternative definitions, then let 
us simply speak of genetic assimilation in the sense used by Waddington, who also 
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admits that there can be replacement of a phenotype of the same form” (in Piattelli-
Palmarini, 1979/1980, p. 63).  
Disregarding the words used, is this appeal itself incorrect? On its face, it seems 
not. But Piaget continued, citing Weiss, and then said something that would have seemed 
at the time to be contrary to neo-Darwinian orthodoxy: 
Now, as for the relation between phenocopy and genome, I would like to remind 
you of Paul Weiss’s profound remark: that when we say “related to the genome,” 
this may have two completely different meanings: the first one being “determined 
by the genes” and the second one “compatible with the genes,” which is not the 
same thing. It is precisely in the case of phenocopies that there are new hereditary 
formations compatible with, but not determined by, previous genes. (in Piattelli-
Palmarini, 1979/1980, p. 63) 
This would have been totally unorthodox at the time, as several commentators pointed 
out (summarized by Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994). But no longer.  
What Piaget was talking about—functional equivalence given structural 
difference—can be understood as arising directly from the formalisms of the neo-
Gödelian turn: the same outcome can occur by different means. This reflects the whole-
part relations captured by Piaget’s use of the term “vicariance” (Chapter V). It also 
appeared later in psychological guise as “morphisms” (see esp. Piaget et al., 1990/1992). 
And that is a key part of the New Theory that has proven very difficult to understood 
(Acredolo, 1997; Bickhard, 1997; Davidson, 1988).  
Still, I don’t really want to be pulled off track just yet by this interesting 
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foreshadowing in his late-biology of that still-later development in his psychological 
writings, even though the biological underpinnings are now being returned to by 
biologists. My intent here, as we move toward a conclusion, is rather to point to the 
quibbling over terms; what Piaget referred to in his preliminaries as “terminological 
difficulties” (Piaget, 1974/1980a, p. 11). In short: in his view, the word he used was not 
as important as what he meant for this labelling to refer to. With that clarified, we can 
then explain his proposal in more detail. 
4.4. Back to nominalism. From this we are returned to Piaget’s nominalism, 
discussed in Chapter 5. We even see that a focus on this wrong word may well be what 
led his critics astray. Yet we also see that Piaget did not himself accommodate to the 
pressure his peers exerted, as he did with his logic. He did not change in response to 
criticisms, and even persisted in his use of this inappropriate term in later writings:  
There has been some question as to whether the genotype copies the phenotype or 
vice versa. As a partisan of the first view, Lorenz has sought to clarify matters by 
proposing the term ‘genocopy’ in connection with a form of behaviour [sic] in 
certain ducks which was at first phenotypical and then became hereditary. But it is 
now standard usage to speak of phenocopy when referring to simple instances of 
an initial phenotype being copied by a later genotype. (Piaget, 1976/1979, pp. 70-
71) 
Yet this at least helps us to make the point about perturbations—and the corrections of 
experts (including relative experts, such as in the relation between teachers and 
students)—becoming selection pressures.  
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In the sense that knowledge-production is a kind of cultural evolution, Piaget’s 
biological contributions to knowledge have effectively died. As a result, contemporary 
scholars cannot observe them in situ. They must instead excavate those remnants that 
continue to be preserved in our cultural archaeological record, and then put them in 
context, in order to correctly interpret what the fact of their former existence might mean. 
And relative to the amount of ink spilled as a result of what seems to have been a simple 
misunderstanding—resulting not from substance, or even from rhetoric, but from 
diction—I suggest that it would have been much easier and more efficient just to do this 
historical heavy-lifting. We don’t even need to delve very deeply to find easy questions 
worth asking that would have led to a similar place as we now find ourselves.  
For example: Why did Piaget (1976/1979) entitle his last biological book 
Comportement Moteur de l’Évolution? This strikes exactly at the very heart of the issue. 
Indeed, I think it was horribly misleading for the translator to render that title as 
Behaviour and Evolution (intending perhaps to allude to Roe & Simpson, 1958a). They 
should have preserved the original: Behavior, Motor of Evolution. Why? Because of what 
Piaget meant.  
Briefly put: without exploring the unknown, organisms cannot encounter selection 
pressures to which they aren’t already adapted. Their structures cannot therefore become 
perturbed (disequilibrated), and they cannot therefore be updated. Or, to give this a neo-
Gödelian spin: without exploring the unknown, the assumption of the perfection 
(completeness) of an adaptation cannot be falsified. This then prevents accommodation 
and the construction of a broader basis for action. In other words: without the openness 
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required of exploration, Piaget argued, there can be no development and no evolution. 
There is only maturation and mutation (cf. Jablonka & Lamb, 2005/2014). 
5. Making sense of the intent 
Of course, we can dig much more deeply here. Indeed, pushing issues of language 
aside, we come to see something quite different (pace Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994). 
Following Waddington and Weiss—which is to say, in a hierarchical multilevel 
biological system—a “perturbation” is addressed initially at the level of greatest 
plasticity: individual behavior. If the organism’s learned responses do not resolve the 
imposed pressure, its remaining effects then feed-back through the hierarchy. First, this 
affords a learning opportunity. Then it alters morphogenesis in development. (Snail shells 
change shape in rough water, and plants grow to different heights.) And then, if still 
unresolved, the pressure can become life-threatening. The extent to which that life-
threatening selection pressure is experienced differentially by the population, the 
following generations’ distribution of genes will then come to accommodate it by means 
of natural selection.  
The result is that an earlier higher-level developmental accommodation can 
become evolutionarily fixed: a change in genes, but preceded by changes in 
development.90 And so an earlier phenotype (due to developmental change within a 
                                                 
90 This then provides an alternative explanation for “punctuated equilibrium” (Gould, 2007). 
Briefly: random mutations accumulate in the genome that have no relevance to the extant selection 
pressures. (There is an accumulation of structures without functions.) When the pressures change, however, 
those organisms that are pushed beyond their reaction ranges—beyond their developmental plasticity—
experience physiological stresses that then highlight the functional effects of previously-irrelevant 
mutations. Most will still be irrelevant. But those mutations that confer a relative advantage will tend to 
have benefits that increase the likelihood of bearing offspring. These offspring then carry those mutations 
forward. Note, though, that the Baldwin Effect serves in this case as a “shield” against selection pressures 
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reaction range) is “copied” at the level of the genes (due to natural selection). The 
difference that previous generations expressed during development then disappears in 
later generations; they develop following their own trajectory. 
 The way to think about this “transmission of pressure” that makes the most sense 
to me is to refer to the French approach to long-division that I learned in elementary 
school. Granted, this is an analogy. But it is very similar to what Piaget seems to have 
meant: the two seem to me to be, in his terms, “isomorphic” (cf. Piaget, 1963/1968, pp. 
188-189). 
Thus, for example: dividing 3 by 2 gives 1 with a remainder of 1, which is 
“carried over” to the next level beyond the decimal (i.e., “the next decimal place”). This 
then gives 10 divided by 2, with no remainder: 5. And that in turn provides a resolution 
of the problem. 
At the higher level, before the decimal, we have 1; at the lower, 5. Hence: 3 / 2 = 
1.5. Once resolved, there is no pressure to continue carrying over a remainder to still-
lower levels.91 The resolution, 1.5, is perfectly adapted to the pressure applied by the 
problem of dividing 3 by 2. (It replicates no matter how many times you check.) 
A slightly different resolution can be had by referring to convention: 2 / 3, for 
example, can be “rounded” at any level. According to the needs of the moment—which, 
                                                 
(see e.g., Deacon, 2003, p. 92; 2005, pp. 110, 113). So do the reaction ranges. Indeed, that’s the importance 
of “plasticity” for evolution (West-Eberhard, 2003). Put in terms of the New Theory, plasticity constrains 
the chain of relevance so that structural changes can accumulate without immediate functional effect. Note, 
though, that this also in turn implies that most adaptations are in fact “exaptations” (Gould, 1991; Gould & 
Vrba, 1982). 
91 Special thanks to Mme Shortliffe at the École publique John Fisher in Toronto for having taught 
these lessons so effectively that they would remain close-to-hand even decades later. 
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referring to Piaget’s ultimate turn to “relevance” in seeking a logic of meanings, we now 
might refer to as the relevance relation afforded by context (Piaget & Garcia, 
1987/1991)—a different response will provide the sought-after resolution: 0.7 vs 0.67 vs 
0.667. All are conventionally-equivalent; again, “isomorphic.” 
Note, though, that any resolution provides a response regardless of whether the 
“resolution” provided is actually “correct” (i.e., “the solution”). Indeed, from this 
perspective, corrections must come from outside the system in order for the appropriate 
adaptation to occur: feedback from the teacher to the student, or further selection pressure 
from the organism’s immediate environment. For students, though, this in turn affords a 
further teachable moment: highlighting the original problem’s reversibility—1.5 * 2 = 
3—thereby encouraging reflection at a higher level of abstraction than the operations 
originally used, and thus also a greater understanding of the structure of mathematics 
itself. But for most organisms, the further interaction is usually not so “constructive.” 
(Mostly, they die.) 
In any case, from this perspective, Piaget’s arguments do not seem at all 
controversial. Of course the first level of response is behavioral, and of course the second 
level is learning. (That’s the Baldwin Effect!) His proposal is simply that we carry this 
insight down through the hierarchy of levels that his colleagues in adjacent disciplines—
Gödel, Beth, Ladrière, Waddington, and Weiss—had talked about.  
This is why behavior is the motor of evolution. For evolution to occur, 
populations must to encounter perturbations that have no resolution at any higher level. 
For the distribution of genes to change, they must be exposed to sufficient selection 
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pressures to kill off a significant proportion of their group’s membership. (By definition.) 
But that same observation doesn’t apply to adaptation. That occurs at a higher level. 
(Also, now, by definition.) 
By parsing Piaget’s meaning, we also then make sense of other comments from 
1975 that—in a reversal of the common understanding from half-a-century earlier—seem 
to turn his earlier sympathy to Haeckelian recapitulationism on its head: 
I believe, with Baldwin and with Freud as well, that the child is more primitive 
than any adult, including prehistoric man, and that the source of knowledge lies in 
ontogenesis. Any adult you choose, whether cave man or Aristotle, began as a 
child and for the rest of his life used the instruments he created in his earliest 
years. Consequently, in the field of knowledge—I’m not generalizing to every 
field—ontogenesis is basic. I would say that it’s more primitive than 
phylogenesis. (in J.-C. Bringuier, 1977/1980, p. 92) 
This is quite a change. And it’s an important one to note explicitly, given how Piaget’s 
otherwise apparently Haeckelian tendencies have been misunderstood (pace 
Oesterdiekhoff, 2012, 2013). 
To be clear: from this perspective, the development of children does not 
recapitulate the stages of evolutionary progress in the human species. Nor does the 
development of knowledge recapitulate the stages of cultural evolution. Instead, 
developmental change precedes evolutionary change. Those changes may simply not be 
conserved: sometimes, the lessons learned are forgotten. 
This all now seems consistent with contemporary writings on developmental 
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systems (see esp. Oyama, 2000a, 2000b) and developmental plasticity (see esp. West-
Eberhard, 2003). But there’s also an important epistemological insight here, with 
relevance to the doing of history.  
It seems Piaget encountered in his biology a variation on the problem he 
encountered with his logic: he didn’t make his case “properly,” according to the 
conventions of the disciplinary sandbox in which he was playing. He was a stranger in a 
strange land; a “foreigner,” whose contributions were then “neglected” (see Note 84; also 
Chapter 4). Indeed, it seems safe now to conclude that the inspiration he found during 
these interdisciplinary travels—which then in turn informed his psychological works—is 
why psychologists have had such trouble understanding them. In short, this is why there 
is an “unknown Piaget” (M. Chapman, 1988a, pp. 2-6). 
6. Beyond genesis 
It would be premature, given the direction of contemporary research, to end our 
story there. Indeed, Waddington and Weiss did more than provide an “existence proof” of 
the formal levels that Piaget used to ground his later works on reflecting abstraction, 
generalization, correspondence, etc. They also provided the means to incorporate the 
social, an important aspect of Piaget’s theory that is still not well-understood.  
Waddington explained, referring to his own illustration giving a level to each of 
genetics, natural selection, epigenetics, and behavior: 
The four-membered evolutionary system… must, of course, continue to operate in 
the human species, as in every other. However, the salient feature about man—
perhaps one might say that it is his defining characteristic—is that he has 
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developed, to an enormously higher degree than is found in any other species, a 
method of passing information from one generation to the next which is 
alternative to the biological mechanism depending on genes. This human 
information-transmitting system is, of course, the process of social learning. 
(Waddington, 1961b, p. 70) 
In Waddington’s presentation, however, cultural evolution was for humans separate from 
biological evolution: “a second evolutionary system superimposed on top of the 
biological one, and functioning by means of a different system of information 
transmission” (Waddington, 1961b, p. 70).  
 It is important to note that this did not anticipate the later neo-Darwinian “memes 
as idea viruses” proposal (discussed by Burman, 2012d). Citing Piaget explicitly, in a 
later essay, Waddington instead attempted to explain how teaching and learning—not 
ideas themselves as carriers of inherent meaning—might be conceptualized in a 
biologically-coherent fashion: 
We need to consider carefully the requirements for any process which will make 
it possible for information to be transmitted from one generation to the next by 
teaching and learning. For such a process to be effective, it is not only necessary 
for a language to be developed in which the information can be expressed, but it is 
essential that the recipient should be brought into a frame of mind in which he is 
prepared to receive the information which is transmitted to him (Waddington, 
1962, p. 111) 
He continued, building upon the results of experiments informed by Piaget’s standard 
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theory to present a new argument for how such receptivity develops: 
The human infant soon after birth seems not to be able to distinguish between 
itself and its surroundings. It exists, apparently, in a truly solipsistic universe in 
which it is the world and the world is part of it. The development of a mentality 
which is prepared to receive information transmitted from outside by language 
demands, of course, the breakdown of this solipsistic unity. The readiness to 
receive a transmitted message implies that there appears within the infant’s mind 
some psychological system which carries the authority which is necessary for the 
information not only to be taken in, but to be allowed to have meaning. 
(Waddington, 1962, p. 112) 
In other words, Waddington argued that it is this acceptance of authority—the source of 
extant conventions—which allows children to develop their thinking: it allows higher 
levels to correct the incompletenesses that must necessarily exist at lower levels.  
This is consistent with Piaget’s (1935) much earlier reference to Claparède’s 
“instinct du conforme” in a discussion of theories of imitation (p. 1). Indeed, his 
discussions of authority lead in a similar direction (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1932, 1933/1995). 
But recognizing the implications of the neo-Gödelian turn, we can now push this 
somewhat further. For example: we can suggest that the level of adults “completes” the 
level of children, albeit imperfectly. (The reasons imposed by grown-ups cannot 
themselves be faultless, and aren’t even always good, but they’re almost always imposed 
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anyway.)92 Of course, we also see the possibility for children to construct their own social 
norms through interactions with each other (cf. Piaget, 1932/1932). And we see that, 
inevitably, new adults—adolescents—will rebel against the tyranny of the older 
generation’s “just good enough” as further cognitive development constructs the tools to 
identify the incompletenesses of the adult world (cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958). This 
then becomes either a fundamental motivator—the impetus to use behavior as a motor for 
idealist change (i.e., to overcome those aspects of the world that are deemed absolutely 
intolerable)—or it becomes a powerful justification for apathy and cynicism (Burman, 
2008c).  
As Waddington implies, however, it’s not the simple existence of authority itself 
that’s most interesting. It’s rather what its role in “completing” implies about human 
nature.  
The argument which I wish to advance is that the authority which is required to 
make possible the socio-genetic method of transmitting information, and the 
authority which is involved in the development of the ideas of ethical good and 
bad, are two aspects of one and the same type of mental functioning…. If this is 
the case, the fact that man is the sort of creature who goes in for having ideas right 
and wrong is an essential part of the same mechanism which makes it possible for 
                                                 
92 At around the same time as the original version of this chapter was accepted for publication, a 
new book was published by Paul P. L. Harris (2012) that develops an important set of related ideas. Yet he 
framed his contribution in explicit contrast with Piaget’s (p. 5). This, however, is useful to us: because he 
cites only three early works, published originally in 1923-1937, the dismissal serves to highlight the 
contemporary value of this sort of history. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of Piaget and Baldwin, he 
repeated the old “Piaget neglected the social” trope that was addressed in Chapter 3 (see Morgan & Harris, 
2015). Here, however, we pursue a different approach of the same “neglected” material. When then find 
that the neglect is ours. 
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him to transmit information by teaching and learning. (Waddington, 1962, pp. 
112-113) 
This argument is developed in greater detail in The Ethical Animal (Waddington, 1960) 
and in his later Gifford Lectures (Waddington, 1972a, 1972b, 1973a, 1973b). But it is the 
coincidence of Piaget’s appeals to Waddington’s and Weiss’ presentations of biological 
levels with the neo-Godelian turn in Piaget’s use of formalisms in defining levels that 
makes it especially important to us in terms of understanding the changes that occurred 
subsequently in the New Theory. 
From this perspective, we can borrow Waddington’s illustration of the levels in 
his “four-membered evolutionary system” and then “read in” to the New Theory an 
augmented version that takes into account his subsequent addition of a higher set of 
social levels (see Figure 2). We then see that the meaning of each individual’s behavior is 
situated in a context defined in part by their social groupings’ ideals and criteria for 
membership. We also see that, even granting that biological change and social change are 
partially uncoupled, each grouping’s possibilities are constrained by the past decisions 
made by its members; that groupings inherit the histories constructed by their members’ 
past actions, and that choice is constrained by those inheritances, which we might call 
norms. These norms then provide the socio-ecological milieu into which each new 
generation develops. And their effects are transmitted, as perturbations, to affect not only 
the development but also the stress levels—and perhaps even the survival rates—of those 
children who inherit them.  
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Figure 11. My accommodation of Waddington’s (1959c, 1959b) four-membered 
evolutionary illustration adds his new top-most level, which I have here called “the 
normative system” (following Piaget’s reply to Derrida at the Cerisy conference of 
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1959 [in Piaget, 1965a, p. 49]). This extends Waddington’s earlier schematic to 
include the interactions that he describes in subsequent writings, and in a way that 
is consistent with Piaget’s use of related material. Individual choice, here, is therefore 
not the primary cause of stress. Instead, contrary to what Waddington originally thought, 
that role is given over to history: the inherited effects of all past choices, which make 
certain futures possible and others not (cf. Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). Choices in 
the present then also shape possible futures, which are in turn inherited by later 
generations. Thus: the present is inherited (necessary), while the future is constructed 
(possible). Adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature, 183, p. 1638, 
1959 (license # 3944080117221). Reprinted with permission from Burman, New Ideas in 
Psychology, 31(3), p. 369, 2012 (license # 3942341238615). 
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7. Conclusion 
I showed, in Chapter V, that Piaget’s later works were informed by the 
recognition of a formal hierarchy of levels. This, therefore, is a further extension of those 
efforts; a second step along the bridge to Piaget’s New Theory, but excavating some of 
his appeals to sources in Biology rather than to those in Logic. As a result, we see that 
Piaget’s later biological writings—and his updating of the Baldwin Effect—can be tied to 
a larger formal discourse on the genesis of the logic that informs children’s reasoning. 
Here, though, psychological development becomes a kind of extended embryology: 
development outside the womb, bathed in the child’s local social ecology. 
Yet what, after this, does development mean? In short: it is the process whereby 
the organism becomes sensitive to stimuli, and which shapes the responses it gives in 
response. This then recasts his old intelligence-testing work in new light. As Piaget 
explained in his 1971 address to the first meeting of the American society named in his 
honor: 
The organism is sensitive to a given stimulus only when it possesses a certain 
competence. I am borrowing this word from embryology in the sense in which 
Waddington has used it. He has referred to the influence of an inductor. 
Waddington has shown that an inductor which modifies the structure of the 
embryo does not act in the same way at all levels of development. If the inductor 
is present before the embryo has the competence to respond to it, the inductor will 
have no effect at all; thus, it will not modify the structure. The embryo must be at 
a point of being competent to respond to the inductor before the inductor can have 
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its effect. (Piaget, 1972, p. 5; cf. Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 22) 
In other words, what development is—from this perspective—is the process not just by 
which the organism becomes responsive to external causes, but it is also the means for 
that organism to access more than the simplest forms of linear causality.  
He continued, framing this proposal in terms that would be more understandable 
to the primarily English-speaking and Behaviorist-thinking audience: 
Stimulus-response is not a one-way road, unilateral scheme. A subject is sensitive 
to a stimulus only when he possesses the scheme [structure] which will permit the 
response. In other words, the sensitivity to the stimulus is the capacity for 
response, and this capacity for response supposes a scheme [structure] of 
assimilation. We again have to create an equilibrium between assimilation, on the 
one hand, and accommodation to a given or an external stimulus, on the other 
hand. (Piaget, 1972, pp. 5-6) 
Then he returned to the problem of genesis that he inherited from Baldwin: “The 
relationship can also be described as circular which again poses the problem of 
equilibrium, an equilibrium between external information serving as the stimulus and the 
subject’s schemes or internal structure of his activities” (Piaget, 1972, p. 6; see also 
Piaget, 1982b).  
From there, his solution was then to appeal to the neo-Gödelian hierarchy, but 
with constant feedback added: dialectical change across levels, coupled with periods of 
discursive change within levels (see Piaget, 1971/1977, 1980b). All that said, however, it 
is not correct, strictly speaking, to say that Piaget intended to update the Baldwin Effect 
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as a means to ground the New Theory. This would put the cart before the horse. Rather, 
Piaget simply appealed to the then-contemporary works that updated the ideas upon 
which his old developmental framework had been built: he returned to his roots, 
following an intriguing possibility suggested by a colleague, and then—reinvigorated—
he reworked his old ideas to fit with how biological knowledge had changed in the 
intervening years.  
Because Piaget’s standard theory had been based on the very same idea which 
underlies the Baldwin Effect (viz. the circular reaction), his later use of biological ideas 
updating that notion (e.g., Waddington’s and Weiss’ use of cybernetic feedback across 
levels) simply replaced Baldwin’s role in his work. It is then in that capacity that we can 
say that the Baldwin Effect was updated. We can read it out of Piaget’s transitional 
writings. But to do so, we need to see through historical lenses; we must ignore the 
distortions due to his translators’ errors—as well as his own infelicitous word choices—
and instead dig deeper to find our own understanding in Piaget’s sources and arguments. 
In so doing, we then find the means to reinterpret Piaget’s problematic writings on 
phenocopy (and indeed all of his discussions of interactions across levels) in terms that 
are more consistent with contemporary attempts to synthesize the new Biology with 
Psychology. We also see how the social finds its place in that proposal. 
In a talk that I had the pleasure to attend, Michael Meaney (2009) referred to such 
efforts as illustrating “where nature meets nurture.” Yet, in pursuing this thought, 
contemporary psychologists typically turn for insight to the works of Gilbert Gottlieb 
(1992, 1999, 2007; see esp. Logan & Lickliter, 2007). In introducing this alternative 
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lineage and its implications, however, I believe we are also justified in examining 
Piaget’s older sources as untapped resources. This, then, is also consistent with how 
biologists have come to treat those older sources as well (see e.g., Drack, Apfalter, & 
Pouvreau, 2007; Drack & Wolkenhauer, 2011; B. K. Hall & Laubichler, 2008). 
In taking on this task, we come to an appreciation of the New Theory as being 
more than “a logical hermeneutics of action” (Beilin, 1992b, pp. 1, 6). It is also more 
complex than the picture afforded by the neo-Piagetian “dialectical Piaget” (so called by 
Morra et al., 2008, p. 6). Instead, we see that Piaget’s standard theory has been updated to 
include both epigenesis and a formally-supported version of its associated hierarchy of 
levels. Elsewhere, I have therefore proposed that the New Theory merits being called by 
a new name that more adequately reflects these additions: “epigenetic epistemology” 
(Burman, 2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2009c, 2013b). This then has the double benefit of 
referencing the broadest form of Piaget’s standard theory, genetic epistemology, while at 
the same time highlighting his debt in the new theory to Waddington, Weiss, and others 
whose works are now being rediscovered by contemporary biologists. Thus, as ideas 
regarding epigenetics—past and present—become increasingly popular, perhaps the 
interest reflected by the proposed name will lead to a new reading of those most-
promising later works by Piaget that we least understand.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
PRIOR TO THIS PROJECT, the start of the New Theory had been dated to 1974-1975. 
This was marked by the publication of Grasp of Consciousness, Success and 
Understanding, and Experiments in Contradiction, as well as an important project led by 
Piaget’s chief collaborator—Bärbel Inhelder—on development and learning (Inhelder, 
Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974/1974; Piaget, 1974/1976, 1974/1978, 1974/1980b). These 
experimental results were then summarized in Equilibration of Cognitive Structures 
(Piaget, 1975/1985). Yet these of course also all have dates when work began, and those 
dates then push the start of the New Theory back into at least the late-1960s.  
That said, however, we now know from detailed archival study that the situation 
was much more complex than had been thought previously (by e.g., Burman, 2008b). The 
first books of the New Theory were preceded immediately by a series of unpublished 
studies, dating from the mid-1960s, which reported the results of over a hundred 
psychological experiments on the child’s developing representation of causal relations 
(Burman & Ratcliff, 2015; Ratcliff & Burman, 2015). These were introduced in print in a 
short first volume, but they were also clearly intended to be published in full. As Piaget 
said explicitly: “We are in possession of about a hundred studies, completed and written 
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up, which we expect to divide into separate small books bearing on the essential points of 
causal explanation” (in Piaget & Garcia, 1971/1974, p. x). But many of these studies 
were withheld for now-unknown reasons.  
I have since found three complete books, first handwritten by Piaget and then 
typed, returned, and corrected—each with a clear narrative arc, properly introduced and 
having a formal conclusion—as well as what looks like a partially-completed fourth 
book. I suspect that these experiments were intended to test the move by biologists 
toward models of non-linear causation, and that it was the complexity of the resulting 
discussion—including talk of “morphisms” (functional similarities across levels despite 
structural differences)—that led to their being shelved (Burman, 2016).  
Indeed, on the basis of this archival work, I now suspect that the works of the 
New Theory can be understood as attempts to explain, simplify, and extend those earlier 
unpublished experimentally-derived insights. If this suspicion is correct—that they all 
relate to an attempt to discover the emergence of different “cybernetic circuits” at 
increasingly-powerful levels in both cognitive development and the evolution of 
knowledge itself—then the turn toward the New Theory can be pushed back directly to 
the conference in 1964 when Waddington visited Geneva (Chapter VI).  
Of course, because I have discussed the importance of context for understanding 
meaning (from several perspectives across multiple chapters), it is clear that 
Waddington’s comments were themselves interpreted through a particular lens: an 
updated logical framework—formalizing the new hierarchy of levels as a replacement for 
the foundation underneath stages (Chapter V)—which itself has multiple names and dates 
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associated with it. Moving backward, these include: Ladrière in around 1960, Gödel in 
around 1958, Beth in around 1956, and many others besides (see Ratcliff, in press-a, in 
press-b). Piaget’s visiting fellowship in 1954 at Gödel’s home institution, the Institute for 
Advanced Study in Princeton, is also potentially implicated. So is Beth’s critique of 1950 
that led to the collaboration that enabled Ladrière’s later contributions to be received in a 
meaningful way (Chapter V).  
These names and dates form a lineage that extends back decades prior to 1974-
1975. Some even extend back before the founding of Piaget’s International Center for 
Genetic Epistemology in 1955 (see Appendix A). But it’s also not the names and dates 
themselves that matter; it’s what they imply. (It’s what they mean, and what we can do as 
a result.) But how far back should we go?  
If some of my peer reviewers had their way, the emergence of the New Theory 
would be traced right back to Piaget’s autobiographical novel of 1918. Although absurd 
to me, this seems justified for them because that is the first explicit discussion of 
“equilibration” in Piaget’s writings (see e.g., Boom, 2009, p. 135; M. Chapman, 1992, 
pp. 40-41; Vonèche, 1992/1996). But this suggestion has never made sense to me because 
the meaning of equilibration has not been stable. Indeed, I have shown that to be the case 
(esp. Chapter V & Chapter VI). 
Granted, the insistence on equilibration as a defining feature of Piaget’s theory 
can perhaps be attributed to a difference in disciplinary sensibilities—between History 
and Theory—regarding the treatment of “continuity” (see Teo, 2013a, p. 842). If that is 
correct, then where the focus falls in a discussion is what signposts the disciplinary norms 
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to be applied in judging the associated arguments. And so, from this perspective, I 
certainly do understand the Theoretical desire to focus on the apparently-continuous 
thread that extends back from equilibration to the circular reaction and thus also to 
Baldwin. Still, one reviewer went well beyond this interest: in their letter accompanying 
the editor’s rejection of an earlier version of Chapter V, they suggested that the fact of 
equilibration having been included in Piaget’s autobiographical novel of 1918 might 
itself justify calling Piaget the original and unrecognized inventor of the idea of 
incompleteness that later made Gödel famous.  
This, to me, is a ridiculous claim. The impact of incompleteness on Piaget’s 
thinking is traceable directly. There is also no evidence of any impact of Piaget on 
Gödel’s thinking in this regard. Indeed, given what’s accessible in the relevant archives, 
no Historian could ever suggest anything of the sort. Still, if such a claim was possible for 
an otherwise-respected colleague to make, we need not stop with Piaget. Following the 
spirit of their suggestion, we might even suggest that the reviewer was wrong about who 
should receive the credit: Piaget clearly owed Baldwin a debt, especially in his early 
works that relied on concepts related to “genesis” that Baldwin introduced as part of his 
proposals regarding Functional Selection (Chapter VI).  
Pursuing this idea then finds us running headlong into Baldwin’s “genetic logic” 
(see esp. Baldwin, 1906; 1908, 1911; also 1915). And this work is indeed similar, if 
considered loosely, to some of Piaget’s later writings about biology and logic. 
(Otherwise, I could not have suggested that Piaget updated the Baldwin Effect.) Yet we 
can also then expect that Baldwin’s proposals would have been received and dismissed in 
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the same way as were Piaget’s, for the same reasons. In short: even if incompleteness had 
been invented earlier than the version in which Gödel presented it, we have no evidence 
of such a thing having been presented in a way that would allow the contribution to be 
received by the relevant community. That is therefore not the impact we seek to explain, 
put in context, and make useful. We are, in short, not seeking “firsts.” 
1. And thus, “new” 
From this perspective, “new” is not an historical object in the same way that a 
“first” is. Rather, “new” is a name; an attribution. And this is actually consistent with 
what my colleagues in Geneva have said of my insistence on pursuing the New Theory as 
the focus of my research. Because, to them, that phrase itself has no essential meaning. 
And I accept that, in no small part because I accept both the fact of change and the textual 
evidence of Piaget having described himself as one of his own “chief revisionists” 
(Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 703n2). But that doesn’t mean the New Theory isn’t “real,” in the 
sense that it could have an impact that’s “new” to an important audience. Piaget’s 
standard ideas are still used; thus, their update would be functionally relevant (cf. Chapter 
VI). 
Yes, the view of Piaget is different in English. I showed this conclusively in 
Chapter IV. The differences in interpretation between different language groups are also 
then consistent with the literature on indigenization: different books have different 
meanings for different groups. (Their contents weren’t copied; the same words were 
reconstructed in different contexts, thus having different meanings and different 
impacts.) And it also reflects a similar kind of nominalism-problem that Piaget 
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encountered with the intersection between his biology and his logic: there’s something 
underneath the name chosen, and that’s ultimately what is most important for the 
communicating author (Chapter II, Chapter V, & Chapter VI). Yet recognizing that the 
author’s intent and the audience’s understanding does not force a retreat to relativism. 
Indeed, from an historical point of view, it’s incredibly useful: we can look for evidence 
of similarities and differences (according to your disciplinary preference). 
If you go looking for “Piaget’s new theory” in the secondary literature, the most 
obviously relevant texts are by Harry Beilin (1921-2007). He published a well-known 
and -cited article situating the later works relative to what he called Piaget’s “enduring 
contributions to developmental psychology” (by which he meant the sub-discipline of 
American Psychology devoted to studying the changes in cognition between birth and 
adulthood). He then discussed the output of Piaget’s last years in greater depth in a 
harder-to-find chapter from the Jean Piaget Society Symposium Series, itself directly 
entitled “Piaget’s new theory” (Beilin, 1992a, 1992b).  
Digging deeper, we see that it was also Beilin who made the distinction between 
“the new theory” and “the standard theory” (Beilin, 1989b). And he was a founding 
member of the Jean Piaget Society itself. He then received their Lifetime Achievement 
Award in 2002. In other words, he was an “insider.” And this can be problematic for 
histories: the view presented often comes with an agenda attached. 
Granted, I am an insider too. This, though, is of a different kind: I work at the 
Piaget Archives in Geneva, and I was elected to serve on the Board of Directors of the 
same society that Beilin helped to found. But I am also an historian: although I first 
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trained as a psychologist at the University of Toronto (HonBSc 2004), my doctorate from 
York University is in the History and Theory of Psychology. In other words, I am trained 
to dig—and then dig deeper.  
Thus: if we continue to delve into the secondary literature, after finding Beilin, we 
find Philip Minor Davidson (1951-2004). We then see that Davidson (1988) not only 
published his own relevant work that’s directly related to what Beilin called “Piaget’s 
new theory,” but he also presented it at the Piaget Society before Beilin published his 
own papers (Davidson, 1984, 1986). He even co-edited the English translation of Piaget’s 
important second-to-last book: Toward a Logic of Meanings (Piaget & Garcia, 
1987/1991). And he continued to write about related issues until a long illness brought an 
early end to both his career and his life (Davidson, 1987, 1992, 1993). 
Digging still deeper, however, we find that Beilin (1980, 1983) was already 
heading in this direction, and had even already used the phrase “new theory” (Beilin, 
1986, p. 117). He also commented on Davidson’s most directly-relevant article (Beilin, 
1988). And he presented his own earlier talks on the topic at relevant societies, including 
the Society for Research in Child Development (Beilin, 1989a). So while we can point to 
the meetings of these associations—the Piaget Society and SRCD—as being important 
locations for interaction between these two popularizers of the idea that there is a “new 
theory,” we cannot appeal to such a review to resolve any possible priority dispute: there 
is no “first” here. Rather, it seems these authors developed their ideas together (cf. Beilin, 
1980, 1985).  
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2. A primary source 
Examining the references in some of Beilin’s earliest work on the subject, we find 
another possible source not cited in his later works: an English translation of a text by 
Piaget (1977b) that explicitly includes—three times—the phrase “new theory” (in the 
title, and on pp. 350, 351). This then appears, on its face, to be a smoking gun: a primary 
source written by the originating author of the material under discussion in the secondary 
literature, which also includes the term of interest. The objection by my Genevan 
colleagues, and the concern regarding relativism and competing perspectives, can then be 
countered: in history, textual evidence trumps all. 
The article in question is the published version of a speech that Piaget had 
intended to deliver at the New York Academy of Sciences. He was unable to attend, 
however, and so Bärbel Inhelder gave the talk in his place. But it was not she who 
translated the version of the speech that Beilin cited. And that, as it turns out, matters 
more than anything else in understanding the fact of the New Theory as being a name 
referring to something that may or may not itself be new.  
First, though: the contents of the speech. We can go from there to the more 
complicated question of whether and how, or why, the material presented was actually 
new. 
The paper is part of the project on “possibilities” that began in 1975, ran for two 
years, and resulted in the posthumous publication of two books in the early-1980s (see 
Piaget, 2004/2006, p. 2; also 1981/1987; 1983/1987). In this case, however, the specific 
issue under consideration was the “groupements” that had provided the original 
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foundation for stage theory. That is then how this speech relates to the new theory: it 
presents a redefinition of the concept of grouping, which I explained earlier by making 
reference to Piaget’s background in biology.  
That said, however, this is not itself a purely theoretical paper. Instead, Piaget 
constructed his argument by reporting the results of a series of experiments: one 
examining the number of combinations that children provide when given the instruction 
to arrange some blocks in all of the random ways possible, another on how children 
respond when asked to cut up a piece of paper in all of the ways possible, etc. The results 
then reflect the same developmental sequence: different age-cohorts of children respond 
in different ways that nonetheless reflect a single constructive lineage.  
For example: young children, aged four to six, present a half-dozen or so 
possibilities with little variability. (These objects can be arranged only in these ways, or 
the paper cut only thusly.) But older children, aged seven to eleven, provide an 
increasingly large number of ways of presenting the given options until around age 
twelve. After that age, though, the children give up after only a few attempts and 
conclude that the possibilities are infinite. Most important: they explain why it must be 
so. 
This new research, Piaget explained, built on work from 1974-1975 on the notion 
of “morphisms” that I saw mentioned in the unpublished manuscripts and which were 
later expanded-upon in Morphisms and Categories (Piaget et al., 1990/1992). This in turn 
reflected a shift away from modeling operations on geometrical transformations toward 
considering them as comparisons. The objects examined are then not themselves altered, 
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either physically or in their arrangement, but instead have features abstracted from them 
such that analogies can be presented.  
Simplifying somewhat from Piaget’s later discussion, this becomes: A is to B as B 
is to C (a comparison), because x, y, z (a justification derived from an abstraction related 
to the comparison). The similarities between the objects compared then become akin to 
family relations, and these relations can themselves be abstracted to form new operational 
structures to be applied more generally. Thus: the fact of A being the cousin of B, and B 
being the cousin of C, implies that A is also the cousin of C—not only by the transitive 
property of equality, but also because the meaning of “cousin” enables a vicariant 
comparison to any similarly-defined relation within that grouping (see also Piaget et al., 
1990/1992, pp. 45n, 54-57, 91-109, 224-226). Children can then use the meaning without 
understanding the underlying formalism, and they can explain it in a way that is 
consistent with that formalism even though they aren’t aware that such a formalism could 
be used to simplify things further. The two resulting explanations are functionally 
equivalent, but exist at different levels. 
In this way, Piaget explained, abstractions and comparisons both prepare the way 
for the operations examined in earlier works and reflect their functioning. The formalism 
sits at a higher level of abstraction than the meaning, which in turn sits at a higher level 
than the family relations (which are higher than the objects represented). The means of 
getting access to these higher levels is then circular. But that isn’t a problem for 
functional selection, which assumes it (Chapter VI).  
Unfortunately, it’s not clear how Piaget derived his results. He didn’t explain this 
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clearly in the speech, but we can add it here. Briefly, then: the inference of the existence 
of an operational structure at one level or another relies on the observer asking for the 
child’s justification. If there is no description of cousin-relations, and especially of the 
necessity that this imparts to the compared-objects as a result of what “cousin” means, 
then the operational structure can’t be inferred to exist despite the child’s use of family 
comparisons. It is therefore the justification that operationalizes knowledge, for Piaget: 
knowing why, and not just knowing that. (Note, too, that this is different from the usual 
comparison between knowing that and knowing how [see Inhelder & Piaget, 
1979/1980].)93 
From there, Piaget turns to discuss “groupings” directly. And that’s where we find 
the source of the key phrase, “new theory,” in the text. To delve into this further, 
however, we need to have a look at the French original. Although it’s great to be working 
from any sort of primary source text, we need to locate ourselves in the unadulterated 
version because we have a reasonable suspicion that changes may have occurred. 
3. French original 
A footnote on the front page of the English version indicates that the French 
original would be published in the Bulletin de psychologie as part of a special issue 
celebrating an important colleague and collaborator of Piaget’s (viz. Paul Fraisse [see 
Appendix A]). But this issue never appeared. However, a chapter with the right title was 
indeed published in a book dedicated to that same colleague. Examining the text itself 
                                                 
93 This difference is probably not coincidental: Gilbert Ryle served on the advisory board of the 
International Center for Genetic Epistemology (see Burman, 2012c, p. 284). 
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then raises a problem: the contents are different, at least initially. 
The original does not include any of the material discussed until just after the 
introduction of the phrase “new theory” in the English version: there is none of the talk 
about the possibility project, its experiments, or the importance of the family relations 
mentioned above. (It seems that these were added solely for the New York audience.) 
Instead, the original jumps right in to a discussion of increasingly difficult formalisms. 
After that, though, the translation and the original overlap almost exactly. 
Piaget (1977a) recognizes that his earlier attempts at logic were decried by 
logicians for their “inelegance” (p. 53), as he put it, but he explains that what he had 
intended by “groupings” was always meant to reflect the classification of species 
introduced by Linné (which is also the name given by the translator, but whom English 
audiences would know better as “Linnaeus”). The change in his theory—which the 
original refers to in French as “new formulations,” rather than “the new theory”—is then 
related to this. 
Here, though, the earlier species-definition of stages is updated to take advantage 
of new axiomatizations by logicians. He cites these as showing that species-groupings are 
the equivalent of “categories” in the form provided by McLane and Eilenberg (discussed 
in Piaget et al., 1990/1992). Piaget then says that a category, in this sense, is what he 
meant by “morphism.” Two levels can thus be functionally isomorphic—their effects are 
interchangeable, like members of the same species—even if their structures are different.  
This makes no sense from the point of view of neo-Darwinian biology. But 
remember, Piaget follows a different model. For him, two organisms can be 
242 
 
physiologically indistinguishable as a result of higher-level changes unrelated to change 
at the level of the genes. And it’s this that allows him to proceed. 
Piaget describes several examples of categories, including their formal 
definitions. These don’t concern us in their details, but something here certainly does: the 
translator made an important mistake. Rather than rendering les vicariances as the 
category of “vicariances,” this instead becomes “vicarious relationships.” And that’s 
something entirely different. 
Vicariance was discussed briefly in Chapter V in order to reconnect the logical 
meaning used by Piaget with the biological meaning that is more easily understood today. 
(Recall that species are called “vicariant” because all members are intra-translatable 
within the grouping: the members of the grouping can make babies that can make 
babies.) Replacing this with “vicarious” therefore has a strange effect. Rather than being 
functionally identical with each other, and thus replaceable as parts relative to the whole, 
the members of a “vicarious” grouping become merely similar. They “feel” alike (cf. 
Burman, 2012b, 2014). But that’s properly a side-effect of what Piaget meant (see e.g., 
Piaget, 1954/1981). And thus the translation loses the strength of the original formalism. 
Inhelder’s (1977) own speech at the same conference provides some additional 
detail, but has the benefit of having been translated by someone else. She thus refers to 
vicariance—rendered correctly—to explain the construction of the level-jump that has 
since come to be called reflecting abstraction: 
How does the child build up these structures, and, especially, how, around the age 
of 11 or 12, does he attain a logical structure that goes beyond that of classes and 
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relations, beyond the double-entry matrices of the concrete operations period? 
Piaget calls the mechanism by which this is achieved “reflexive abstraction.” [sic] 
Such abstraction takes place when the subject derives from his actions and 
operations certain principles that lead to a new organization when he is confronted 
with a new problem. For example, at the level of concrete operations, the child is 
already capable of substituting one criterium for another (shifting), and of 
conserving the whole in whatever way it has been divided into parts (Inhelder and 
Piaget, 1964). This is a manifestation of what has been called “vicariance”. 
Subsequently, by reflexive abstraction, this concept leads to the idea of a division 
of one and the same totality into all its possible parts. Through this abstraction, 
which is accompanied by a constructive generalization, the subject reaches the 
logicomathematical concept of the set of all subsets. (Inhelder, 1977, p. 336) 
This makes the main theoretical issue of Piagetian later constructivism clear, and ties 
everything together: abstractions and generalizations occur through a process similar to 
Baldwin’s Functional Selection, but across and within neo-Gödelian levels. My 
illustration in Chapter VI makes this clear, but the resulting meaning is worth reiterating: 
lower levels constrain higher levels, and are constrained by them, such that possibility 
and necessity interact with exploration in the construction of novelty. 
 From this perspective, Piaget’s final turn away from extensional logics 
and toward relevant logics must be interpreted through a much deeper context. As Beilin 
(1992b) explained: 
When Piaget (1980[c]) declared he had previously been in error in placing almost 
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exclusive stress on extensional, truth-table logic and that a more balanced theory 
of meaning was needed giving greater attention to intensional logic [see esp. 
Piaget & Garcia, 1987/1991], it appeared as though a radical and sudden 
transformation had occurred in his theory.[94] It was indeed a radical change, but it 
was not occasioned by a sudden shift in the direction that Piaget’s theory had been 
taking in the 10 years prior to that time. (p. 1) 
My main contribution, then, is to push back the date by placing those changes in context. 
And I’d like to push that just a little bit further. 
4. Translator’s intent? 
Nowhere in the French original did Piaget use the words “new theory.” We also 
cannot ask the translator, Gilbert Voyat, what he intended by introducing the term. This is 
because he died soon after the translation was published, and his archival papers have not 
yet been found. But I would like to suggest, perhaps controversially, that his choice of 
labels was quite intentional. This is because he was an insider—a Genevan—who had 
decamped for the US and, I’m told, had intended to become Piaget’s local representative 
in New York. 
There are clues to this in his writings at the time. For example, in an article 
                                                 
94 The difference between extensional logic and intensional logic is akin to the difference between 
the fact of an object’s existence (the thing in itself) and what that object implies (as epistemic 
phenomenon). Truth tables can therefore summarize the logical transformations that an object can undergo, 
but cannot represent what those transformations imply. Also: since self-contradiction cannot be modeled in 
this way by a truth table, but can indeed be modeled as an implication, the logic of intension (which Piaget 
referred to as “a logic of meanings”) is more applicable to his problem. Piaget’s shift to the new theory can 
therefore be understood as a shift toward a kind of phenomenology, but one caused by the formal properties 
of the structures of the mind. This then also parallels Godel’s shift toward Husserl in his own later works 
(see e.g., Tieszen, 1992; 2012; van Atten & Kennedy, 2003; also van Atten, 2006). 
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describing Piaget’s impact in the US, Voyat (1977) talked about the “subtle distortion of 
Piaget’s original aims” (p. 346). He then published a simplifying introductory textbook 
(Voyat, 1982). Yet he also identified an opportunity: 
The intensity and breadth of the interest aroused [among teachers] in America by 
the findings of the Geneva school are truly remarkable. A host of individual 
teachers and the many “new schools” (sometimes called “Piaget schools”) all 
claim to base their educational epistemology on operational theory. One might 
well ask how such enthusiasm is possible when the mainstream of American 
pedagogy is still in thrall to a militant and vigilant behaviorism. Part of the answer 
to this question is that the demands which American education has to meet on the 
pragmatic level tend to maintain the system in a state of permanent instability. 
Another point worth mentioning is the complementarity and resemblance between 
Piaget’s approach and Dewey’s, which continues to underpin a dissenting 
tradition in educational thinking in America. (Voyat, 1977, p. 346)  
In other words, we can suggest that it was teachers—rather than psychologists—whom 
Voyat sought to target. But why? He explained directly: 
an increasing number of educationalists find in this theory exactly what they are 
looking for, namely, a theoretical framework and the knowledge needed for the 
organization of their projected applications. (p. 346) 
Still, though, there was a barrier in the way: 
No unifying tendency is visible here save for the explicit invocation of Piaget’s 
thought, and what we see is actually a large number of distinct trends with no 
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predominant orientation emerging for the time being. (p. 347) 
Thus, Voyat saw a problem that could be addressed by taking advantage of the disparate 
groups’ joint and collective allegiance to Piaget’s name.  
 From this perspective, what would a unifying view need to do? It would need to 
adopt a high-level epistemological view, in the sense that it would need to be relevant 
both to teachers and to researchers in psychology and cognitive science who are seeking 
to understand the development of knowledge (p. 347). It would also need to reconnect 
with Piaget’s biology in a way that would be acceptable, given the American “suspicion” 
of “disguised Lamarckism” (p. 348). And, most important of all, it would need to 
reincorporate interaction: 
the concept of interaction is the one that remains the most mysterious to the 
American way of thinking. It is paradoxical to discover that this most vital 
element in operational [Piagetian] theory, in tandem with the notion of 
equilibration as an essential mechanism in cognitive development, remains the 
most alien of concepts for those schooled in the classical tradition of American 
psychology. (Voyat, 1977, p. 348) 
I think, now, that this has been achieved simply by showing how Piaget came to present 
the ideas that Voyat led Beilin (and Davidson) to consider. Interaction is assumed of 
Functional Selection, and it is also required of the neo-Gödelian approach. That then also 
addresses the weird biological theory, and provides the means to see the development of 
knowledge through its various levels. 
 Still, there are some open questions. One relates to the interaction between Voyat 
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and Beilin. They were both based at CUNY. And thus there is the possibility for a local 
history that cannot be pursued without their archival and institutional papers. The timing 
of Voyat’s labeling of the New Theory also coincides with the height of what has been 
called “Piaget bashing” (Chapter III). The choice of words could therefore easily have 
been a rhetorical strategy, related to the context of the time: a kind of literary sleight of 
hand to separate “the problematic Piaget being bashed” from “the Piaget who still has 
things to offer,” even while knowing that they were the same person. Of course, it’s hard 
to say this with certainty: we will only know once we have access to the relevant archival 
papers. 
5. Final thoughts 
The label—the “new” theory—is a term of art highlighting what is different in 
Piaget’s later works from what American readers have come to expect. There is no great 
philosophical rupture at work, although there are of course many smaller historical 
ruptures to be found.  
We are thus returned to the beginning, because it was in this sense that Beilin 
(1992b) explained the difference between the two, old and new:  
Piaget’s late additions extend the theory and at the same time conserve it. They 
extend the constructivist aspect of the theory by emphasizing the nearly unlimited 
possibilities in mind, and at the same time show the constraints that come from 
integrating the products of only some possibilities, and the procedures needed to 
actualize them. Thus, the developing rational mind is inherently productive, yet 
constrained, and we are reminded that the development of mind is subject 
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constantly to dialectical forces, the position that Piaget increasingly came to 
espouse in the later theory (p. 12). 
In short, the “new” theory is more constructivist, more focused on possibility and 
necessity (i.e., on formal views of constraint), and—if such a thing were possible—more 
dialectical. It is consistent with the standard theory, but different enough to be of interest 
even to skeptics. And its differences included some elements that were very hard to 
understand without bringing back the missing context. 
In the end, though, we can leave off quoting Inhelder in her introduction to 
Voyat’s interview of Piaget in February of 1980: “After this glimpse of recent work, I 
hope you will be convinced that Piagetian theory is not a closed system but is in a 
continual state of refinement and development” (in Voyat et al., 2011, p. 9). It is, in brief, 
a model of itself: changing, developing, and evolving. As he put it: 
At all levels of development there are implications between actions or meanings; 
then there are dialectical relations that lead the subject to go beyond what he has 
already acquired. These spiralling [sic] constructions of a dialectical nature 
constitute what I have long considered to be the essence of the growth of 
knowledge. Development does not simply consist of ever new equilibrations, but 
of ‘augmentative’ equilibrations. (Piaget, 1980a, p. 6) 
The ultimate lesson: one never finishes. The journey continues. And in terms of how this 
applies to my own research, I am looking forward to that journey with great anticipation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Exploring the doing of history using levels 
 
What follows is the pre-review manuscript of an article co-authored with Marc Ratcliff, 
my supervisor in Geneva. It was written in English by me, using notes and a short first 
draft written by him in French. And although it was his suggestion that we pursue the 
connection to Gödel that I outlined originally in Chapter V, it was my idea to have that 
inform an historiographical experiment. That then shaped the narrative arc, and I 
followed my standard method to fill in the details: “get out of the way, and let the story 
tell itself.” We discussed this second draft, and I revised it. The resulting manuscript has 
been submitted to Estudios de Psychología, following their invitation. Two versions will 
be published: the original in English (below), and a Spanish translation that the editors 
will arrange on our behalf. Where I have made translations of the French sources, the 
original text is provided in footnotes. 
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THE MOBILE FRONTIERS OF PIAGET'S PSYCHOLOGY 
From academic tourism to interdisciplinary collaboration 
 
“The frontiers of formalization are… mobile, or ‘vicariant,’ and are not 
closed once and for all like a wall marking the limits of an empire. J. 
Ladrière proposed the ingenious interpretation: ‘we cannot survey, at one 
glance, all the operations possible of thought....’” (Burman's [in press] 
trans of Piaget, 1968, p. 31; citing Ladrière, 1960, p. 321) 
 
“…the epistemic framework of psychology in 1959 is not that of 
psychology in 1930; or even 1950. These new frameworks are also never 
imposed by outsiders, even should those outsiders be named Kant or 
Husserl. Instead, one day or another, insiders discover that they encounter 
a particular philosophy that suits them. On that day, they are brought 
together in greater unity. But to declare beforehand that what a 
psychologist does is not psychological, and exceeds the disciplinary 
frontier—I reject the premise” (our trans of Piaget, 1965a, p. 61).95 
 
A number of historians have shown that, early in his career, Jean Piaget (1896-
                                                 
95 In the original: “…les cadres de la psychologie de 1959 ne sont plus ceux de la psychologie de 
1930 ou même de 1950. Mais ces cadres nouveaux ne sont jamais imposés du dehors par des non-
techniciens, qu’ils s’appellent Kant ou Husserl. Qu’un jour ou l’autre on découvre que ces cadres 
rencontrent telle ou telle philosophie qui leur convient, ce jour il y aura davantage d’unité. Mais décréter 
d’avance que ce que fait le psychologue n’est pas psychologique et qu’il dépasse ses frontières, c’est un 
impératif que je refuse” (Piaget, 1965a, p. 61). 
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1980) drew heavily on multiple disciplines outside of what we now consider psychology. 
Whether psychoanalysis, mathematics, physics, biology, sociology, philosophy, 
anthropology or religion, the sources of his inspiration were many and varied (see e.g., 
M. Chapman, 1988a; Hofstetter et al., 2012; Vidal, 1994; Vonèche, 1992/1996). This is 
reflected clearly in the speeches he gave to various societies: until WWII, Piaget 
communicated the results of his work at meetings devoted to the discussion of 
psychology, philosophy, philosophy of science, biology, sociology, natural science, 
physics, and education. The spectrum of his publications was equally broad.  
Given Piaget’s wide-ranging interests, however, one might wonder about the 
disciplinary status of psychology in his professional circles in Geneva. Indeed, one might 
enquire specifically about its role and place at the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute for the 
Sciences of Education, which Piaget co-directed—starting in 1929—with founders 
Edouard Claparède (1873-1940) and Pierre Bovet (1878-1965). After all, it is via this 
institution that Piaget ultimately “got to psychology” after receiving a doctorate in natural 
history (Burman, 2015, p. 157; responding to Vidal, 1997b). And that is therefore what 
we examine in this article: the interaction between personal interest and institutional 
context, as well as the resulting implications in terms of possibilities for future action. 
Yet, at the same time, such an examination would also be too limited in scope. The 
institutional context itself had a context, both national and international, into which 
Piaget had to fit as well. We therefore attempt to go beyond the kind of institutional 
microhistory that is typical for such an examination, although we do so in a way that is 
perhaps a bit audacious for such a short piece. 
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Beyond presenting an interesting view of one of the key figures of developmental 
psychology, the essay’s historiographical audacity derives from the identification of a 
change in the formalism underlying Piaget’s theory of knowledge. Briefly put: the 
original theoretical foundation of his well-known stage theory of child development was 
replaced with an open hierarchy of levels (see Burman, in press). One consequence of 
this is reflected in the epigraph, and in our choice of title: the limits of what can be 
formally represented—which, in Piaget’s later work, meant “the limits of what can be 
known”—aren’t fixed. The effects of this realization can then be seen in Piaget’s 
changing relationship with psychology as a scientific discipline, which we will discuss in 
detail. But the implications of that change also go much deeper, even informing his 
posthumously-published examination of the parallel between child development and the 
history of science (see Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989; with commentary by Beilin, 1990; 
Kitchener, 1987). So, although unorthodox as “history,” we take the risk of having it 
inform our approach here too. 
1. Our motivation and approach 
Historians have argued since Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) that everything that 
happens occurs in a specific context, and that this context must be reflected in the 
histories that are subsequently told.96 Yet we might now reconsider this singular and 
amorphous “context” in terms of the identified hierarchy of levels: actions at one level 
are both constrained, and made possible, by the levels adjacent to it (see also Burman, 
                                                 
96 The consequences of this are often referred-to as “the new history of psychology” (see esp. 
Furumoto, 1989; with recent discussion by Teo, 2013a).  
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2013b). Indeed, this seems now to have been the basis of Piaget’s later turn toward 
“logics of meaning,” in which he and his co-author argued that it is possible to model the 
effect that this “entailment” between functionally-interacting levels has on decision-
making by taking note of relevance relations (Piaget, 1980c; Piaget & Garcia, 1987/1991; 
with commentary by Apostel, 1982; Ducret, 1988).  
That said, however, the underlying insight—identifying levels, and then 
examining interactions across and between them—never really caught on specifically as 
an investigative tool.97 We therefore attempt it here as a kind of historiographical 
experiment. In short, we aim to examine some of the levels and interactions in Piaget’s 
own history in order to see his professional life in its contexts, but also to delve more 
deeply into an unexamined aspect of his broader theory as it existed at the end of his life. 
As a consequence, we also then come to a new appreciation of Piaget’s relationship with 
his home discipline of psychology as its boundaries moved, and as he himself became 
increasingly involved in moving them.98  
We begin by examining the interaction between the two most basic levels 
implicated in our story. Piaget is thus first placed in the context of the primary institution 
devoted to psychological research with which he identified: the Rousseau Institute (see 
also Burman, 2015; Ratcliff & Borella, 2013). We then jump up a level to consider the 
                                                 
97 Two names loom especially large when considering Piaget’s influence on historiography: 
Thomas Kuhn (see Burman, 2007b) and Hayden White (see Miller, 1987). Yet because our approach takes 
advantage of insights not available to either of them, the results are quite different. 
98 If this attempt must be associated with specific methods, then we can call those methods 
“symmetry” and “reflexivity” (see Bloor, 1976/1991, 2014). By this we mean that the resulting approach 
applies equally to Piaget’s successes as it does to his failures. It also applies both to his epistemology, and 
to ours. What follows is therefore as much the product of Science and Technology Studies as it is of the 
History of Psychology (but see Note 96). 
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context in which that local network was itself situated, and ask how Piaget’s strategic 
decisions in representing its interests reflected the extant demands (see also Hofstetter, 
2010). Those early successes led to new opportunities, first at the national level and then 
internationally. As a result, we are able to see that the same kind of thinking operated 
successfully at multiple levels. We then discuss when and how that thinking failed, and 
how Piaget accommodated his approach. The result is therefore a look at how Piaget 
defined psychology, in relation to the ways in which it was possible to do so acceptably, 
but also why he came to believe so strongly in the importance of formalized 
interdisciplinary collaboration after having been for decades an informal and happy 
tourist of philosophy, biology, etc. 
2. The contexts of Piaget’s early psychology 
When Piaget first joined the Rousseau Institute, in 1921, it was not a 
“psychological” institution. The lessons given in psychology originated in several 
Faculties, so the discipline was not institutionalized at the time in the way that it has since 
come to be. Although the psychology laboratory there was among the world’s first—and 
is believed today by Genevans to have been the very first created specifically in a Faculty 
of Science (in 1892)—it was also held apart in a now-unexpected way: the work 
produced did not have a clear “psychological” institutional identification.99 Indeed, until 
1968, no psychological dissertation from Geneva bore mention of an institutional 
                                                 
99 Claparède also created, in 1937, a temporary (half day per week) neuropsychology service at 
the Hospital of Geneva. But he did so without informing the administration. This was then cited, simply, as 
“the laboratory at the hospital” (see Ratcliff & Ruchat, 2006). 
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“psychology.”100 Instead, students were registered in the Faculty of Letters, Science, or 
Medicine.  
There was of course the easily-recognizable journal, Archives de Psychologie, 
which was founded in 1901 by Claparède and Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920).101 They 
then edited it together for nearly twenty years; that is, until Flournoy’s death and his 
replacement on the masthead by Piaget in 1921 (Ratcliff & Hauert, 2006, pp. 104-105; 
Hofstetter et al., 2012, p. 68; cf. Burman, 2015, p. 157). However, when the journal 
published psychological research—from both Swiss and international scholars—the 
articles appeared alongside work in philosophy, anthropology, sociology, pedagogy, and 
even biology. The presented “archives,” such as they were, were therefore not “of 
‘psychology’” in the much-narrower way that we mean this term today. 
As for the broader political and economic context, between the Great Depression 
and the rise of Fascism in Europe, the local situation in Geneva became increasingly 
tense during Piaget’s early years there. When the Swiss army ultimately turned its guns 
on a crowd of anti-fascist demonstrators, on 9 November 1932, thirteen were left dead 
and sixty-five more were injured. This then also precipitated a crisis at the nearby 
Rousseau Institute, as the faculty there in turn became increasingly politically-polarized.  
While the Institute’s directors, Bovet and Claparède, wanted to support a kind of 
militant activism against the excesses of the Right, Piaget sought instead to decouple the 
                                                 
100 In the several monikers used from the founding of the Rousseau Institute until that of the 
Faculty created in 1975, the word “psychology” first appeared only in 1968 in the name of the “School of 
psychology and educational sciences” (see Hofstetter et al., 2012). 
101 Indeed, it was Flournoy who had founded Geneva’s experimental psychology laboratory in 
1892 (see Ratcliff, Borella, & Piguet, 2006). 
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Institute’s scientific activities from any possible politically-motivated response 
(Hofstetter et al., 2012, pp. 59-62; also Hofstetter, 2010; Vidal, 1997a). This choice to 
adopt a strategic outward-facing neutrality—by accentuating the scientific objectivity of 
Genevan research (cf. Green, 2010)—then had important implications for the discipline 
that Piaget subsequently helped to promote. Briefly: to the extent that psychological 
research was itself seen to be purely scientific, rather than political, the Institute and its 
students would be safe from Fascist retaliation. 
Still, though, the outbreak of WWII saw a dramatic decrease in the number of 
students enrolled in the Institute’s teacher’s college. The Institute’s resources then 
declined by an equivalent amount. Claparède also died in 1940, and Bovet retired. The 
old regime thus ended. The founders were gone, and the other losses threatened to bring 
the institution down too. The very survival of the Rousseau Institute, as well as of its 
scattered and semi-camouflaged psychology (still without institutional recognition), thus 
became the primary issue faced by Piaget as its new Director.  
3. Strategic movements 
Starting in 1936-1937, Piaget had inaugurated what historian Jean-Jacques Ducret 
(2011) called his “classic program” (see for discussion Ratcliff, in press-b). This was an 
intensive investigation of the nature of mental “operations,” informed by logical 
principles (see also Burman, in press). It was thereby intended to provide a solid 
foundation for his experimental study of children’s knowledge. Yet, at the same time, it 
also provided the basis for his theoretical program in “genetic structuralism” (i.e., the 
investigation of the construction of novel causes [structures], and not just novel outcomes 
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[functions]). Indeed, this is the work that occupied the bulk of Piaget’s time as a scholar 
until the 1950s. 
With his elevation to Professor and Director, in 1940, a number of organizational 
changes were made as well. First, management of the Institute was split: Piaget would 
continue to advance the research program in experimental psychology, while a co-
manager would oversee the ongoing training of teachers. Second, scientific research in 
psychology itself was split. Piaget then took on the oversight of all fundamental (basic, 
pure) research and—following the departure of several previously well-positioned 
researchers—assigned to André Rey subordinate oversight of all work in applied 
psychology (Hofstetter et al., 2012). This structure then informed every other endeavor 
that the Institute undertook, as well as the way in which psychology was itself defined in 
Geneva.  
3.1. Research strategy, or strategic research? For Piaget, and thus also for the 
new regime at the Rousseau Institute, psychology was to be taken seriously for two main 
reasons. First, and in agreement with Wundt, because psychology is a laboratory science 
that identifies phenomena which can be described with reference to laws. But also, 
second, because its observations can be formalized.  
Piaget explained this in an article published in 1941, in which he summarized his 
joint experimental and theoretical efforts with reference to the complementarity between 
law-driven research and his efforts at formalization. As he put it:  
Psychologists have often sought to express the laws of behavior in mathematical 
terms, and even those of consciousness itself. But the measurement of 
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psychological fact has not yet exceeded the power of statistical law, which applies 
with certainty to all (and without prejudging the true nature of the underlying 
mechanisms that are described only probabilistically). It is in this way that the 
‘metric scales of intelligence’ provide only broad statistical comparisons of the 
results achieved gradually by one’s intelligence during its evolution.[102] But still, 
neither statistics nor metric scales allow for the direct measurement of intellectual 
operations themselves, or help to translate the fact of these operations into an 
analytical framework. And they certainly don’t detail the transformations that 
constitute development as such. (our trans of Piaget, 1941, pp. 215-216)103  
In other words, what Piaget sought was more fundamental than what was typical of 
psychological research at the time, and also quite different from what one would expect 
today: he sought “the changes in the formative processes that could explain [the gradual 
accumulation of acquired characteristics]” (our trans of Piaget, 1941, p. 216).104  
It is fascinating to see in the original sources that he pointed to factor analysis as a 
                                                 
102 This is certainly a reference to work done in the style of Binet and Simon, and Piaget soon 
afterward referred to both Binet and Terman together (see e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956, p. 68). For 
Piaget’s thoughts about Binet specifically, however, see (Piaget, 1975; also Wertheimer & Maserow, 
1980).  
103 Or, as he put it in the original: “Les psychologues ont souvent conçu l'espoir d'exprimer sous 
une forme mathématique les lois du comportement et même de la conscience. Mais la mesure des faits 
psychologiques n'a guère dépassé jusqu'ici le niveau des lois statistiques, qui s'appliquent assurément à tout 
et ne préjugent pas de la nature intime des mécanismes dont elles expriment le résultat probable. C’est ainsi 
que les « échelles métriques de l'intelligence » sont des comparaisons statistiques encore bien grossières des 
résultats progressivement atteints par l'intelligence en son évolution, mais elles ne permettent en rien de 
mesurer ni même de traduire en un schéma analytique les opérations intellectuelles elles-mêmes, pas plus 
que le detail des transformations qui constituent le développement comme tel.” (Piaget, 1941, pp. 215-216). 
104 This translation reverses the negative in the original, for clarity here, but it keeps the intended 
meaning. The line provided is from the last half of the continuation of the earlier quote: “Il est vrai que l'on 
a pu représenter celui-ci par des lois exponentielles mais outre qu'elles ne différencient alors pas la 
croissance psychique de la croissance organique en général, elles decrivent a nouveau la sommation 
graduelle des acquisitions et non pas les modifications des processus formateurs qui pourraient les 
expliquer” (Piaget, 1941, p. 216). 
259 
 
possible way to engage with these issues, even mentioning Spearman by name, because 
Piaget is often accused today of having neglected statistical methods. But we also see 
what it was that he was striving for: the true challenge, he noted, was to understand the 
connection between identified statistical factors and the underlying causes that change 
during development (Piaget, 1941, p. 215n). To engage this question of causes, he then 
asked a theoretical question similar to that asked by Boole a century before: “At least in 
the study of the psychology of thinking, why not seek to apply those techniques of logical 
calculus that refer to the most general aspects of mathematics while at the same time 
remaining qualitative?” (our trans of Piaget, 1941, p. 216).105 
To an extent, the means by which Piaget would answer this question had already 
been provided by his earliest “classic” investigations on the development of mental 
operations. But to these he added a second experimental program focusing on lower-level 
processes; namely, perception (see Ratcliff & Hauert, 2006). This was then introduced, in 
the article of 1941, by contrasting the view of Gestaltists like Köhler—that basic 
perceptions reflect indecomposable wholes—with the view that had emerged in Piaget’s 
own experimental and theoretical work: that the development of intellectual operations 
could be characterized by a kind of reversibility, in whole-part relations, that is simply 
not allowed under the assumptions of the other theoretical system (Piaget, 1941, p. 285).  
                                                 
105 This reorganizes the sentence for clarity, but also excludes a delightful turn of phrase in 
defining qualitative inquiry that we would like to provide separately: “where the immeasurable achieves the 
same precision as the measurable” (our trans of Piaget, 1941, p. 216). Here, though, is his question as 
written—in its entirety—from the original: “Pourquoi donc ne pas chercher à appliquer, au moins au 
domaine de la psychologie de la pensée, la technique opératoire de la logistique, qui rappelle celle des 
parties les plus générales de la mathématique tout en demeurant sur un terrain qualitatif où le non-
mesurable atteint la même précision que le numérique?” (Piaget, 1941, p. 216). 
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3.2. At a higher level. Institutionally, both research programs—theoretical and 
experimental—also benefited from new editorial leadership at the Institute’s Archives de 
Psychology. Indeed, with the war obstructing the production and circulation of new 
knowledge, the journal (now co-edited by Piaget and Rey) was forced to refocus on 
publishing work produced primarily by the Genevans themselves. The once-international 
journal was therefore brought in-house, if only temporarily. 
 At the same time as these actions served Piaget’s research programs, they also 
contributed to the institutional legitimization of psychology in Geneva. And the research 
programs themselves—genetic structuralism and experimental psychology (combining on 
the one hand a constructivist and formalistic understanding of development while at the 
same time, on the other hand, testing the Gestaltist laws of perception in their 
developmental aspect)—were well-suited to this role. In short: they enabled the Institute 
to avoid the crackdowns that led, elsewhere, to the suppression of exactly Claparède’s 
and Bovet’s argued-for kind of resistance.106 It was thus by balancing tradition and 
innovation, while at the same avoiding political scrutiny, that Piaget began to force upon 
Genevan psychology a particular and sustainable identity. (His own political resistance 
came through subtler means, which we will describe in greater detail in a future essay.) 
 3.3. Higher. Two still-higher levels were also constructed during the war. A new 
publishing venue to represent a unified Helvetian psychological discipline—the Swiss 
Journal of Psychology—was founded in 1942. This was then followed by the founding, 
                                                 
106 The best known example of this is provided by the suppression of “pedalogical” works in the 
Soviet Union, 1936-1956, which is today better known for having included Vygotsky’s writings (leading to 
the erroneous belief that it was his work specifically that had been “banned” [see Fraser & Yasnitsky, 
2015]). 
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in 1943, of a new professional association: the Swiss Psychological Society (known 
today acronymically and simultaneously, in French and German, as “SSP-SGP”). In other 
words, during WWII, psychology itself was nationalized in Switzerland (although 
“confederated” is a more appropriate term in the Swiss context). 
As the two international stars personifying this new vision of psychology,107 the 
French-speaking Piaget and the German-speaking Carl Jung (1875-1961) were given 
places of prominence in both organizations. Indeed, both are now remembered as key 
founders. Piaget then served as the first president of the SSP-SGP in 1943-1945. And he 
also served as a co-editor of the journal, with Jung, from 1942 to 1946.  
It should be said, however, that the establishment of the society and the journal 
are not considered critical moments in either of Piaget’s or Jung’s personal biographies 
(see e.g., Piaget, 1967a, p. 145). They are rather more typically understood as a reaction 
by the Swiss academic community to the chaos of war; a closing-in of ranks, and 
overlooking of internal conflicts, in a moment of existential uncertainty. Yet to suggest 
this is of course to adopt a perspective that is higher than that of the individual, and 
higher even than the level of a national institution. It places the foundational events in an 
international context, relative to a World War, and one is therefore left to wonder if 
things might have turned out differently (i.e., if the way things are, or the way they are 
perceived to be, isn’t actually “necessary”).  
That said, however, our purpose is not to point to the possibility of counterfactual 
                                                 
107 They had also both received honorary doctorates, just five years before, at Harvard’s 
Tercentenary (see Burman, 2015, pp. 151, 153; Hsueh, 2004, pp. 21-24). 
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history. Rather, we would argue simply that adopting an epistemological approach that 
explicitly avows a reversible levels-oriented perspective enables one to adopt a broader 
view. Thus, just as we can jump up to the international level and place these foundational 
events in context, so too can we jump down a level and look for sources. Doing so in this 
case then suggests that the founding of these institutions could be seen as an 
endorsement, extension, and generalization of the local strategy of scientific neutrality 
and objectivity adopted in Geneva. After all, it was this that allowed the Rousseau 
Institute to function without having constantly to defend itself from political interference. 
And as a result, too, Swiss psychologists then came to benefit from the support of a new 
set of allies: medical doctors constituted nearly half of the new society’s founding 
members.108 
3.4. Parallel developments. The two research programs inaugurated at the start 
of this period ended in 1955 and 1962, respectively, and both had a significant impact on 
the outward spread of Genevan psychology during the 1960s. Indeed, the results of the 
program in genetic structuralism—by then recast as the much broader “genetic 
epistemology” (which was itself also later updated [Beilin, 1992b])—had a global 
impact, especially during the resurgence in American interest in Piaget’s work as part of 
the widespread education reforms after Sputnik (see e.g., Bliss, 1995; Herman & Ripple, 
2002; Hsueh, 2005; also Müller et al., 2013). Although Piaget had already been known to 
Americans as a methodologist, he thus also came to be seen as a “theorist” too (see 
                                                 
108 This is a very different outcome from the way similar alliances were forged in France, when 
e.g., Binet was working to create the metric scale of intelligence (see Nicolas et al., 2013). 
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Bruner, 1983, pp. 133-134). 
Yet to truly understand what was going on at the time, and see the social and 
intellectual contexts that informed this work (while enabling its subsequent success), we 
need to jump up another several levels and then look down to compare similar processes 
in different contexts. To put it more simply: the postwar period was a time of broad 
disciplinarization for psychology globally. In other words, similar processes were being 
undertaken simultaneously in different contexts around the world. Indeed, as is well-
known, the differently-institutionalized American Psychology boomed at this time (see 
Pickren, 2007). But so too did French Psychology, albeit in a different way. We then also 
see that Piaget’s own efforts weren’t confined just to Switzerland. 
3.5. Piaget in France. In the aftermath of WWII, a vast editorial project began to 
come together in Paris under Paul Fraisse (1911-1996). His goal was to unify the 
disparate strands of scientific psychology as it was conducted by speakers of the French 
language.109 A supporting association was then created in 1951 (Fraisse, 1988, p. 125). 
And this had, as one of its outcomes, a large 9-volume Traité de psychologie 
expérimentale that was co-edited by Fraisse with Piaget (1963-1965).  
In contrast to an earlier WWI-era synthesis by Georges Dumas (1866-1946), the 
new Traité was explicit in associating French psychology with the experimental sciences. 
In France and Belgium, the institutionally-recognized efforts of Piéron, Wallon, Fraisse, 
Zazzo, Michotte, Nuttin, and their students also helped to reinforce this new identity. 
After WWII, French psychology thereby shifted in its fundamental orientation: less 
                                                 
109 Fraisse, of course, had his own contexts (see Carroy, Ohayon, & Plas, 2006).  
264 
 
philosophical, and more laboratory-based. Fraisse then went on to be elected president of 
the Société Française de Psychologie (1962-1963) and the International Union of 
Scientific Psychology (1966-1969). 
One could certainly argue that this change to a laboratory-based approach reflects 
an Americanization of postwar French Psychology. (This is supported explicitly by 
Fraisse’s recognition of the influence of E. G. Boring on his own historical perspective 
[see Fraisse, 1963/1968, p. 1n; and thus see also Kelly, 1981; O'Donnell, 1979].) The 
shifting of the disciplinary center from Europe to the US would also play a role in such 
an argument (see e.g., van Strien, 1997). But we prefer a more “polycentric” 
historiographical approach (Danziger, 1994, 2006; Pickren, 2009b; with commentary by 
Brock, 2014b). And we note that the French disciplinary turn toward laboratory science 
was consistent with Piaget’s much earlier strategy from Geneva, rather than simply 
reflecting the outward spread of an inevitable American revolution (cf. Hobbs & Burman, 
2009).  
Briefly put: Piaget was with Fraisse at the center of it all, commuting regularly by 
train between Geneva and Paris to teach at the Sorbonne from 1952 until 1963 (see 
Meljac & Diener, 2000). He had also been president, in 1954-1957, of the International 
Union of Psychological Science (see M. R. Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, & 
Bélanger, 2000). And as the director of the International Bureau of Education, 1929-
1969, he had important ties to UNESCO’s transnational program as well (Hofstetter, 
2004, 2015; Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2013; see also Selcer, 2009). Thus, whether or not 
the change in French Psychology was caused by the projection of Piaget’s originally local 
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strategy to the national level through the founding of the SSP-SGP as a scientific society 
of laboratory-based psychologists—followed by the adoption of a similar strategy by 
similarly-inclined international others—it is a simple observation that Piaget was 
involved intimately in the disciplining of psychology as it was conducted in the French-
speaking world. And focusing solely on the American influence is to be blinded to that 
other relevant level. 
With this made clear, however, we are also led to an apparent contradiction: 
Piaget’s International Center for Genetic Epistemology (referred-to acronymically in 
French as “CIEG”) was not itself a psychological institution. We suggest, therefore, that 
Piaget’s founding of the CIEG was a further parallel effort to the disciplining of 
psychology. In short: he brought his earlier undisciplined tourism inside, and then 
institutionalized that in Geneva—rather than psychology itself—as the superordinate 
ideal of “interdisciplinarity” (see e.g., Piaget, 1964/1971; Piaget, 1966/1967, 1970a; also 
Darbellay, 2011; Vonèche, 1993). 
4. The turn away from undisciplined tourism 
Piaget published in biology until 1929, in sociology from 1928 until 1951, and in 
logic from 1937 until 1953. Yet these attempts to work simultaneously on several fronts 
met with a mixed reception: while Piaget’s efforts in psychology garnered great 
international acclaim, his earlier work in biology led to his ejection from the discipline 
(Vonèche, 2003). His work in logic also produced a similar initial reaction (Burman, in 
press; Ratcliff, in press-a; see also Apostel, 1982; Ladrière, 1982). And his sociology 
fared only somewhat better: although he occupied a chair of sociology at Geneva from 
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1939 to 1952, this has been largely forgotten (see Piaget, 1977, collecting together works 
published 1928-1960/1995; 1962/2000; also M. Chapman, 1986; Kitchener, 1991). 
We suggest that the reason for his excursions into these foreign territories was the 
same as his reason for pursuing his “classic” research programs. To wit: to understand a 
thing, you have to see it from different perspectives.  
This was reflected mostly obviously in his still-untranslated-in-English 3-volume 
Introduction à l’épistémologie génétique (Piaget, 1950). Indeed, in this new higher-order 
approach, participants would work to accommodate the main weakness of a disciplined 
psychology: 
When a discipline—such as experimental psychology—separates from 
philosophy to set itself up as an independent science, this decision by its 
representatives should not be attributed to their greater seriousness or value. The 
choice is rather one of giving up on certain divisive topics. It is also a 
commitment, either by convention or by gentleman’s agreement, to engage only 
with questions that can be answered by the exclusive use of certain common or 
communicable methods. As a result, there is in the constitution of a science a kind 
of necessary renunciation: a requirement to present as objectively as possible the 
results that were achieved (or the explanations that were pursued), and not to 
intermix these findings with concerns that while valuable must be left outside the 
disciplinary boundaries (frontières) as drawn (our trans of Piaget, 1950, p. 9).110  
                                                 
110 In the original: “Lorsqu’une discipline, telle que la psychologie expérimentale, se sépare de la 
philosophie pour s’ériger en science autonome, cette décision de ses représentants ne revient pas à 
s’attribuer, à un moment donné, un brevet de sérieux ou de valeur supérieure. Elle consiste simplement à 
renoncer à certaines discussions qui divisent les esprits et à s’engager, par convention ou gentleman's 
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In other words, what a science is—for Piaget—was discipline; shared norms, and a 
devotion to both observation and communication. Yet discipline also requires restraint. 
This then in turn affords an interesting view of the demarcation problem: science 
as it is practiced by scientists is narrower, by common shared agreement, than the 
scientific interests of those who practice it. Yet Piaget also thought that great leaps 
forward came as a result of reflecting carefully on these narrow results, as those broader 
interests led otherwise disciplined individuals to stray into speculative territory. From this 
perspective, the development of knowledge then becomes a repeating two-step process: a 
discursive scientific phase, and a dialectical reflective phase (see esp. Piaget, 1980b). But 
here too was a problem: the methods to pursue this reflection had not yet themselves been 
formalized. The source of humanity’s greatest advances in knowledge was therefore 
undisciplined; unscientific. Thus, in 1953, Piaget received the first of several grants from 
the Rockefeller Foundation to begin to address that very problem. And that support led in 
turn to the founding of the CIEG in 1955, which Piaget directed until his death in 1980 
(see J. C. Bringuier, Gruber, Carreras, & Cellérier, 1977/1980; Bronckart, 1980).  
From this perspective, it would be a mistake to suggest that the founding of the 
CIEG represented an abandonment of Piaget’s efforts at disciplining psychology. Instead, 
the two go hand-in-hand. Indeed, as he later explained, he saw the interdisciplinarity 
institutionalized there as representing “the future of experimental sciences” (Piaget, 
                                                 
agreement, de ne parler que des questions abordables par l’emploi exclusif de certaines méthodes 
communes ou communicables. Il y a donc, dans la constitution d’une science, un renoncement nécessaire, 
une détermination de ne plus mêler, à l’exposé aussi objectif que possible des résultats que l’on atteint ou 
des explications que l’on poursuit, les préoccupations auxquelles on tient peut-être bien davantage par 
devers soi, mais que l’on s’oblige à laisser en dehors des frontières tracées” (Piaget, 1950, p. 9). 
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1971b, p. 539). This was later expanded-upon in a speech to the American Psychological 
Association: 
Psychology, like all other sciences, can live and prosper only in an 
interdisciplinary atmosphere. Interdisciplinary relationships indeed exist, but they 
are still insufficient. In the science of human beings, it is clear, for example, that 
the study of intelligence brings up the problem of the relationship between 
thought and language—hence a collaboration between psychology and linguistics; 
and the current work of linguists on transformational grammar and linguistic 
structure in general is very promising for possible comparisons with the operatory 
character of intelligence. But this is an immense field to cover, and collaborations 
are only beginning. Likewise, there exist numerous relationships between data 
from the science of economics and of “conducts,” and game (or decision) theory, 
which was elaborated by economists, constitutes a very enlightening instrument 
for the analysis of “strategies” of behavior. But here, too, collaboration is only 
beginning. (Kamii speaking at APA for Piaget, 1978, p. 651) 
In short, interdisciplinarity is the disciplined institutional solution to not being able to 
“survey, at one glance, all the operations possible of thought” (from the first epigraph). It 
serves psychology, and is served by it. To have its full impact on the discipline, however, 
interdisciplinarity must also be implemented by insiders: psychologists (from the second 
epigraph). 
5. Conclusion 
 This essay was not intended to provide a comprehensive history. Rather, it was an 
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historiographical experiment. And, in that, it seems to have been successful: we now have 
access to new perspectives, as well as new questions worth asking, and we can see how 
their subjects and objects relate to each other. Granted, covering the same territory with 
greater historical rigor would require several indepth studies, some of which have already 
been published and are cited below. But the act of identifying those opportunities is in 
itself quite valuable. 
The perspective provided by adopting Piaget’s late epistemological framework is 
overly condensed, as history, but it is also nonetheless convenient as a tool for collecting 
together a large number of parts coherently in a short space. The result is also then, too, 
to place this kind of epistemological history (and thus the called-for deeper histories too) 
alongside more detailed empirical approaches as a way of reflecting on reported facts 
about the world. As Piaget explained:  
no science can be placed on a single plane, and each one of them involves 
multiple and distinct epistemological levels. All sciences of nature, therefore, 
involve transcendental aspects… that are inherent in research itself and that are in 
constant movement and… impossible to substantiate or put down on paper once 
and for all. In fact, there exists a reflexive [circular, self-reflecting] progress in the 
sciences…. It consists of the constant delineation of new conditions of 
intelligibility, which are transcendental with respect to the content of later 
experience. (Kamii speaking at APA for Piaget, 1978, p. 649) 
Adopting the levels perspective then shows why, for Piaget, epistemology was also 
necessary for psychology: it provides the disciplinary tools for reflecting on what it is that 
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psychology investigates scientifically.  
The frontiers of psychology are therefore mobile first because new facts are 
discovered. But they move more quickly and further when meta-psychological reflection 
raises new questions and shows why and how they are worth pursuing as part of the 
normal conduct of the discipline. Although the discipline remains whole, its boundaries 
then move outward into new territories as a consequence of new thoughts becoming 
possible to think; a result of the “epistemogenesis of reasons” (see Piaget, 2004/2006; 
also Henriques et al., 2004). And it is interdisciplinary investigation—or, more broadly, 
exploratory behavior in general (cf. Piaget, 1976/1979)—that most often provides the 
impetus for this expansion. But we can of course also now say that Piaget’s own 
perspective is the result primarily of focusing on one level’s interactions with another, 
and both of these levels can be placed in their different contexts. This has of course been 
argued-for of his psychology, but not of his epistemological framework as a whole. The 
result is then a much more nuanced view, not only of Piaget’s life but also of his theory.  
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